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Summary.
This thesis describes how the industrial revolution arrived in the North West 
Monmouthshire area in the form of a coke based iron industry in the late eighteenth 
century and how this iron industry grew in the first half of the nineteenth century such 
that the district became one of the major iron producing areas of Britain. Over this 
period there was a transformation of the area from thinly populated farmlands into an 
industrial area consisting of a number of ironworks and associated coal and iron ore 
mines with towns emerging around the iron manufacturing centres.
The catalysts for the developments described above were a group of 
industrialists who came to the area mostly with experience of the iron industry 
elsewhere. The thesis describes how these industrialists and their successors dealt with 
an array of difficulties over the period. These difficulties included poor 
communications, shortages in capital at times and fluctuations in demand for iron 
products. The ironmasters also had to attract and retain their workforces. The thesis 
explains how the ironmasters dealt with changes in technology and how they 
improved productivity such that iron output increased considerably over the period. It 
will be shown that the consequence of the development of a vibrant iron industry in 
the area was that the population of these iron districts grew at a truly dramatic rate.
Two points should be mentioned on the approach taken to the thesis. Firstly an 
attempt has been made to see the events that occurred in the context of the time and 
locality hence there has been considerable concentration on nineteenth century writers 
and especially on local newspapers. Secondly much information is presented in 
tabular form in keeping with the background of the author.
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Chapter 1, Introduction.
1.1 The British Industrial Revolution.
As Pat Hudson reports in The Industrial Revolution, current interpretations of 
the industrial revolution in this country usually are of the view that ‘less happened, 
less dramatically than was once thought’.1 The rates of economic growth in the classic 
period of the industrial revolution, 1760-1830, have recently been reduced by 
historians2 and, as Hudson adds, ‘Perhaps it is more important in defining the 
industrial revolution to stress the sustained nature of the economic growth which the 
period initiated rather than the speed’.3 The point is further amplified by Joel Mokyr 
who believes that the classic period of the industrial revolution should be regarded as 
one of incubation rather than one of rapid growth ‘in which the groundwork to future 
growth was being laid’.4 Throughout the eighteenth century and especially from about 
the middle of the century changes were taking place in many aspects of society, 
industrial, commercial, and social. In addition to major changes within established 
industries such as the cotton and iron production industries new industries of all sorts 
were appearing on the scene. These new industries ranged from the production of day- 
to-day items to new types of industries such as fashion and life assurance. Hence the 
industrial revolution is now seen as much more fundamental than just growth rates, 
technological advances and the factory system.
Despite this wider view of the industrial revolution it cannot be denied that the 
industrial revolution period saw a dramatic growth in major or staple industries such 
as iron and cotton manufacture with the iron industry in the country experiencing
1 Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution, London, 1992, p 1.
2 Joel Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’ in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson, (eds.), 
The Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, 
Cambridge, 2004, p 1.
3 Hudson, The Industrial Revolution, p 2.
4 Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’, p 14.
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growth rates well in excess of the more modest general rates now assumed by 
historians.5 In fact Joel Mokyr believes that the growing role of coal and iron was the 
key characteristic of the industrial revolution,6 the vital technological breakthrough 
being Abraham Darby’s discovery in about 1713 that coal in the form of coke could 
be used instead of charcoal to fuel blast furnaces for the production of pig iron.7 
Although coke was not used generally for this purpose until about 1750s the 
consequences for South Wales were quite dramatic as the South Wales coalfield was 
seen as an attractive proposition for entrepreneurs wishing to enter iron 
manufacturing, the area also having ample supplies of iron stone, limestone and water 
from the numerous rivers of the region, all ingredients essential for a vibrant iron 
producing industry. Consequently coke-fired blast furnaces were erected in South 
Wales after mid century with Merthyr being the main centre for the iron industry.
1.2 The Industrial Revolution and the North West Monmouthshire Area.
In the 1770s the North West Monmouthshire area was relatively deserted 
without even a small village, largely consisting of farms scattered around the hillsides. 
However by the 1830s and 1840s the area was well populated with an array of towns 
emerging around a vibrant iron industry that was responsible for approaching fifteen 
percent of the pig iron output of the whole country in 1830. The general aim of this 
thesis is to explain how this remarkable train of events came about.
The study is centred on an area to the east of Merthyr, where minerals were as 
abundant as in the Merthyr district and with the geography necessary for a coke fired 
iron industry to be developed. The area is a relatively small region of approximately 
ten miles west to east by about three to four miles north to south, stretching from
5 Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’, pp 1-4 and Table 3.1 of this work.
6 Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’, p 18.
7 H. Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, London, 1854, p 56.
8 H. Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, p 84.
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Tredegar and Sirhowy in the west just a short distance from the Glamorgan border, to 
Clydach and Blaenavon to the east with Ebbw Vale, Beaufort and Nantyglo in 
between. The north part of the area is within the old boundary of Breconshire. The 
region, known to locals in the early nineteenth century as ‘The hills’, is located at the 
heads of the Sirhowy, the Ebbw Fawr, the Ebbw Fach, and the Afon Lwyd river 
valleys, includes much of the Clydach river valley and appears to have been ideal for 
the development of coke fired furnaces. Although only twenty miles from the nearest 
port, Newport, the area ranges from about 900 to nearly 1,500 feet above sea level and 
the nearest market town was Abergavenny which is to the east about ten miles from 
Ebbw Vale.
That the area under study was relatively deserted prior to 1780 can be seen 
from the detail of Thomas Kitchin’s Map of Monmouthshire, dated 1748, Map 1.1. 
The only village anywhere near the study area is Blaenau Gwent, incorrectly named 
‘Llanyhangel’ on Kitchin’s map, situated below the site of the Nantyglo ironworks. 
The nearest substantial town, the market town of Abergavenny, can be seen in the 
upper centre of the map.
In this thesis it is argued that the industrial revolution in the North West 
Monmouthshire area as represented by the coke based iron and the associated mineral 
extractive industries based on and around the Sirhowy, Tredegar, Ebbw Vale, 
Beaufort, Nantyglo, Clydach and Blaenavon ironworks arrived late in the context of 
the British industrial revolution timescale and that the eventual emergence for such an 
iron industry in the area depended on the arrival of entrepreneurs from Merthyr and 
other areas of the country.
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Once established these ironworks experienced substantial growth and it is 
further argued that these ironworks were remarkably successful as a group and that 
iron output in the region expanded dramatically through the first half o f the nineteenth 
century. It will be maintained that the success o f these ironworks and the growth 
experienced was due to the skill, nature and access to capital o f the ironmasters and 
their approach to a range o f factors, these factors being technological, economic, 
demographic and social.
Over the decades the ironmasters attracted huge numbers o f unskilled workers 
to the area with the consequence that the population o f the area grew at a truly 
exceptional rate for this period in history almost entirely because o f the needs o f the 
ironworks and the associated mineral industries. This rate o f population growth was 
sustained over the period o f the study and credit must be given to the ironmasters for 
attracting and accommodating such vast numbers o f people. The masters built large
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numbers of houses around their works usually in rows such that gradually an array of 
new towns evolved, the location of the ironworks often dictating the layouts of these 
towns.
1.3 The approach adopted to the thesis.
The role of the industrialists or ironmasters is the key issue in this dissertation 
and throughout attempts are made to understand the approaches adopted by the 
ironmasters to the great variety of issues that faced them establishing the ironworks, 
supervising the growth and, by and large, the success of the works through to the 
middle of the nineteenth century. As such a main aim of the study has been to try to 
understand the issues as they appeared at the time.
Once the ironworks were established the ironmasters sought to expand their 
businesses and to achieve this aim they had to face a variety of economic, 
technological, business and personnel matters. Attempts have been made to isolate the 
main issues in these categories and to analyse how the ironmasters dealt with such 
issues and, where possible, establish how successful they were. In order to try and 
understand how the ironmasters dealt with the issues identified it was found necessary 
to introduce a degree of technical detail in each case. For example to understand how 
the masters faced the wide fluctuations in demand for iron in the first half of the 
nineteenth century it was necessary to understand the underlying economic and 
political factors that affected demand. Similarly when discussing how the ironmasters 
dealt with technological changes it was necessary to look at the technological issues 
themselves in some detail including key issues such as iron ores. The attitude of the 
ironmasters often depended on their particular circumstances and to understand why 
they may have acted differently from ironmasters in other regions, a technical
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knowledge of many of the aspects of ironmaking was found desirable, including 
identification of the differences across the country in mineral resources.
Although the study is centred on a relatively small area geographically 
attempts have been made to put the findings of the research into a wider context, 
locally, regionally or nationally. For example iron output growth rates and population 
growth rates are compared with national rates and those for selected regions. Many 
other similar attempts at putting the findings in context are made. In addition attempts 
have been made to see the progress of the industrial revolution in the area, as 
represented by the coke-fired iron industry, in the context of the British industrial 
revolution as a whole with the general conclusion that the industrial revolution in the 
North West Monmouthshire area occurred slightly later than in certain other districts. 
Again, where possible, themes that are of particular interest to current historians that 
appear relevant to the study are identified and commented upon and where findings 
differ from current historians’ views these differences are discussed. The study area in 
this period in history is probably best known in the context of the Chartists’ march on 
Newport or for the activities of the ‘Scotch Cattle’, groups of men who frightened 
certain local people and caused damage to property in times of industrial strife.9 
However in order to keep the work within the prescribed word count limit, work done 
on these issues had to be omitted and consequently industrial relations matters have 
been excluded from the thesis entirely.
1.4 The sources.
Original sources were essential to this project but because of the approach 
taken contemporary secondary sources were also vital. Unfortunately no 
comprehensive documents relevant to any of the ironworks exist for the whole period
9 Monmouthshire Merlin, 14 June 1834, 18 September 1841, Scotch Cattle, (and many other repeats).
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to 1850 and very few documents survive at all for some of the works of the group. 
However some very useful documents have survived, the most comprehensive being 
for the Ebbw Vale Company in the early part of the period. For this ironworks there 
are four books extant, a memorandum book for 1796 to 1819, a letter book for 1824 to 
1827 and company journals for the years 1791 to 1796 and 1814 to 1815. There are 
also many leases and other legal documents extant. It is possible to get an appreciation 
of how an ironworks was run on a day-to-day basis in the early part of the period 
under study from these Ebbw Vale documents. For the later part of the period there is 
the Blaenavon Minute Book from 1836 which gives an excellent view of the working 
of an early joint stock company within the iron industry. There are also some 
documents extant for other ironworks such as Clydach and Abersychan for selected 
years and there are the published works such as The Dowlais Iron Company Letters 
1782-186010 and The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797.11 The former of 
these works was particularly important as it covered the whole period concerned. 
There are other early documents held at the Gwent Record Office (GRO) the most 
voluminous being leases of land to ironmasters and by ironmasters to other parties. 
Also in existence are a few wills of ironmasters and many miscellaneous documents 
of some relevance, the most useful being the sale documents of various ironworks and 
the collection of documents on Samuel Baldwin Rogers at Newport libraiy.
The other main original source documents used in this project were 
contemporary newspapers, principally the Monmouthshire Merlin which commenced 
publication in 1829 and the Monmouthshire Beacon which dates from October 1837. 
A thorough study of these newspapers was found to be extremely productive for most 
chapters as it contained a multitude of items of relevance to aspects of the study
10 Madeleine Elsas (ed.), Iron in the Making: Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Glamorgan 
County Council, 1960.
11 Chris Evans (Calendared by), The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, Cardiff 1990.
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including items on the iron industry and trade, locally and for the country, items on 
ironmasters and particular ironworks, and much detail on the people of the ‘Hills of 
Monmouthshire’.
Much use was also made of contemporary or near contemporary published 
secondary sources. Of a historical nature the most useful were John Lloyd’s The Early 
History o f the Old South Wales Ironworks (1760-1840) published in 1905,12 William 
Coxe’s An Historical Tour in Monmouthshire published in 1801,13 H. Scrivenor’s 
History o f The Iron Trade published in 185414 and Samuel Smiles’ Industrial 
Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers, published in 1884.15
For more technical information reference was made to contemporary works by 
established writers on metallurgy including John Percy’s Metallurgy: Iron and Steel 
published in 1864,16 William Truran’s The Iron Manufacture o f Great Britain 
published in 185517 and works by David Mushet.18
The area under study is not devoid of good local histories for some of the 
towns. For Tredegar there are Evan Powell’s History o f Tredegar, written in 1884 and 
published in 1902,19 and Oliver Jones’ The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar 
written in 1969.20 There is also an early unpublished history of Tredegar written by 
David Morris in 1862 titled ‘The History of Tredegar From the Beginning of the Iron 
Works up to the present day’.21 Ebbw Vale’s historian, Arthur Gray-Jones wrote his
12 John Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), London, 1906.
13 William Coxe, An Historical Tour in Monmouthshire, London, 1801.
14 H. Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, London, 1854.
15 Samuel Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers, London, 1884.
16 John Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, London, 1864.
17 William Truran, The Iron Manufacture o f Great Britain, London, 1855.
18 David Mushet, Papers on Iron and Steel, Practical and Experimental, London, 1840; Report on 
Victoria Iron Works and Mining Grounds, Bath, 1841.
19 Evan Powell, History o f Tredegar (Subject of a competition at Tredegar Chair Eisteddfod, 25 
February 1884), Newport, 1902.
20 Oliver Jones, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, Tredegar, 1969.
21 David Morris, The History of Tredegar from the Beginning of the Iron Works up to the present day, 
(unpublished), Winning entry in the Eisteddfod of the Cymrodorion of Tredegar in 1862.
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book, A History o f Ebbw Vale in 197022 and the curators of the Ebbw Vale Steelworks 
Archive compiled and edited their excellent study of the iron and steel industry in the 
town titled Ebbw Vale ‘The Works ’ 1790-2002.23 Part 1 of this book ‘Essays on the 
early industrialisation of the valley and urban area of Ebbw Vale’ is based on an 
unpublished M.A. thesis by F. J. Ball, a local historian who produced other published 
and unpublished work on Ebbw Vale. There is also an unpublished history of 
Nantyglo and Blaina written by David James in about 195024 and to obtain an idea of 
the area prior to the advent of the coke fired iron industry there, and consequently the 
industrial revolution, reference can be made to Edmund Jones’ The History o f 
Aberystruth, published in 1779.25
For the demographic work required for chapter 6 extensive examinations were 
made of the enumerators’ returns for the 1851 national census for selected zones 
within the study area. The 1841 census although used was found inappropriate for 
most purposes as places of birth were not supplied, only county of birth.
There are a number of excellent twentieth century secondary sources within 
the general subject area and these were used to obtain a general understanding of the 
iron industiy in Britain and in South Wales in the industrial revolution period. Works 
such as those of Alan Birch, Laurence Ince, Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, 
A. H. John,29 J. R. Harris,30 J. B. Lowe,31 Chris Evans,32 John P. Addis33 and Barrie
22 Arthur Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, Risca, Monmouthshire, 1970.
23 B. Caswell, J. Gaydon and M. Warrender (edited and compiled.), Ebbw Vale ‘The Works ’ 1790-2002, 
Ebbw Vale, 2002.
24 David James, History of Nantyglo and Blaina, Gwent County Library, Approximately 1950 
(unpublished).
25 Edmund Jones, The History o f Aberystruth, 1779, Facsimile edition, J. E. Owen (ed.), 1988.
26 Alan Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784 to 1879, London, 
1967.
27 Laurence Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, Merton, 1993; Neath Abbey and the 
Industrial Revolution, Stroud, 2001.
28 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff 1987.
29 A. H. John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, Cardiff 1950.
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Trinder34 amongst others, were excellent for this purpose and the outstanding work of 
Philip Riden and John. G. Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980,35 was 
essential for the study. Finally, attention was given to themes relevant to the study and 
concerning the industrial revolution period that interest current and recent historians.
30 J. R. Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, Basingstoke and London, 1988.
31 J. B. Lowe, Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875, Cardiff, 1977.
32 Chris Evans, ‘The Labyrinth o f Flames ’ Work and social conflict in early industrial Merthyr, Cardiff, 
1993.
33 John P. Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, Cardiff 1957.
34 Barrie Trinder, The Darbys o f Coalbrookdale, Chichester, 1974; The Industrial Revolution in 
Shropshire, Chichester, 2000.
35 Philip Riden and John G. Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Cardiff, 1995.
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Chapter 2. The Start of the Industrial Revolution in the North West
Monmouthshire Area c.1780-1810.
2.1 Introduction.
The early industrial revolution in Monmouthshire was based on the 
development of coke-fired ironworks and the associated mineral extractive industries. 
The sale coal industry did not truly come into its own until the latter half of the 
nineteenth century. A limited and somewhat scattered charcoal iron industry existed 
in the Monmouthshire area before and in the eighteenth century but as it will be 
shown this did not lead directly to coke based iron manufacture.
It will be argued in this chapter that these industries were developed later than 
might have been expected in view of the facts that domestic demand for iron 
increased dramatically in the eighteenth century and the North West Monmouthshire 
area possessed the geological and geographical requirements for the development of a 
major iron industry following the substantial technological advances that took place in 
the early and middle of the eighteenth century. Hence it is argued, with reasons, that 
the industrial revolution itself was delayed in the region.
It will further be argued that despite all the favourable factors that existed for 
iron making developments to occur in the area, major iron works were not set up until 
the arrival of a group of in-coming entrepreneurs or industrialists. Local Welsh 
businessmen were not involved and the major landlords generally took a more passive 
role. These incomers as a group had many characteristics in common with 
industrialists in general in the early British industrial revolution and it is further 
argued that the approach taken by these industrialists regarding the business and 
physical structure of the ironworks in their early life greatly contributed to the success 
of the businesses.
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2.2 The Proto-Industrial Revolution in the North West Monmouthshire Area.
In the late Middle Ages and up to the seventeenth century in Britain wrought
iron, that is malleable iron, had been produced in a single and laborious process
known as a bloomery, the fuel being charcoal. In some areas of the country such as
Lancashire and Scotland iron was still manufactured by this method in the eighteenth 
1century. Although the blast furnace was introduced into Britain around 1500 AD the 
bloomery method was only gradually replaced by the blast furnace but by the late 
seventeenth century this latter method was generally adopted and hailed the 
production of wrought iron by the two stages indirect process. That is pig iron was 
produced in a blast furnace still fuelled by charcoal followed by a forge stage that 
converted the pig iron into wrought iron.3 There was one key difference between these 
two methods. The bloomery process resulted with individual blooms of wrought iron 
being produced and hence the process was discontinuous. The indirect process 
however meant that the blast furnace was a continuous process4 and output of pig iron 
was much improved. So in Britain in what is usually referred to as the proto-industrial 
revolution period,5 the decades prior to the middle of the eighteenth century, pig iron 
was made from charcoal fired blast furnaces and wrought iron by a discontinuous or 
two stage process.
In fact in England and Wales in 1740 there were only 59 such charcoal fired 
blast furnaces well distributed around the country as shown in Table 2.1.This picture 
contrasts dramatically with the situation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
when there were many more charcoal furnaces in the country. In the table Sussex had
1 J. R. Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, Basingstoke and London, 1988, pp 11-13.
2 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 11.
3 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, pp 12-13.
4 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, pp 13-14.
5 Pat Hudson, ‘Industrial Organisation and Structure’, Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 
2004, pp 29-36.
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only ten charcoal fuelled furnaces in 1740 though this county had the largest number 
of furnaces at that time. However in the previous two centuries there were over one 
hundred charcoal furnaces in the Weald, the majority of which were situated in 
Sussex. There were also over eighty forges in the Weald in these two centuries. This 
indicates the extent of the decline in the charcoal based iron industry in Britain by 
1740 and this must have been at least in part due to deforestation6 though J. R. Harris 
thinks that shortages of water was a more common problem7 in the particular area.
Table 2.1 Iron Furnaces in England and Wales in 1740
No. of Furnaces Tons No. of Furnaces Tons
Brecon 2 600 Monmouthshire 2 900
Glamorganshire 2 400 Nottinghamshire 1 200
Carmarthenshire 1 100 Salop 6 2,100
Cheshire 3 1,700 Staffordshire 2 1,000
Denbighshire 2 550 Sussex 10 1,400
Derbyshire 4 800 Warwickshire 2 700
Gloucestershire 6 2,850 Worcestershire 2 700
Herefordshire 3 1,350 Yorkshire 6 1,400
Hampshire 1 200
Kent 4 400 Total 59 17,350
Source. H. Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, London, 1854, p 57.
As can be seen from the Table 2.1 the largest area of production was 
Gloucestershire with its ironworks in the Forest of Dean. Here, however, like Sussex, 
there was a dramatic fall in importance of this area as at the end of the seventeenth
o
century almost half of Britain’s total iron production was achieved in the Forest. 
From the table also it can be seen that whilst iron was made in South Wales it was on 
a relatively small scale and the production for England and Wales as a whole was well 
below the country’s needs as imports of iron greatly exceeded exports as shown in 
Table 2.2.
6 Henry Cleere and David Crossley, The Iron Industry o f the Weald, Leicester, 1985, pp 306-8.
7 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 24.
8 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 18.
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As Table 2.1 shows both Glamorgan and Monmouthshire had 2 charcoal fired 
furnaces in 1740 and there is evidence that there were other ironworks in the district 
prior to the first coke-fired furnace in the Monmouthshire area in about 1779. The two 
charcoal furnaces in the county included in the table were probably those at Pontypool 
and at Tintem9 both a fair way from the area under study. Richard Hanbury set up an 
ironworks at Pontypool in 1580 and this works continued to be run by the Hanbury 
family as a charcoal fuelled one into the coke era and is believed to be one of the last 
charcoal fuelled works to be operated in South Wales.10 The Tintem works also ran 
from the sixteenth century and the Hanbury family were involved here as well at 
times.11 There were also seven charcoal forges in Monmouthshire including four run 
by the Harford partnership,12 which was later to be involved in both the Nantyglo and 
Ebbw Vale ironworks. The Harford family was a Bristol firm of merchants. A forge, 
in the eighteenth centuiy and after, was the name given to a works or section of a 
works that converted pig iron to wrought iron.
There is evidence of charcoal fuelled ironworks nearer to the area under study. 
It is known that there was a forge at Llanelly in Breconshire quite near to the place 
where the coke fired furnaces were later to be erected at Clydach near the end of the 
eighteenth century. The Hanburys were also associated with this early forge at 
Llanelly.13 There was a forge at Glangrwyney near Crickhowell that was owned by 
Walter Watkins who later had an involvement in the initial development of the coke- 
fired furnaces at Pen-y-Cae that is Ebbw Vale.14 There was also an early charcoal
9 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 July 1844, The Monmouthshire Iron Trade.
10 Laurence Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, Merton, 1993, p ix; Chris Barber, Eastern 
Valley, The Story o f Torfaen, Llanfoist, 1999, pp 25-6.
11 Barber, Eastern Valley, The Story o f Torfaen, p 25.
12 Rev. J. Evans and John Britton, A Topographical and Historical Description o f the County o f 
Monmouth, London, 1807, p 34.
13 Arthur Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, Risca, Monmouthshire, 1970, p 37.
14 Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, p 41.
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fired ironworks in the Sirhowy valley at Pont Gwaith Yr Haem located about three to 
four miles downstream from Tredegar and probably erected in the 1730s.15 In addition 
to these ironworks, late eighteenth century maps of Monmouthshire record ‘Brynore 
iron and coal mines’ close to where the town of Tredegar was later to be developed.16
Hence nationally the charcoal iron industry in Britain was at low ebb 
immediately prior to the onset of the industrial revolution. Locally there was a 
scattered charcoal fuelled iron industry including works near Tredegar and Clydach. 
Although the charcoal ironworks of Britain at this time were small concerns the works 
were generally organised on a capitalist basis with the owners or ironmasters 
employing a small number of men at each works. For example there were only three 
or four men working at Pont Gwaith yr Haem with each worker expected to be an all- 
rounder able to carry out a number of the activities associated with iron manufacture 
at one site with the required minerals being brought to the site.17 This approach is 
unlike the domestic method of the early cotton industries of the North before the 
factory system came into being there. In this case the work was generally done within 
the family at home, unsupervised.18 With the charcoal furnaces run on a capitalist 
basis and with the discovery of the use of coke for fuelling the blast furnaces it might 
be thought that the proto-industry that existed in the Monmouthshire area would have 
led to the industrial revolution proper in mid century but this was delayed until around 
the 1780s.
15 Evan Powell, History o f Tredegar (Subject of a competition at Tredegar Chair Eisteddfod, 25 
February 1884), Newport, 1902, pp 21-2.
16 John Cary, Map of Monmouthshire, Strand, 1787.
17 Oliver Jones, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, Tredegar, 1969, pp 24-5.
18 J. T. Ward, The Factory System, Newton Abbot, 1970, p 38.
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2.3 Requirements for the Development of a Coke Based Iron Industry.
A number of factors were necessary for the industrial revolution to take off in 
a particular area resulting in a major industry. In the context of the iron industry these 
factors were economic, geographical and geological and there also had to be the 
catalysts, the people who initiated the enterprises. Finally there had to be a ready 
workforce. This section identifies these key factors for the iron producing industry 
around the mid eighteenth century in Britain and examines if the North West 
Monmouthshire area had all these factors.
As Pat Hudson has pointed out the existence of a proto-industry in a region did 
not necessarily mean that an industrial revolution proper would develop there.19 
However the existence of a proto-industry must point to the possibility that major 
industrial developments might take place later if only because some of the factors for 
both levels of industry would be common.
The principal economic requirement was the existence of a demand for iron 
products. Demand for iron domestically increased dramatically during the eighteenth 
century as can be seen from Table 2.2, which shows imports of iron increasing over 
the century. Entrepreneurs must have been conscious of the opportunities for 
improving domestic supply. Domestic supply was also favoured considerably in the 
late eighteenth century because of the tariffs imposed on foreign imports by the 
government.20
The catalyst for the onset of the industrial revolution in the iron industry was 
Abraham Darby’s successful use of coal in place of charcoal in the smelting of iron
19 Hudson, ‘Industrial Organisation and Structure’, pp 32-4.
20 Chris Evans, Owen Jackson and Goran Ryden, ‘Baltic iron and the British iron industry in the 
eighteenth century’, Economic History Review, LV, 4 (2002), p 645.
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Table 2.2 Comparison of Iron Imports and Exports -  England and Wales.
IMPORTS
Years Average Tons
1711-1718 15,642
1729-1735 25,501
1750-1755 34,072
1761-1776 48,980
EXPORTS
1711-1718 4,365
1729-1735 5,334
Source. H. Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, London, 1854, pp 58.
ore in about 1713. Darby found that by using coal in the form of coke he could 
produce pig iron but the method was not widely used until around 1750 probably 
because Darby’s early coke pig iron had higher silicon content than charcoal pig 
iron.21 Darby’s innovation was not the only improvement. There were also 
developments in the production of the blast for the furnaces. In the early eighteenth 
century the charcoal furnaces were blown by leather bellows driven by water power 
but later in the century blowing machines came into use such as those of Isaac 
Wilkinson who used cylinders operated by a water wheel and then machines built by 
John Smeaton that had three cylinders and pistons again driven by water wheels.22 
Later still, in the last quarter of the century came the first use of steam engines such as 
those of Bolton and Watt, to drive the blast.23 J. R. Harris states that by 1790 steam 
power was widely employed for production of the blast24 and this had obvious 
advantages over water power, not being dependent on fast flowing rivers and streams 
but of course water was still required for the engine itself. However the use of steam 
power for the blast though obviously desirable was not a key factor for the industrial 
revolution to take off within the iron industry in South Wales. The general use of
21 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, pp 32.
22 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, pp 10-11.
23 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 35.
24 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 35.
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steam engines to generate the blast was delayed considerably in South Wales as will 
be explained later in this chapter.
The extent that coke fired furnaces had replaced charcoal fired ones is 
demonstrated in Table 2.3 based on pig iron production in 1788.
Table 2.3 Pig-iron output in England and Wales from charcoal fired and coke fired furnaces, 1788.
Charcoal Furnaces Coke Fired Furnaces
No. of 
Furnaces
Tons
at
each
Total 
in each 
county
No. of 
Furnaces
Tons
at
each
Total 
in each 
county
Breconshire 2 800 1,600
Carmarthenshire 1 400 400
Cheshire 1 600 600
Cumberland 1 300 300 1 700 700
Derbyshire 1 300 300 7 600 4,200
Glamorganshire 3 600 1,800 6 1,100 6,600
Gloucestershire 4 650 2,600
Lancashire 3 700 2,100
Merioneth 1 400 400
Monmouthshire 3 700 2,100
Shropshire 3 600 1,800 21 1,100 23,100
Staffordshire 6 750 4,500
“ 3 expected 
furnaces
3 800 2,400
Sussex 2 150 300
Westmoreland 1 400 400
Yorkshire 1 600 600 6 750 4,500
Total 24 13,100 53 48,200
Source. Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, pp 86-7.
In 1788 pig iron produced from coke-fired furnaces was between three and four times 
that from charcoal furnaces.
While recognising that the use of coke was the key change for the blast 
furnaces there is debate over the degree to which this was behind the increased 
productivity. The gains in productivity by the use of coke might have been largely due 
to falling coal prices, alternatively it might have been more to do with the 
technological improvements.25 It is certainly true that charcoal prices rose in the 
middle of the eighteenth century whilst coke prices tended to fall thereafter26 but the
25 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 37.
26 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 34.
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use of coke also seemed to allow larger blast furnaces to be built27 that would have 
improved productivity. It would seem both factors worked in the favour of coke 
usage.
For an iron industry to be developed in a British coalfield other minerals 
needed to be available. In addition to a ready supply of ironstone or iron ore, 
limestone was needed for use as a flux in the blast furnaces and other minerals such as 
clay were needed for brick making. The main geographical requirement is for the 
ironworks to be sited near a river or fast running stream. Water was required to 
provide power for the blast in the smelting furnace and for many ancillary reasons. 
The works should also be sited not too distant from a port.
That the North West Monmouthshire area possessed the key mineral and 
geographical requirements for the emergence of large iron producing concerns was 
stressed by Archdeacon Coxe, writer of the famous book An Historical Tour in 
Monmouthshire. Coxe visited the Blaenavon and Nantyglo area in 1801 and stated, 
About forty years ago the iron works suddenly revived, from the 
beneficial discovery of making pig iron with pit coal, instead of 
charcoal, which was soon afterwards followed by the improvement 
of manufacturing even bar iron by means of pit coal: hence a 
district, which contained such extensive mines of iron ore and coal, 
prodigious quantities of limestone, and numerous streams of water, 
could not fail of becoming the seat of many flourishing 
establishments.
The discovery alluded to by Coxe was that by Abraham Darby who had used pit-coal 
in the blast furnace in the early years of the eighteenth century though it was not until
27 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 9.
28 William Coxe, An Historical Tour in Monmouthshire, London, 1801, pp 229-30.
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the second half of the century that pit-coal was in general use in blast furnaces in the
country.29 Coxe also wondered how the mineral treasures of the area had been so long
neglected despite the fact that iron had been made in the area for centuries on a small
scale.30 The slow progress in the county was also commented on in the
Monmouthshire Merlin which observed that for several years after the introduction of
^ |
the use of pit coal (in the form of coke) very little progress was made.
Thus the North West Monmouthshire area had the basic physical requirements, 
an abundance of coal for conversion into coke, ironstone and limestone and the rivers 
and streams needed for waterpower. Coal and ironstone were the important minerals 
compared with limestone and the last mentioned had no effect on the siting of the 
blast furnaces.32 The further ingredient needed for the ironworks was clay that would 
have been used to make bricks some of which would be needed to line the blast 
furnaces. There is evidence of an abundance of clay in the Nantyglo area as there are a 
number of entries in the Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819 indicating that 
clay and bricks were brought from Nantyglo to the works at Ebbw Vale.33 A further 
point in favour of the development of iron working in the area was the nearness to the 
surface of the veins of ore and coal enabling the mining of the minerals to be carried 
out cheaply. As Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber point out between ten and twelve 
tons of coal, ironstone and limestone were needed to produce one ton of pig iron in 
1800 and hence the nearness and accessibility of the raw materials exerted a strong 
pull on the location of the industry and in South Wales seams of both coal and
29 Scrivenor, History o f the Iron Trade, pp 56, 84.
30 Coxe, An Historical Tour in Monmouthshire, pp 228-9.
31 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 July 1844, The Monmouthshire Iron Trade.
32 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987, p 17.
33 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819.
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ironstone outcropped at the surface along the Northern rim of the coalfield.34 
Furthermore, not all the coalfields of the country had large deposits of ironstone, for 
example the North Eastern and Lancashire fields,35 and the carbon content of the coal 
in some of the coalfields was less than that in South Wales coal.
Having the necessary minerals reasonably accessible and adequate supplies of 
water was not enough in itself as the land on which ironworks might be erected had to 
be obtainable. In other words the landowners had to want their lands to be used and 
the minerals on and under these lands exploited. The principal landowners of the area 
were inclined to support these ventures as will be explained in the section 2.5.
The technological improvements in the mid and late eighteenth century iron 
industry point to two other key requirements for a successful entry into this industry. 
The need for large amounts of capital cannot be understated and a full discussion on 
the financing of the iron industry in the North West Monmouthshire area is given in 
Chapter 5. The iron industry in this period although requiring substantial capital was 
still labour intensive and an adequate supply of labour was also a prime requirement. 
The area under study was very thinly populated in the late eighteenth century but as 
will be demonstrated in Chapter 6 a workforce was obtainable from the surrounding 
regions. The vast majority of the workforce for the Monmouthshire works were thus 
immigrant workers and later, descendents of these immigrants. It is likely that 
immigrants having opted to come to the area for work would be more amenable to 
new work processes.
The final and most important factor was the catalyst to the venture that is the 
person or persons responsible for the initiation of the whole enterprise. Such a person 
had to have access to the necessary capital and have the vision to plan the enterprise
34 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, pp 4-5.
35 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 5.
36 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 37.
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taking into account all the problems and difficulties that existed in setting up a new 
industry often in previously unexploited localities. A great deal of discussion has 
taken place as to the necessary requirements of an entrepreneur or industrialist in the 
early industrial revolution whatever the industry being considered. Paul Mantoux 
believed that the distinctive quality of an industrialist was that of an organiser and 
although the industrialist need not have been an inventor he must have been aware of 
technical innovation.37 A most influential work on this subject is The First 
Industrialists written by Francois Crouzet and published in 1985. Crouzet defines an 
industrialist as the head of a large concern in which he has a significant financial 
interest and is actively involved in management. He adds that the meaning of ‘large’ 
will vary according to the area and type of industry.38 In the early industrial revolution 
an ironmaster running an ironworks consisting of one or more blast furnaces and 
employing forty or more men would be regarded as an industrialist.
It is clear then that Crouzet sees the industrialist of the early industrial 
revolution as the key figure in the undertaking and one who is deeply involved in the 
enterprise, almost certainly on a day to day basis and therefore based at the site for 
much of his time. As such the industrialist would carry out a variety of functions and 
not just that of management. For example he would probably be involved in the 
marketing of his products and possibly also in the accounting for the business. In fact 
he would deal directly with a whole variety of aspects of the operation of the 
company’s business either on his own or in association with active partners and he 
would be likely to at least share in the responsibility for negotiating contracts for the 
sales of products, for the purchase of supplies, equipment and raw materials and for 
work done by skilled and unskilled workers. The above discussion is intended to
37 Francois Crouzet, The First Industrialists, Cambridge, 1985, p 10.
38 Crouzet, The First Industrialists, p 1.
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illustrate how vital the industrialists or entrepreneurs were for the onset of the 
industrial revolution in general and for the start of the developments in the South 
Wales coke fired iron industry in particular.
Of all the industrialists of the early British industrial revolution the ironmasters 
were the first group to emerge prior to the last third of the eighteenth century.39 
Possibly the most notable were the Darbys of Coalbrookdale in Shropshire, a true 
dynasty founded in the seventeenth century.40 Nearer to the study area is Merthyr and 
it was here that the Crawshay dynasty was established. Richard Crawshay, the first of 
the dynasty, hailed originally from Yorkshire, the son of a farmer41 he made his way 
initially in London at a firm of iron merchants run by Robert Moser. Crawshay was a 
partner by 1772.42 Later he moved to Merthyr and at Cyfarthfa he was a pioneer of the 
use of Henry Cort’s puddling and rolling process. He is credited with the improvement 
of the process in practice by making modifications to the puddling furnace.43 Possibly 
the other best known ironmaster dynasty in South Wales was that of the Guests of 
Dowlais. John Guest came to Merthyr in 1763 after experience of ironmaking in 
Shropshire. In Merthyr he spent a few years developing and working with Isaac 
Wilkinson (1695-1784) at the Plymouth works in Merthyr before he became involved 
at Dowlais, becoming a partner in 1782 after spending some time as manager.44
Of course the iron industry was just one of the industries of the early British 
industrial revolution and there were key entrepreneurs or industrialists at the heart of 
these other industries as well. One example is Sir Richard Arkwright who is at least
39 Crouzet, The First Industrialists, p 26.
40 Barrie Trinder, The Darbys o f  Coalbrookdale, Chichester, 1974, p 21.
41 Chris Evans (Calendared by), The Letterbook o f  Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, Cardiff 1990, p ix.
42 GRO. D.43. M250 (4801). 5 June 1772, Articles of Partnership Crawshay & Moser.
43 Evans, Letter book o f  Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, pp xiii-xv.
44 Chris Evans, ‘The Labyrinth o f Flames ’ Work and social conflict in early industrial Merthyr, Cardiff, 
1993, pp 15-16,61-2.
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partly credited with the development of the Midlands cotton industry.45 Crouzet points 
out however that these industrialists were not a homogeneous group as cotton masters 
and ironmasters were themselves quite different from each other and both groups 
tended to lead much larger integrated units compared with the other industries.46 
Crouzet went further with his analyses of the industrialists of the industrial revolution 
and produced tables illustrating the background occupation of these industrialists. He 
found that over 40 percent of these industrialists had had backgrounds already in 
industry and nearly 20 percent had been merchants of one kind or another. Few were 
from the upper, professional or working classes or from the land.47
Entrepreneurs did not appear in the North West Monmouthshire area until the 
last two decades of the eighteenth century despite all the favourable factors for a coke 
fired iron industry to be developed there. Their arrival formed a ‘second wave’ of 
industrialisation in the region, the first being that in the Merthyr area commencing in 
the late 1750s and the following two decades. It is not surprising therefore that some 
of the incoming industrialists to the study area had gained experience of the iron 
industry as proprietors or senior employees of enterprises in Merthyr48 though the 
earliest industrialists to the area mostly came from the Midlands, London and 
Bristol.49
These incoming entrepreneurs who were responsible for the initial and early 
development of the iron works of the North West Monmouthshire area display a 
similar profile to that established for industrialists nationally by Crouzet but with an 
even greater stress on industry, in their case the metal industry.
45 Ward, The Factory System, p 50.
46 Crouzet, The First Industrialists, p 36.
47 Crouzet, The First Industrialists, pp 147-50.
48 Evans, The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, pp 179-96.
49 Jones, The Early Days o f  Sirhowy and Tredegar, pp 29-30; GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of 
Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 Oct 1779; GRO. D.7.15. Lease, Earl of Abergavenny and Hill, 
Hopkins and Platt, 30 Nov 1789.
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Crouzet in his analyses of the occupations of founders of businesses in the 
industrial revolution found that 41.8 percent nationally had had industrial occupations 
and 19.6 percent had been merchants and traders, no other occupation group being 
prominent. Crouzet’s sample was relatively large, analysing the occupations of 316 
founders of large concerns in Britain in the period 1750 to 1850. A similar analysis 
has been carried out in this thesis for the founders and industrialists of the North West 
Monmouthshire area in the early industrial revolution period and although the sample 
sizes are small a clear pattern emerges. 75 percent of the founders of ironworks 
businesses in the area had industrial backgrounds almost entirely within the iron 
industry while as many as 80 percent of industrialists (including founders) had such 
industrial backgrounds. These percentages are much higher than the national average 
and point to a particular situation in that the Monmouthshire industrial developments 
were a second wave in the region. The results of Crouzet’s analyses and those of the 
Monmouthshire founders and industrialists are shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 A comparison of the occupations of founders and industrialists of ironworks of the North 
West Monmouthshire area with founders for the country as published bv Francois Crouzet for 1750-
1850.
National 
Total %
National
Metal
Concerns
%
N.W.
Mon
Founders
N.W.Mon
Founders
%
N.W.Mon
Industrialists
N.W.Mon.
All
Industrialists
%
Upper class 2.5 2.7
Professional 2.5 3.6 1 8.3 1 6.7
Merchants 
and traders
19.6 12.6 2 16.7 2 13.3
Industry 41.8 43.2 9 75.0 12 80.0
The land 4.1 8.1
Working class 9.8 17.1
Miscellaneous 3.8 4.5
Total 100.0 100.0 12 100.0 15 100.0
Source of Crouzet’s data. Crouzet, The First Industrialists, pp 147-150.
Sources for Monmouthshire Industrialists: Evans, The Letterbook o f  Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, pp 
179-96; Jones, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, pp 29-30;
GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 Oct 1779; GRO. D.7.15. Lease, 
Earl of Abergavenny and Hill, Hopkins and Platt, 30 Nov 1789; John Lloyd, The Early History o f the 
Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), London, 1906, pp 140-92.
25
2.4 The Coming of the Industrialists to the North West Monmouthshire Area.
1778-1811.
J. R. Harris has commented on the lack of local enterprise in South Wales in 
the early industrial revolution50 and this was certainly true in the North West 
Monmouthshire area. Despite ironworks being developed in the Merthyr area just a 
few miles to the west there was little development if any in the study area in the 1760s 
and for most of the 1770s. Generally it seems that the owners of the scattered charcoal 
fired furnaces in Monmouthshire did not wish or were not able to take advantage of 
the new opportunities given to the area by the coke fired furnace process, the 
abundance of minerals and ready water supplies. The one exception was the Harford 
partnership which had a number of charcoal forges in South Wales51 and was later to 
be involved in both the Nantyglo and Ebbw Vale ironworks. The reason most of the 
owners of local charcoal furnaces failed to progress to coke fired works was probably 
a lack of capital. A. H. John has stressed this lack of local sources of capital in South 
Wales as a whole52 and this seems to have opened the door to others who had access 
to capital.
The nineteenth century local historian, Evan Powell, writing in 1884, stated 
that a gentleman named Mr. Kettle, from Shropshire, erected a furnace at Sirhowy. 
Powell believed that this furnace was initially fired by charcoal but later by coal. The 
ironworks eventually failed and then the land was leased to a group of businessmen.53 
Oliver Jones, in The Early Days o f Sirhowy & Tredegar disputes Powell’s assertion 
that Kettle built a furnace in the 1750s and believes that Sirhowy ironworks started
50 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 72.
51 Evans and Britton, A Topographical and Historical Description o f  the County o f  Monmouth, p 34; 
Chris Evans, ‘Global Commerce and Industrial Organisation in an Eighteenth Century Enterprise: The 
Melingriffith Company’, Welsh Historical Review No. 20, (2000-1), pp 416-19.
52 A. H. John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, Cardiff 1950, p 23.
53 Powell, History o f  Tredegar, pp 22-3.
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with the 1778 lease of landowner Charles Henry Burgh.54 In fact a certain John Kettle 
was a Birmingham industrialist in the 1730s, known principally for steel 
manufacturing55 and there could be a connection between this man or a relative of his 
and Sirhowy but the likelihood is that even if an ironworks existed there in the 1760s 
it was not coke fired.
Hence industrialists began to set up a coke fired iron industry in the area in the 
last few years of the 1770s and within just over twenty years all seven of the 
ironworks forming the main focus of this study were set up or at least initiated. 
However there were variations in the patterns of the development of these ironworks.
The first wave of ironworks development came in 1778 and 1779 with the 
establishment of the Sirhowy and Beaufort works at the heads of the Sirhowy and 
Ebbw Fawr rivers respectively. The initial entrepreneurs of Sirhowy ironworks were 
businessmen, three from London involved in the tea and grocery trade and one from 
York, a merchant.56 They must have recognised the potential of the area and it is 
possible that Thomas Atkinson, the York merchant, may have been the leading figure 
as it is believed that he was at one time in the iron trade at Ulverton in Lancashire.57 
However Tredegar’s historian, Oliver Jones, believed that Atkinson had spent many 
years in South Carolina and so he may have made capital from the slave trade. 
Changes in the partnership at Sirhowy came in 1794 when all but William Barrow of 
the original partners left and two new men joined. Matthew Monkhouse, a nephew of 
Atkinson and a cleric, and Richard Fothergill, who was a master builder from 
Clapham, London, became partners and the main ironmasters, Barrow leaving a few
54 Jones, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, p 29.
55 Evans, Jackson and Ryden, ‘Baltic iron and the British iron industry in the eighteenth century’, p 
653.
56 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840% p 145.
57 Gray-Jones, A History o f  Ebbw Vale, pp 38,40.
58 Jones, The Early Days o f  Sirhowy and Tredegar, p 30.
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years later.59 Beaufort ironworks was established by the Kendalls, a family of 
businessmen, individually based in Cheshire, Lancashire or Shropshire according to 
the lease they took out with the Duke of Beaufort.60 John Lloyd stated that one of the 
Kendalls, Edward, was especially able and was the managing partner61 and Ebbw Vale 
historian, Arthur Gray-Jones, believed that the Kendalls had owned ironworks in 
Derbyshire, Scotland and one near Machynlleth.62 In fact the Kendall family had 
interests in the iron industry as early as 1714 when an Edward Kendall was one of the 
principals in the Kemberton furnace in Shropshire.
As neither the original Sirhowy partners nor the Kendalls apparently had any 
previous association with this particular region of South Wales it is impossible to say 
what actually prompted them to set up business in the area. It is possible that there 
was a link between the two groups as Gray-Jones thought that the Kendalls had a 
connection with the works at Ulverton in which Atkinson, of the Sirhowy works, had 
been greatly involved.64 If this was the case it could explain why these two ironworks 
were initiated so near and at almost the same time. It would seem that there might 
have been contact between Atkinson and the Kendalls on the move to the area.
The pattern of incoming businessmen from England who recognised the 
opportunities in the area continued at Blaenavon as three businessmen from the West 
Midlands established an ironworks there in 1789. Thomas Hill was from Stourbridge 
in Worcestershire, Thomas Hopkins was from Rugeley in Staffordshire and Benjamin 
Platt from Great Witley also in Worcestershire. It is believed all three were involved
59 Jones, The Early Days o f  Sirhowy and Tredegar, p 33.
60 GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, land plus power to erect ironworks 
etc. 16 Oct 1779.
61 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 178.
62 Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, p 38.
63 Barrie Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, Chichester, 2000, p 25.
64 Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, pp 37-8.
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in the iron trade and Hill’s family had been connected with the trade for some time.65 
John Lloyd believed that Thomas Hill was a man of wealth ‘as he was spoken of in 
that regard by the firm of Harvey (Harford), Partridge and Company’ and he 
considered Thomas Hopkins ‘a man of means’.66 In fact Hill had one of the largest 
shareholdings in the Monmouthshire Canal enterprise67 which adds weight to Lloyd’s 
assertion of his wealth. The Hill family and to some extent the Hopkins family 
continued to be involved at Blaenavon for many years.
The establishment of the remaining four works was somewhat different from 
that at Sirhowy, Beaufort and Blaenavon in that the industrialists who came to 
Clydach, Nantyglo, Tredegar and Ebbw Vale all had experience at ironworks nearby. 
The entrepreneurs who set up the Clydach ironworks, situated in the gorge very close 
to the river Clydach, in the mid 1790s were Edward Frere and Thomas Cooke both of 
whom had worked under Richard Crawshay at Cyfarthfa in Merthyr.68
Nantyglo ironworks, not initially a success, was set up in 1792 by a 
partnership of the Blaenavon entrepreneurs who held the lease of the land on which 
the Nantyglo works was to be erected and the firm of Bristol merchants, Harford, 
Partridge and Co 69 The Harford family had long been involved in the iron trade and 
their works included Melingriffith in Glamorgan.70 They were a rare example of 
ironmasters in the region who made the successful transition from charcoal fired 
ironworks to larger scale coke ones.71 A dispute arose between the two sets of
65 Sir Joseph Bradney, A History o f  Monmouthshire, Volume 1 Part 2b, The Hundred o f  Abergavenny 
(Part 2), London, 1992, pp 399-400 (originally published in 1907).
66 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 161.
67 ‘A List of the Proprietors and Committee of the Monmouthshire Canal Navigation’, Reginald 
Nichols (ed.) Monmouthshire Medley, Volume 3, Pontypool, 1978, pp 37-43.
68 Evans, The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1791, p 124.
69 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 166-7.
70 Evans, ‘Global Commerce and Industrial Organisation in an Eighteenth Century Welsh Enterprise: 
The Melingriffith Company’, pp 419 on.
71 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 27.
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79partners at Nantyglo and the works stopped after only one year of iron production. It 
was not until 1811 that the future of Nantyglo ironworks was secure when Joseph 
Bailey and Matthew Wayne appeared on the scene. Joseph Bailey was the nephew of 
Richard Crawshay of Cyfarthfa ironworks and he had left Yorkshire for Merthyr on 
hearing of the success of his uncle at Cyfarthfa. Joseph worked his way up at 
Cyfarthfa showing great steadfastness and perseverance. However when the old 
ironmaster died Bailey realised that William Crawshay, the grandson of Richard, 
would restrict his scope at the Cyfarthfa works and so he looked to pastures new. 
Joseph had been a beneficiary in Richard Crawshay’s will and thus he was able to buy 
his way into the Nantyglo concern. Matthew Wayne, although lacking the enterprise 
of Bailey was regarded as a fine man and had been furnace manager under Richard
T'XCrawshay.
The active Tredegar partners Richard Fothergill, Matthew Monkhouse and 
Samuel Homfray, were also partners at other nearby ironworks. Fothergill and 
Monkhouse were partners at the Sirhowy ironworks in 1800 though they had not been 
original partners at that works, while Samuel Homfray was from Penydarren 
ironworks in Merthyr. It was Homfray, who, as son-in-law of the major landowner of 
the site, Sir Charles Morgan, was able to get a favourable lease.74 The fourth and fifth 
partners at Tredegar were London merchants, William Thompson and William 
Forman. The Tredegar partnership was thus one of the strongest in the region 
financially, backed by Homfray who made his money at Penydarren and the two
72 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 166-7.
73 Charles Wilkins, The History o f the Iron, Steel, Tinplate and Other Trades o f  Wales, Merthyr Tydfil, 
1903, pp 73-6.
74 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 140-2; David Morris, 
The History of Tredegar from the Beginning of the Iron Works up to the present day, winning entry in 
the Eisteddfod of the Cymrodorion of Tredegar in 1862, p 1.
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wealthy London businessmen, Thompson and Forman.75 These three men and certain
•  76of their descendents were to have long associations with the Tredegar works.
The establishment of the Ebbw Vale ironworks, just a relatively short distance 
down the Ebbw Fawr River from Beaufort, differed from that of all the above works 
in that there was the involvement of a Welsh iron producer. Walter Watkins of Dan y 
Graig, Breconshire, had a forge at Llangrwyney (now Glangrwyney) near Crickhowell 
and, assisted by Charles Cracroft, a capitalist, Watkins established a furnace at Ebbw 
Vale in 1786.77 Gray-Jones gives as the reason for Watkins’ decision to start making 
pig iron at Ebbw Vale the fact that the Beaufort ironworks had built a forge and hence 
used their own pig iron for this forge. Previously Beaufort had supplied Watkins’ 
forge at Llangrwyney with pig iron.78 Watkins soon sought a partner with experience 
of coke blast furnaces and a partnership was set up on 3 April 1789 between Jeremiah 
Homfray, one of the Homfray brothers of Penydarren ironworks in Merthyr, and 
Watkins and Cracroft as ironmasters.79 This partnership was short lived and in 1791 
Homfray became the owner of Ebbw Vale ironworks supplying pig iron to Watkins at 
Llangrwyney and a few months later Homfray was joined in partnership by Harford, 
Partridge and Company, Homfray having a one third share and the Harford, Partridge 
Company having two thirds. The capital was to be £7,000 and Homfray was to reside 
on site and be the superintendent of the works. This arrangement lasted until 1796 
when Homfray assigned all his interests to Harford and Co. for £500 paid in £100 
instalments.80
75 Powell, History o f Tredegar, p 38.
76 Philip Riden and John G. Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Cardiff 1995, p 28.
77 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 151.
78 Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, p 41.
79 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 151.
80 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 152.
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Hence it is clear from the above brief account o f the establishment o f the 
ironworks o f the North West Monmouthshire area that the role o f the incoming 
industrialists was vital. It is significant that the vast majority o f these industrialists had 
had experience o f ironmaking elsewhere before embarking on the Monmouthshire 
enterprises and this might be a reflection on the perceived difficulties and 
complications that applied for the construction and operation o f larger scale ironworks 
in the region. For example the ironworks were relatively isolated, situated at the heads 
o f the valleys close to the moors o f Llangynidr and Llangattock. Communication was 
a major problem and there were no turnpike roads in the area. The ironmasters had to 
construct roads or railroads from the quarries and mines to the ironworks. There were 
no villages nearby and so the ironmasters had to build houses for the incoming 
workers. These difficulties and many others such as want o f capital would have put 
off less determined men.
Map 2.1 Detail o f ‘A New Map o f the County o f Monmouth’ by C. Smith. 6 January 1804.
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The location of the ironworks at the heads of river valleys is clearly shown in 
Map 2.1, a detail of the 1804 map of the Monmouthshire by C. Smith. The map was 
first issued in 1801 and this probably explains the absence of the Tredegar ironworks 
which was being constructed at that time. The Clydach ironworks is not shown but 
was located on the Clydach River that flows west to east below the village of Llanelly 
in the upper right of the map.
2.5 The Role of the Landlords.
The key role in the development of coke-fired ironworks in the North West 
Monmouthshire area was that of the incoming industrialists but the role of the major 
landlords in these developments is less clear. There were three major landlords in the 
area, the Duke of Beaufort, the Earl of Abergavenny and the Morgans of Tredegar 
Park near Newport. There were other landlords or freeholders involved, particularly in 
connection with the Sirhowy and Ebbw Vale works, but these had relatively small 
holdings and did not rival the huge lands owned by the three mentioned above.
Much of the land in the east of the North West Monmouthshire area was 
owned by the Earl of Abergavenny and it was on this land that the Blaenavon and the
Ol ^
Nantyglo ironworks were erected. Most of the land m the north part of the area, in 
the old county of Breconshire, was the property of the Duke of Beaufort and it was on 
this land that the Beaufort and the Clydach ironworks were built82 while much of the 
land in the west on which the Tredegar works was erected was owned by the Morgans 
of Tredegar Park.
From a study of the early leases between these landlords and the industrialists 
there seems little doubt that the landowners were keen to have their lands exploited for
81 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 161.
82 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 178-80.
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the minerals on and under them and they were happy for ironworks and associated 
constructions to be built as required. Some leases even allowed for rivers to be 
diverted83 and they usually gave the ironmasters the power to sublease parts of the 
land leased to them, to farmers and others at rents higher than they themselves paid 
thus granting the ironmasters built in profits.84 Further, these early leases often failed 
to include the payment of royalties on the amounts of minerals used or the amounts of 
iron produced.85 Full details of the leases are given in Table 5.1 in Chapter 5.
It seems therefore that the major landlords were most keen to assist the 
industrialists in all ways including the granting of favourable lease terms though they 
also took a wide view of their responsibilities under these leases. They sought to 
protect their other tenants, local people and the environment in general as evidenced 
by various clauses in the leases. For example they often put controls on the price that 
the ironmasters could charge tenants and other local inhabitants for coal86 and some of 
the leases insisted on new trees being planted when existing trees had to be felled.87
Considering the national picture for ironworks developments Alan Birch says 
that it is impossible to establish whether it was the entrepreneurs or the landowners 
who were principally responsible for the industrial activity.88 In the North West 
Monmouthshire area it is clear that the landowners were keen to have their minerals 
exploited and ironworks built on their lands but it is difficult to know if they ever took 
the initiative with these developments. What is certain is that no major landowner ever 
became a partner in any of the early coke fired ironworks of the North West 
Monmouthshire area. Nevertheless some of the landlords insisted via the leases that
83 GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 Oct 1779.
84 GRO. D.397.1669. Leases, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 28 Dec 1801.
85 GRO. D.7.15. Lease, Earl of Abergavenny and Hill, Hopkins and Platt, 30 Nov 1789.
86 GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 Oct 1779.
87 GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 Oct 1779.
88 Alan Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784 to 1879, London, 
1967, p 179.
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certain sums had to be expended by the industrialists. In the original lease for the 
Beaufort ironworks in 1779 the Duke of Beaufort insisted that the sum of one 
thousand pounds had to be spent on a good iron furnace within eighteen months of the 
date of the lease89 and Sir Charles Gould Morgan went much farther in the agreement 
for the Tredegar ironworks developments by stating that at least £40,000 had to be 
spent on the works on or before 29 September 1809.90 Morgan also insisted that use 
had to be made of his wharf at Newport for the transportation of iron91 and so he had 
additional reasons to hope that the venture would succeed.
Thus there may just be hints that both the Duke and Sir Charles might have 
taken the initiative but on the evidence available it still seems unlikely that the major 
landowners took the initiative with the ironworks developments. They did not become 
partners in the ironworks ventures and they might have been deterred by the huge 
costs involved and the complications associated with such ventures. The favourable 
lease terms they offered the ironmasters also suggests that in these early years the 
landowners did not fully appreciate the value of the minerals on and under their lands. 
Had they done so they might have been more likely to invest directly in the ironworks 
partnerships as they did invest in other industrial enterprises in the region such as the 
Monmouthshire Canal. Sir Charles Morgan played a leading role in the planning of 
the canal and invested in it.92 In this Sir Charles was typical of the major landowners 
of Britain in the industrial revolution period as they are believed to have been 
sensitive to investment opportunities such as the canals and turnpike roads. In fact
Q'y
British landowners are thought to have been entrepreneurially minded.
89 GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 Oct 1779.
90 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 141.
91 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 140.
92 John Elliott, The Industrial Development o f the Ebbw Valleys, 1780-1914, Cardiff 2004, p 131.
93 Eric J. Evans, The Forging o f the Modem State: Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870, Harlow, Essex, 
2001, pp 135-6.
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The conclusion therefore must be that while the role of the major landowners 
in the developments of the ironworks of the North West Monmouthshire area was 
certainly important, even enabling, it was not the key role which was that of the 
industrialists. The landlords wanted the ironworks to succeed but they were cautious 
with regard to these developments. They did not possess the experience of setting up 
ironworks in new areas and they were content to give the industrialists the facilities 
and the freedoms to make their enterprises successful.
2.6 The Business Development of the Ironworks in the Years to 1810.
The approach the industrialists took with regard to the physical and business 
structure of the ironworks in the early years is examined in this section and it is 
claimed that the structure adopted greatly contributed to the success of the works in 
their early life with the one exception of the Nantyglo works. This works failed after 
just one year in operation but this failure was due to a dispute between the partners 
and not due to the structure of the business. Although all the ironworks in the group 
were set up within twenty years there is a surprising variation in the way they 
developed in this early period and with the pace of the developments.
The capital structure of the early ironworks was the partnership usually 
consisting of between two and five partners. This contrasted starkly with other major 
business developments in the area such as the Monmouthshire Canal which had a 
large number of shareholders including local landowners and ironmasters,94 
developments such as canals were probably seen as less risky and less complicated 
than the more localised ironworks. The iron works partnerships usually centred on one 
or two principal masters such as Edward Kendall at Beaufort, Joseph and Crawshay 
Bailey at Nantyglo, the Hills and Hopkins of Blaenavon and the Harfords at Ebbw
94 ‘A List of the Proprietors and Committee of the Monmouthshire Canal Navigation’, pp 37-43.
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Vale and it is this concentration of control and enterprise that was the key to the early 
success of the ironworks. John Addis stated that the early ironmasters had an attitude 
of self-sacrifice and frugality that enabled them to face difficult times and situations 
courageously95 and this must have been the case with the early ironmasters of the area 
such as Edward Kendall, Thomas Hill, Thomas Atkinson and the Harfords.
With regard to the physical structure of the early ironworks the key issue for 
the ironmasters was the siting of the blast furnaces. Invariably blast furnaces in this 
period were sited close to rivers or streams in order to utilise waterpower to generate 
the blast. The geographic layout of the area, a succession of relatively narrow valleys, 
meant that the furnaces could be built into banks near the rivers and this made the 
charging of the furnaces with ore, coke and limestone relatively straightforward. The 
siting of blast furnaces into banks was not a feature limited to coke furnaces however 
as the technique was started in the earlier charcoal phase of iron smelting.96
The use of steam power is often associated with the early industrial revolution 
within the iron and other industries but there is evidence that its use generally in blast 
furnaces was delayed in the North West Monmouthshire area. However a Boulton and 
Watt steam engine was installed to power the blast of the second furnace at Sirhowy 
in the late 1790s97 and a Boulton and Watt blowing engine was in use at Blaenavon 
from the end of the eighteenth century.98 The blast for the initial furnace at Beaufort 
was driven by a great bellows powered by a water wheel"and waterpower was still 
being used at Clydach well into the nineteenth century. A watercolour by Thomas
95 John P. Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, Cardiff, 1957, p 155.
96 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 14.
97 G. N. von Tunzelman, Steam Power and British Industrialisation to 1860, Oxford, 1978, pp 56,93-4; 
Geoffrey Hill and Gordon Green, Industrial Locomotives o f Gwent, London, 1999, p 85.
98 Jeremy Knight, ‘The Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company 1836-1864, A Victorian Joint-Stock 
Venture’, Bulletin o f the Board o f  Celtic Studies 1980, Volume 28, Part 4, (May 1980), p 640.
99 Gray-Jones, A History o f  Ebbw Vale, p 39.
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Barker dated 1808 shows the blast driven by water power100 and although there was a 
Trevethick engine at Clydach in 1825101 the sale document produced when the 
business was put up for sale in 1833 stated that the blast for the blast furnaces was 
supplied by a Bolton and Watt engine nearly new and by a blowing machine worked 
by a water wheel.102 Hence Clydach seems to have been late in adopting a steam 
engine for powering the blast and even then was still supplementing this with 
waterpower. However for the other works in the group the timing of the introduction 
of steam engines to power the blast is difficult to assess. Certainly a steam engine had 
been erected at Nantyglo prior to its sale to Joseph Bailey and Matthew Wayne in 
1811 as the works was described then as consisting of two furnaces, one steam engine,
i mworkmen’s houses, buildings etc. plus mines, veins, quarries etc. for minerals and 
the steam engine was to power the blast as there was no forge at Nantyglo at that time. 
Even at Tredegar the situation is not clear despite the involvement there of Samuel 
Homfray of Penydarren who had a particular interest in steam engines. Tredegar’s 
historian, Evan Powell, believed that a steam engine was acquired for the blast around 
1802 from the Neath Abbey works and had to be conveyed via sea to Newport and 
then to Abergavenny, presumably by canal, and finally on to Tredegar across the hills. 
However Powell adds that this engine was known as number 2 and he deduced that 
the number 1 engine, presumably also acquired for the blast, was one developed by 
Richard Trevithick, the engineer at Penydarren.104 Powell was writing in 1884 and it is 
clear from parts of his work that he was relying sometimes on local oral sources.
100 Thomas Barker, Clydach Ironworks, A water colour painting, 1808, in John Van Laun, The Clydach 
Gorge, Abergavenny, 1979, p 8.
101 NLW. Maybeiy MSS 3431/3432, 18 June 1825.
102 GRO. D.591.19.384. Particulars of freehold and leasehold estate comprising the Clydach Iron 
Works, South Wales, 17 July 1833.
103 GRO. D.7.12. Lease, Thomas Hill, Samuel Hopkins and Joseph Bailey, Matthew Wayne, 25 March 
1811.
104 Powell, History o f Tredegar, pp 25-7.
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Nevertheless Trevithick was working for the Homffays at Penydarren developing 
engines so it is quite possible that Samuel Homfray acquired a Trevithick engine as 
early as 1802. The issue at Tredegar is further complicated by the fact that the list of 
stationary steam engines produced by the Neath Abbey Iron Company, given in 
Appendix two of Neath Abbey and the Industrial Revolution by Laurence Ince, does 
not include any before 1806 and none at all for Tredegar in the early part of the 
nineteenth century.105
From this discussion it can be said that the commencement of coke fired 
furnaces in the North West Monmouthshire area was not dependent on the use of 
steam engines to power the blast and water power was the main force for this purpose. 
Steam engines were used for the blast at some early furnaces but it is likely that other 
steam engines recorded in the period might have been used elsewhere at the ironworks 
site such as at the forge, driving the rolling mill. The late introduction of steam power 
for the blast in general does not in any way suggest that the industrialists of the area 
were not innovative. Steam engines must have been expensive and there was the 
further complication of transporting them from their place of manufacture to the hills 
of the area, quite a difficult task. The ironmasters were certainly justified in making 
the maximum use of the fast flowing rivers next to their furnaces in this early period.
The ironworks of the area had all been established by the first years of the 
nineteenth century but they did not develop at similar rates thereafter. The increases in 
iron output year by year can be seen as an indicator of the pace of development. Harry 
Scrivenor in his History o f The Iron Trade written in 1854 gives tables of iron carried 
on the Monmouthshire canal. Scrivenor had been a manager at the Blaenavon 
Ironworks in the early 1840s after it had become a joint stock company but it appears
105 Laurence Ince, Neath Abbey and the Industrial Revolution, Stroud, 2001, Appendix Two.
39
he did not stay very long106 and went on to write about the iron industry. Scrivenor’s 
figures are not actual output totals but they do give a good idea of the production at 
the respective ironworks. Below is an extract from one of his tables.
Table 2.5. Iron carried on the Monmouthshire Canal in the early 19th century, (tons').
Year Blaenavon Beaufort Clydach Ebbw Vale Tredegar Nantyglo
1804 8,490 2,950 1,266 2,890 - -
1806 6,594 3,989 1,599 3,252 3,124 -
1808 7,163 4,004 963 1,553 5,529 -
1810 12,254 3,948 1,372 2,758 7,696 -
1812 14,579 3,995 1,774 4,648 7,862 1,168
Source. H. Scrivenor, History o f The Iron Trade, London, 1854, pp 127.
From the table it can readily be seen that whilst all the works apart from 
Nantyglo grew in the early years of the nineteenth century some grew much quicker 
than others. Blaenavon and Tredegar grew quickly whilst Clydach in particular grew 
slowly. As can be seen, the Nantyglo works was not operating right up to 1810. The 
use of iron carried down the canal is somewhat misleading in this early period because 
it masks output of pig iron sent to other works in the area. As will be shown below 
some of the works sent much of their pig iron to other local works especially 
Cyfarthfa and so such output would not be expected to be included in Scrivenor’s 
figures. As the century progressed this practice diminished and Scrivenor’s figures 
become a better guide. Scrivenor seems to have included Sirhowy in his ‘Sundry 
persons’ column as he has not shown them separately.
The different pace of development of the ironworks in the group must have 
been at least in part related to the amount of capital available in these early years. 
Blaenavon was undoubted aided by the generous lease terms they had and the vast 
extent of the minerals resources on and under the lands they leased. The Tredegar
106 GRO. D.751.356. The Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book.
40
works had a group of partners that included Samuel Homfray of the Penydarren works 
at Merthyr and Ebbw Vale had the resources of Harford and partners, the successful 
Bristol merchants who had other iron forges and tinplate interests in South Wales. 
Clydach however had no such financial resources as indicated by the fact that Frere 
and Cooke, the ironmasters there, had to borrow £10,000 from their former boss,
107Richard Crawshay of Cyfarthfa, to build a mill in 1805. This point is probably also 
relevant for Nantyglo that had failed in the mid 1790s once Harford and Co. left. The 
works did not really start up properly until 1811 when Joseph Bailey and Matthew 
Wayne from Cyfarthfa bought the works.
Although the pace of development of the group in terms of output was diverse 
the progress of the works towards total integration was generally slow. An ironworks 
could be regarded as fully integrated if the enterprise extended from extraction of 
minerals, through to the production of pig iron via blast furnaces and finally on to the 
manufacture of wrought, that is malleable iron, in the form of bars by means of 
puddling furnaces and rolling mills. However that a particular works was not fully 
integrated in the early period need not be a criticism of the ironmasters. In the early 
years, most of the ironworks of the area did not have forges, a forge meaning puddling 
furnaces and rolling mills, the facilities for making wrought or bar iron and later rails 
from pig or refined iron. Pig iron, whilst sometimes used by the ironworks themselves, 
or sold, as castings, was more often sold directly to neighbouring works such as 
Cyfarthfa or Penydarren in Merthyr and some might have been sent to smaller forges 
in the neighbourhood. For example Ebbw Vale sent pig iron to Walter Watkins’ forge 
at Llangrwyney early on and was still sending pig iron there as late as 1817. It also 
sent iron to other forges and in 1796 it was supplying Bassaleg forge with finers metal
107 John van Laun, The Clydach Gorge, p 9.
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(refined iron).108 One works of the group, the Beaufort ironworks, appears to have had 
a forge early on as Gray-Jones, Ebbw Vale’s historian, believes that a forge was built 
there as early as 1785.109 It is not known if this forge was run using Cort’s puddling 
process, 1785 does seem too early for this. Probably they were using the potting and 
stamping process initially and switched to Cort’s method later. There is no evidence 
that a forge was set up in any of the other works in the group until the nineteenth 
century. As stated above Clydach built its first mill in 1805 and Blaenavon was even 
slower. Its forge and mill, at Gamddyrris, a few miles from the blast furnaces, was not 
built until 1817.110 Ebbw Vale also seems to have built its forge late as it was certainly 
selling pig iron to Penydarren in 1796.111 Tredegar had its first forge in 1807 and 
Tredegar’s historian, Evan Powell, described the opening of the forge and mill that 
year as a red letter day in the history of the town.112 Joseph Bailey and his partner, 
Matthew Wayne, set about planning the Nantyglo works as an integrated concern once 
they took control of it in 1811 and it is believed that forges and new furnaces were 
erected in a very short period of time.113
Hence all the works in the group had become fully integrated concerns by 
1817 apart from Sirhowy which appears never to have had a forge. The industrialists 
of the area had good reason to delay making their concerns fully integrated. Cort’s 
puddling and rolling process was only just getting established following the eventual 
success with the procedure at Cyfarthfa and Penydarren and it would have seemed 
more cost effective for the Monmouthshire works to supply these two Merthyr works
108 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819; GRO. D.2472.3. Ebbw Vale Company 
Journal 1791-6; GRO. D.2472.4 Ebbw Vale Company Journal 1814-15.
109 Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, p 41.
110 Chris Barber, Exploring Blaenavon Industrial Landscape World Heritage Site, Llanfoist, 
Abergaveny, 2002, p 23.
111 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819.
112 Powell, History o f Tredegar, pp 30-1.
1,3 David James, History of Nantyglo and Blaina, Gwent County Library, Approximately 1950, 
(unpublished), p 10.
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with pig iron in the early period rather than develop their own forges. They might also 
have been deterred by the fact that it was not until the 1790s that independent forges 
in South Wales became reconciled to the use of coke pig iron in their works in large 
proportions. For example the Melingriffith forge used predominantly charcoal pig iron 
in the 1780s even importing some from New Jersey, USA, but by the mid 1790s they 
were using substantial amounts of charcoal pig and coke pig together with some finers 
metal.114
Therefore it is fair to say that the industrialists of the North West 
Monmouthshire area made the most of the favourable factors such as the nearness of a 
plentiful supply of water and the abundance of minerals in the early structure of their 
businesses. Some delayed incurring costs such as those associated with the acquisition 
of steam engines at least for a time and the ironmasters deemed the construction of 
forges non-essential in the early years though they moved to fully integrated concerns 
later. These approaches and the consequent savings in costs might have helped them 
meet the expense associated with improvements in communications within the area.
2.7 Why the Industrial Revolution was late in the North West
Monmouthshire Area.
Once Abraham Darby had demonstrated that coal, in the form of coke, could 
be used as fuel in the blast furnaces to smelt iron ore the coalfields of Britain became 
potential areas for the development of large-scale iron production. The Darby family 
was based in the Coalbrookdale district in Shropshire and so it is no surprise that 
when the iron industry in the country really took off in the 1750s the Shropshire 
coalfield was in the forefront of the developments. Coke fired blast furnaces also 
sprang up in Lancashire, South Wales and in Scotland. In fact Shropshire men had an
114 Chris Evans, ‘Global Commerce and Industrial Organisation in an Eighteenth Century Welsh 
Enterprise: The Melingriffith Company’, pp 420-2.
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involvement in certain such developments in Merthyr in South Wales and in 
Lancashire.115 However despite the ideal geological and geographical criteria that 
existed in the North West Monmouthshire part of the South Wales coalfield for the 
development of coke fired furnaces none were erected there until the last two decades 
of the eighteenth century.
In Shropshire in and on the periphery of the coalfield the population had been 
rising in the first half of the eighteenth century even before the rapid expansion of the 
iron industry which started there in 1755, there being many existing villages in the 
vicinity of the River Severn.116 The situation there was quite unlike that of the North 
West Monmouthshire at the time, an area that had no village of any size within it. The 
Coalbrookdale area also benefited from the Severn as a form of transport, the river
117being a navigable one.
In South Wales, in Merthyr for example, coke-fired ironworks were erected in 
the mid eighteenth century. The Dowlais works was established in 1759, the Plymouth 
works in 1763 and Cyfarthfa in 1765 with the last of the four Merthyr works, 
Penydarren following in 1784.118 Merthyr Tydfil however was a pre-existing village 
that is it was in existence well before the establishment of the ironworks of the 1750s 
and 1760s. Thomas Kitchin’s map of Glamorgan dated from the 1760s has the village 
of ‘Merthyr TydviT placed by the River Taff with a road to Cardiff close by.119 J. R. 
Harris states that there was an involvement by the local mineral owners in Merthyr but
115 Barrie Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, 2000, pp 38-9.
116 Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, p 4.
117 Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, p 8.
118 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987, p 6.
119 Thomas Kitchin, A New Map of Glamorganshire, c. 1760s.
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that the key figures were the entrepreneurs, in this case men like Isaac Wilkinson, 
Anthony Bacon, John Guest, Richard Crawshay and the Homfrays.120
It has already been established that the industrial revolution did not take off in 
the North West Monmouthshire area until entrepreneurs arrived on the scene from 
other areas and thus the reason why this area was developed later than in Merthyr 
must rest with the entrepreneurs. They must have been more attracted to the Merthyr 
area. There are a number of reasons why they may have preferred Merthyr such as the 
presence there of an existing village which could have been used as an initial base and 
as a source of labour. The North West Monmouthshire area was very thinly populated 
in the third quarter of the eighteenth century and despite its mineral wealth the area 
would have been less well known than Merthyr with its road and river links to the 
coast at Cardiff. The mineral owners may also have played a role at Merthyr121 and 
possibly acted as catalysts whereas the landowners of the Monmouthshire area seem
to have taken only a passive interest being content to lease their lands but never
becoming partners in the ironworks companies. The other factors in the North West 
Monmouthshire situation were the almost total absence of a workforce and the poor 
communications that existed there, Kitchin’s map of Monmouthshire dated about 
1748 shows no roads at all in the north west of the county.122 Hence if the 
entrepreneurs were faced with a direct choice between the Merthyr area and North 
West Monmouthshire the absence of a road in the latter might have been critical.
With the above factors applying therefore it is not surprising that the industrial 
revolution in the form of a major coke fired iron industry arrived in the North West 
Monmouthshire area later than other areas such as Merthyr and Shropshire. As some 
of the industrialists who eventually set up iron works in the area had already been
120 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, pp 54-5.
121 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, pp 54-5.
122 Thomas Kitchin, A New Map of Monmouthshire, 1748.
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involved in the Merthyr iron industry the developments in North West 
Monmouthshire could be regarded as a second or later phase of the industrial 
revolution in the east of the South Wales coalfield.
2.8 Conclusion.
The North West Monmouthshire area had all the geological and geographical 
features necessary for the industrial revolution to have taken off in the form of the 
development of a major coke fired iron industry in the mid eighteenth century 
following the technological advances that had been made in the iron industry by that 
time. However such an iron industry did not emerge until a group of industrialists 
from outside took an interest in the area. The profiles of these industrialists were not 
untypical of industrialists of the British industrial revolution but a distinctive feature 
was the high proportion who had had previous experience of the iron manufacturing 
industry. Iron manufacturing anywhere absorbed large amounts of capital but this was 
especially so in a remote area with no infrastructure and no local workforce and these 
incoming industrialists managed to obtain sufficient funds to establish their ironworks.
It must be assumed that as the small scale and scattered charcoal iron industry 
that existed in Monmouthshire did not lead on to the development of major coke 
furnaces the owners of these charcoal furnaces did not have the capital or 
entrepreneurial drive to take their businesses to the next level. It also appears that 
whilst the landowners of the area played an important role they did not wish to 
become directly involved in iron manufacturing possibly deterred by the sheer 
complexities of setting up such industries in remote areas.
The entrepreneurs were therefore the key to the introduction of the industrial 
revolution to North West Monmouthshire and the relatively cautious approach they
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took with regard to the physical and business structure o f their companies undoubtedly 
contributed to the steady early success o f the enterprises.
Finally it has been demonstrated that the arrival o f the industrial revolution 
into the North West Monmouthshire area was later than might have been expected and 
that its eventual arrival could be regarded as a second or later phase o f the industrial 
revolution in the north east o f the South Wales coalfield. It is significant that even as 
late as around 1800, maps o f the area still referred to localities as furnaces or works 
not towns or villages. S. Smith’s map o f Monmouthshire o f 1804 records ‘Sorrwy’ 
Furnace, Beaufort Works, ‘Ebwy Vale’ furnace, ‘Nant y Glo’ Furnace and ‘Blaen 
Avon’ Furnace. Clearly the industrial revolution in the area was still at its infancy.
Illustration 1 A view o f  the Blaenavon Ironworks c. 1800.
Source. William Coxe’s An H istorical Tour o f  Monmouthshire, Part the second, published in London 
in 1801. The engraving is adjacent to page 228.
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Chapter 3. Demand for Iron Products, the Reactions of the Ironmasters and 
the Growth of the Iron Output in the North West Monmouthshire 
Area. - First Half of the Nineteenth Century.
3.1 Introduction.
This chapter is especially concerned with the demand for iron products in the 
British iron industry in the first half of the nineteenth century. The demand for iron 
fluctuated such that in general nine separate periods can be identified, these periods 
being of boom, depression or relative depression and of a mixed or uncertain nature. 
The fifty-year period was also one of steady decline in iron prices with minor peaks 
and troughs, again a particular problem for the industrialists.
The effects of the contrasting economic periods on the iron industry of the 
study area are discussed together with the reactions of the ironmasters, locally and 
nationally, to the differing circumstances. Unfortunately data in the first quarter of the 
century is relatively limited but relevant information is much more abundant in the 
second quarter. The main original sources of data used in the section on demand are 
the Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book of 1796 to 1819, the Ebbw Vale Letter Book of 
1824 to 1827, the Blaenavon Minute Book, The Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782- 
1860 and local newspapers especially the Monmouthshire Merlin. This newspaper has 
been used extensively with the intention of seeing the changing economic 
circumstances from the perspective of the local ironmasters.
The chapter also includes a discussion of the growth of iron output of the 
ironworks of the area. However before discussing the growth of iron output in this 
period it is necessary to take account of the changing view of the industrial revolution 
itself. The industrial revolution is now seen by some economic historians as broadly
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based.1 For example more stress is now being put on the role of commerce and 
financial services and it is now claimed that the largest fortunes made in the period 
were made by bankers and landowners not by the major industrialists of the cotton or 
the iron industries.2 Even where technological change was considerable it did not 
apply in all regions of the country3 but this does not mean that areas largely untouched 
by major industrial developments were any less involved in the industrial revolution 
as it is now perceived.
Thus an element of caution is necessary when discussing an area of the 
country that apparently experienced dramatic industrial growth before making a claim 
that consequently the area truly was exceptional for the industrial revolution period. 
However it is claimed that the North West Monmouthshire area was exceptional in 
that its growth of industrial output was in an area thinly populated prior to the 
industrial revolution and this meant that the ironmasters faced a whole range of 
problems in addition to those related to demand. Many of the industrialists in other 
areas and in other industries may not have faced some of these difficulties. It is for 
this additional reason that it is claimed that in general the ironmasters of the area were 
themselves exceptional.
With regard to source data the principal modem publication containing pig 
iron output data is Philip Riden and John G. Owen’s British Blast Furnace Statistics 
1790-1980 A There were no annual official returns of iron output until 1854 and so the 
estimates given by Riden and Owen were assembled from private surveys. There were 
sufficient numbers of these surveys for Riden and Owen to produce output figures for
1 Eric J. Evans, The Forging o f the Modem State, Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870, Harlow, Essex, p 
129.
2 Evans, The Forging o f  the Modem State, Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870, pp 129-30.
3 Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution, London, 1992, p 101.
4 Philip Riden and John G. Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Cardiff 1995.
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17 individual years from 1788 to 1852 inclusive.^ Table 1.1 o f their volume displays 
output o f pig iron for Great Britain and for thirteen regions, South Wales being one of 
them. Hence there are no separate entries o f iron output for Monmouthshire or for any 
individual ironworks in this publication. However there is a comprehensive source of 
iron output data for Monmouthshire and individual ironworks therein, Harry 
Scrivenor’s History o f The Iron Trade published in 1854.6 Fortunately Scrivenor gives 
more detailed information about the counties o f Monmouthshire and Glamorgan than 
other areas though his data for these counties was not actual iron output but iron sent 
down the Monmouthshire and Glamorgan canals. Scrivenor gives data for the 
Monmouthshire ironworks for years 1802 to 18407 and for Glamorgan ironworks for 
the years 1817 to 1840.8
3.2 The Economic Factors affecting the Iron Industry of the North West
Monmouthshire area c.1800-1850.
This section outlines how the demand for iron fluctuated over the first half of 
the nineteenth century and how the local ironmasters attempted to deal with these 
changes in demand. The section also examines the principal effects o f the demand 
movements on the local iron industry and highlights the main changes and 
developments that resulted. The fluctuations in demand for iron products and the 
continual trend towards lower prices within the British iron industry in the period 
1799 to 1845 are seen clearly in Figure 3.1
5 Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp ix to xxi.
6 H. Scrivenor, H istory o f  The Iron Trade, London, 1854.
7 Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, pp 127, 258.
8 Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, pp 126, 257.
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Figure 3.1
National and Local Bar Iron Prices
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Sources. National prices, Alan Birch, The Economic History o f  the British Iron & Steel Industry 1784 
to 1879 , London, 1967, p 230. The sample o f local prices (i.e. South Wales prices) shown were 
assembled from various original sources. Prices are in pounds per ton for the years 1799 to 1845.
Russia and Sweden had been the main exporters o f bar iron until late in the 
eighteenth century when the Baltic War o f 1788 harmed exports from these countries 
to the obvious benefit o f the new British producers.9 The British Government also 
aided British manufacturers by the imposition of duties on imported iron, the rate of 
such duties increasing steadily through the first quarter o f the nineteenth century.
Table 3.1 Duties on Foreign iron 1782-1825 (per ton).
1782-1795 £2. 16. 2d
1796 £3. 1. 9d
1797 £3. 4. 7d
1798-1802 £3. 15. 5d
1803 £4. 4. 4 V2d
1804 £4. 17. Id
1805 £5. 1. Od
1806-1808 £ 5 .1 .5  3Ad
1809-1812 £5. 9. lOd
1813-1818 £6. 9. lOd
1819-1825 (British ships) £6. 10. Od
(foreign ships) £7. 18. 6d
Source. Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, pi 28
9 Chris Evans (ed.), The Letter book o f  Richard Craws hay 1788-1797 , Cardiff, 1990, p 24.
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By 1800 all seven of the group of ironworks of the North West 
Monmouthshire area under study were working concerns or, in the case of Tredegar 
ironworks, their establishment had been initiated. Hence these works were ready to 
take advantage of the generally favourable period for the iron industry to around 1815. 
Although a lack of information makes it difficult to measure the degree of this 
favourable period in the British iron industry during the Napoleonic Wars there is 
enough evidence to confirm that the period was generally one of boom with the price 
of bar iron remaining over thirteen pounds per ton.10 As for the country as a whole 
131 new blast furnaces were built in Britain between 1796 and 181011 and competition
from abroad was falling away such that by the end of the Wars in 1815 imports of
• •  •  •  12foreign iron were quantitatively insignificant.
Although this early period was favourable for the iron industry the local 
ironmasters nevertheless found it necessary in January 1809 to meet at Newport and 
agree to support the price of iron fixed at the recent Gloucester meeting of British 
ironmasters. They were keen to keep the price at £14.5.0d per ton and agreed not to 
sell to any commission house who they thought would sell below this price.13 Two 
years later the local ironmasters agreed again at Newport to fix their price for tram 
plates.14 These examples indicate that the ironmasters soon found it desirable to work 
together on occasions when, as a group, they felt their businesses would suffer. In fact 
there are records of ironmasters’ meetings held in South Wales to discuss prices from
10 Alan Birch, The Economic History o f  the British Iron & Steel Industry 1784-1879, London, 1967, pp 
20 - 1.
11 Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Tables 2.1 to 2.13.
12 Roger Burt, ‘The extractive industries’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge 
Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004, pp 
430-1.
13 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, 13 January 1809.
14 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, 2 January 1811.
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1808 through to the 1820s.15 The meetings were attended by the ironmasters 
themselves, almost a prerequisite for decisions to be made at this time. The ability of 
the ironmasters to work together for particular purposes even though they were also 
competitors was to be a major characteristic of the relationship between the local 
ironmasters throughout the first half of the nineteenth century.
Unfortunately for the British iron industry the years following the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars saw a depression in the industry as the price of English merchant bar 
iron fell from £13.5.0d per ton in 1815 to as low as £8.15.0d in 1817.16 This change in 
economic climate was reflected in the Ebbw Vale Company’s current account, which 
more than halved from 1814-15 to 1816-17.17 It was in this period that perhaps the 
most dramatic change in the ownership of one of core ironworks took place. The 
Sirhowy ironworks had been run jointly with Tredegar ironworks since the 
construction of the latter. The Sirhowy lease was due for renewal in 1818 but some 
years earlier the Harford partnership of Ebbw Vale ironworks had acquired the 
Sirhowy lease. A dispute arose over new lease terms and the result was that ownership 
of the Sirhowy works transferred to the Ebbw Vale partners.18 Communication 
between the two works, Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy, was difficult in this early period 
such that in 1832 the Ebbw Vale Company was forced to construct a tunnel through 
the mountain connecting the Sirhowy works with Ebbw Vale.19 This dispute over the
15 Madeleine Elsas (ed.), Iron in the Making: Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Glamorgan 
County Council, 1960, pp 1-17; GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819; GRO. 
D.2472.2. Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827.
16 Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784-1879, p 230.
17 F. J. Ball, Essays on the History of Ebbw Vale. Volume 1 Industrialisation, Ebbw Vale, 1971, 
(unpublished), pp 233-4.
18 Arthur Gray-Jones, A History o f Ebbw Vale, Risca, 1970, p 49; Oliver Jones, The Early Days o f  
Sirhowy and Tredegar, Tredegar, 1969, pp 46-9; John Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales 
Ironworks (1760-1840), London, 1906, p 149; Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document No. 146, Deed of 
Assignment of Sirhowy Iron Works to the Harford Company, 14 November 1822.
19 Oliver Jones, ‘The Sirhowy-Ebbw Vale Tunnel’ in Presenting Monmouthshire, The Journal o f  
Monmouthshire Local History Council, No. 31, (Spring 1971), pp 21-5.
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Sirhowy works was the only major one between the ironworks of the area throughout 
the first half of the nineteenth century.
The uncertainty for the iron trade continued in 1819, when the ironmasters 
nationally vigorously opposed a tax on coal at the pithead which they saw as a tax on 
iron20 and it was not until 1824 that there was evidence of a substantial improvement 
in the iron market. The meetings to fix prices continued but it seems that the meetings 
were rarely attended by all the relevant ironmasters though on balance it does seem 
that decisions made were generally followed but it is possible that by the middle or 
late 1820s meetings aimed at fixing prices became less successful. As early as 1818 
William Crawshay of the Cyfarthfa ironworks in Merthyr had unilaterally dropped his 
price for bar iron at Cardiff from £12 to £11 and the meeting held at Merthyr on 9 
May 1818 simply agreed to follow him21 and it was reported in the Ebbw Vale 
Memorandum Book on 28 June 1824 that regular quarterly meetings of the Trade had 
been abandoned though an entry for 12 July of the same year stated that ‘...the usual 
Quarter day meeting of the iron trade took place yesterday at Newport at which such a 
small number of the Trade attended...’.22 It is likely that as the industry grew and 
particular ironmasters became more powerful that the regular meetings began to lose 
significance at least for price fixing. There is evidence of co-operation between 
ironmasters of different regions and this was done sometimes via letters. For example 
W. Pinton, chairman of the Staffordshire Ironmasters wrote to Guest and Company of 
Dowlais on 2 March 1818 indicating that an advance of 15/- a ton on bar iron and 25/- 
per ton on rods had been declared in Staffordshire but then abandoned because there
20 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Minutes of the Meeting of the Iron Trade of South 
Wales, at Castle Inn, Merthyr, 26 January 1819, pp 215-6; Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 February 1819.
21 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, 9 May 1818.
22 GRO. D.2472.2. Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827,28 June 1824, 12 July 1824.
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was no corresponding advance at Cardiff and London.23 This period from 1815 to 
1823 or very early 1824 could be seen as an uncertain one with the price of iron 
falling to as low as £8 per ton in 1822.
The situation was to change in 1824 and demand for iron was high such that 
the Ebbw Vale ironworks for example was turning down orders for pig iron.24 The 
ironmasters there even had to refiise to sell pig iron to such customers as David 
Mushet, the eminent metallurgist at Coleford.25 The price of merchant bar iron 
nationally reached a peak of £14 in 1825 and in June the Ebbw Vale Company had to 
inform the Neath Abbey Iron Company that they had no foundry pig iron to spare. 
This refusal or inability to sell pig iron was partly because the local ironworks by this 
time were specialising in the production and sale of wrought iron in the form of bars. 
Therefore in times of high demand for iron generally works like Ebbw Vale were 
using most of the pig iron they produced for their own purposes, that is largely for the 
manufacture of bar iron.
It was in this favourable economic period that ironworks were established 
further down the valleys from the core group of works of the study. In the Ebwy Fach 
valley below Nantyglo, Coalbrookvale ironworks was set up in 1823 and the Blaina 
ironworks in 1825. While in the Afon Lwyd valley below Blaenavon, the Pentwyn 
ironworks was established in 1825. In addition, the Bute works was established in the 
same year near the existing Rhymney ironworks on the Glamorgan/Monmouthshire
23 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, W. Pinton, Chairman of Staffordshire Ironmasters 
to Guest and Company, Dudley, 2 Mar 1818.
24 GRO. D.2472.2. The Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827.
25 GRO. D.2472.2. The Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827,4 September 1824.
26 GRO. D.2472.2. The Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827, 17 June 1825.
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border in the nearby Rhymney valley.27 This rush of new works led to the possibility 
that an oversupply situation would result at the next fall in demand.
The products sold in this boom period were still mainly bar iron products, the 
production and sales of wrought iron rails had still not yet generally got under way. 
The Ebbw Vale Company sold bar iron in a variety of shapes and sizes plus items 
such as nail rods and cable bolts.
The price of iron declined gradually after 1825 and by the early 1830s iron 
prices were at their lowest level of the century so far. Some ironmasters, such as 
William Crawshay of Cyfarthfa ironworks in Merthyr, were strong enough financially 
to apply a policy of stocking of iron when demand fell29 but most of the ironmasters of 
the region did not have this luxury and would had to have considered cutting supply 
and/or reducing prices further. Crawshay was often out of step with the other 
ironmasters on the north east part of the South Wales coal field and in 1830 he refused 
to sell bar iron below £6 whilst others, such as the Baileys of Nantyglo and the British 
Iron Company at Abersychan continued to sell at £5 10s.30 Undoubtedly Crawshay 
was greatly assisted by the Crawshay family’s London merchant house which could 
take iron from Cyfarthfa in depressed times.31
This period was difficult for the Monmouthshire ironmasters although it saw 
the start of the production of wrought iron rails and the Ebbw Vale Company obtained 
contracts in 1828 to supply these rails for the Stockton and Darlington Railway. One 
of the main customers of the Monmouthshire ironmasters was the Monmouthshire
27 Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp 1-31 and John Priyeane’s Map of
the Ironworks and Collieries in the Counties of Monmouth and Glamorgan, Newport, 1843
28 GRO. D.2472.2. The Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-27, Letter to Samuel White, Waterford, 24 
August 1824, Price list.
29 John P. Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, Cardiff 1957, pp 71-5.
30 Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, p 75.
31 Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, p 21.
32 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987, p 67.
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•  0*3Canal Navigation Company who advertised regularly for supplies of tramplates. 
Despite regular orders of these types the iron trade remained in a depressed state and 
in February 1831 some of local ironmasters complained to the proprietors of the 
Monmouthshire Canal company about their tonnage rates claiming that ‘those who are 
embarked in iron & coal concerns painfully feel, not only that they are deriving no 
profit therefrom, but that their capitals are dwindling away’.34 Some contemporary 
writers however thought that the ironmasters themselves had contributed to the 
depression by extending the supply excessively such that prices were forced down.35 
There is some evidence for this for in 1824/5 there were around 185 furnaces in blast 
in Britain, the pig iron price being about £3.13.0d. However in August 1832 there 
were as many as 252 furnaces in blast and the pig iron price was lower at about 
£2.17.0d.36
In August 1831 the Staffordshire ironmasters wanted to reduce production 
provided the South Wales producers would do likewise but on this occasion it appears 
they feared that William Crawshay I of Cyfarthfa and Crawshay Bailey of Nantyglo 
ironworks might not go along with the plan.37 Some of the ironmasters, those amongst 
the strongest financially and possibly amongst the most single minded, were reluctant 
to cooperate with these supply cutting schemes. A letter written by Crawshay’s son, 
William Crawshay II, confirmed this as he stated that his father and Bailey felt strong 
enough to act independently if they saw fit. Another example of this independence 
of mind seems to be indicated in a letter from a Staffordshire ironmaster to J. J. Guest
33 Monmouthshire Merlin, 6 June 1829,17 April 1830,23 April 1831, 19 May 1832, 1 December 1832.
34 Monmouthshire Merlin, 12 February 1831, Letter to the proprietors of the Monmouthshire Canal 
from Thomas Prothero.
35 Monmouthshire Merlin, 29 October 1831 and 28 September 1832.
36 Monmouthshire Merlin, 29 September 1832, The Iron Trade.
37 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Michael Grazebrook to J. J. Guest, Worcestershire, 
26 July 1831, p 9.
38 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, William Crawshay Junior to J. J. Guest, Cyfarthfa, 
23 Sept 1831, p 9.
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of Dowlais when he wrote ‘We are also informed that your house in particular is 
guilty of adding to the great mischief already existing in Wales, viz of increasing your 
establishment by building 4 new furnaces at the present moment’.39
The economic climate for the iron industry in the country did not improve 
during the next few years and in August 1832 a deputation of iron masters from the 
Staffordshire and Shropshire districts had an interview with Earl Grey and Lord 
Althorp at the Treasury on the subject of the depressed state of the iron industry. The 
ironmasters blamed the government’s attempts to enforce the restoration of the gold 
standard to the ancient basis of £3.17.10V&d per ounce.40 In 1833 some European 
governments were seen in some quarters as adding to the difficulties for British iron 
manufacturers by increasing import duties on British iron, the biggest complaint being 
against the Hanoverian Government’s imposition of £3.6.0d per ton on imported 
iron.41 There were orders for malleable iron rails in 1833 such as those for the Bodmin 
and Wadebridge railway and the Stanhope and Tyne Rail Road Company and there 
were orders at Liverpool for rails for the United States.42 It was not the lack of orders 
that was the problem in 1833 but the ‘ruinous price’ as the trade saw it.43 Probably 
with the aim of improving the demand situation the local ironmasters themselves took 
a positive role in some of the railway enterprises, most of the Monmouthshire and 
Merthyr ironmasters being on the committee to plan for a railway from South Wales 
to Gloucester to join with projected lines from Bristol to London.44
The effects of this continued period of uncertainly and low iron prices were 
felt in the North West Monmouthshire area. In January 1833 the Beaufort ironworks
39 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Bagnall & Sons (John and Thomas Bagnall) to 
Guest, Gold Hill Iron Works, West Bromwich, Staffs, 4 April 1835.
40 Monmouthshire Merlin, 11 August 1832.
41 Monmouthshire Merlin, 9 March 1833.
42 Monmouthshire Merlin, 9 February 1833, 18 May 1833, 27 April 1833.
43 Monmouthshire Merlin, 9 March 1833.
44 Monmouthshire Merlin, 19 October 1833.
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was sold to the Baileys, ironmasters of the neighbouring Nantyglo works for 
£45,00045 indicating that Messrs. J. and C. Bailey were in a relatively strong financial 
position compared with some of the other ironmasters. In July of the same year the 
Clydach ironworks was put up for sale though the sale was unsuccessful.46 The 
original ironmaster of the Clydach works, Edward Frere, had left the works the 
previous year after more than thirty years with the company leaving John Powell as 
the active proprietor.47 The Blaenavon ironworks proprietors also felt it necessary to 
put the company on the market in November 183348 though the company was finally 
sold as a joint stock company49 a few years later.
The Rhymney ironworks was up for sale in May 183550 and like Blaenavon it 
became a joint stock company after it was sold. Railway activity continued to increase 
during the year such that in November there was concern at railway speculation in the 
country.51 By the end of 1835 the market had become buoyant especially the export 
market with many orders having been received by British manufacturers for railroad 
iron from Europe, the United States and elsewhere abroad. The improved situation 
for manufacturers continued throughout 1836 with domestic demand for rails, chains 
and carriages prominent adding to foreign demand especially that from the United 
States.53 This year saw the flotation prospectuses for the Blaenavon ironworks, the 
Varteg ironworks and that for the Monmouthshire Iron and Coal Company that is the
45 GRO. D.397.1679. Sale of Beaufort Ironworks to J. and C. Bailey, 17 January 1833.
46 GRO. D.591.19.384. Particulars of freehold and leasehold estate comprising the Clydach Iron Works, 
South Wales, 17 July 1833.
47 GRO. D.591.23.46. Clydach Ironworks, 19 January 1832.
48 GRO. D.7.194. Sale document, Blaenavon ironworks, 22 November 1833.
49 Joint stock iron companies are discussed in Chapter 5.
50 Monmouthshire Merlin, 23 May 1835.
51 Monmouthshire Merlin, 21 November 1835.
52 Monmouthshire Merlin, 19 December 1835, 26 December 1835, The Iron Trade.
53 Monmouthshire Merlin, 3 September 1836, The Iron Trade.
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Victoria ironworks54 which was situated a mile or two south of Ebbw Vale. As earlier, 
it appears that the local iron industry was expanding its supply side in boom times.
The boom however was short lived and by the end of 1836 the market was less 
certain such that some ironmasters in South Wales, Shropshire and Staffordshire 
reduced their production of iron in an attempt to maintain prices.55 In South Wales 
dramatic action was agreed at Newport and the ironmasters decided to reduce 
production by 20 percent. To achieve this they agreed to blow out furnaces and reduce 
production on the remaining ones until the 20 percent figure was attained. The plan 
was to last for one year. This agreement had the effect that the largest ironworks such 
as Dowlais and Cyfarthfa had to blow out three furnaces while the Ebbw 
Vale/Sirhowy and the Nantyglo/Beaufort groups had to put two out of action with the 
remainder of the works closing down one furnace each.56 There can be little doubt that 
this agreement held as it accepted that one ironmaster would inspect the books of 
another to ensure that the agreed reduction had been done. Samuel Homffay of the 
Tredegar ironworks was requested to arrange for these measures to be carried out and 
a copy of the agreement was to be sent to the respective chairmen of the Shropshire, 
Staffordshire, Scottish and North Wales ironmasters’ meetings.57 The Blaenavon 
directors reported to their shareholders that this agreement to reduce production by 20 
percent and the consequent blowing out of one furnace had caused a loss of up to 
£800.58 To illustrate how this exceptional agreement was to be followed through, 
Table 3.2 shows how the ironmasters agreed each particular ironworks in South Wales 
was to conform to the agreement by shutting down furnaces.
54 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 May 1836, 23 July 1836, 20 August 1836.
55 Monmouthshire Merlin, 10 December 1836, 7 January 1837, The Iron Trade.
56 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Meeting of Ironmasters, King’s Head, Newport, 3 
December 1836. pp 12-13.
57Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Samuel Homfray to Guest Lewis and Co, 4 April 
1837, p 13.
58 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book, 15 Sept 1837.
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Table 3.2. Agreement of the ironmasters of South Wales to reduce their production of pig iron.
Schedule of furnaces to be blown out, (to be carried out on or before the 15th 
December 1836).
Ironmasters. Ironworks. No. of Furnaces 
To be blown out.
Thomas Forman Penydarren, Merthyr 1
Samuel Horn fray Tredegar, Monmouthshire 1
Thomas Guest Dowlais, Merthyr 3
Summers Harford Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy 2
William Wood Abersychan, Monmouthshire 1
L.Powell Clydach, Breconshire 1
Thomas Hill Blaenavon, Monmouthshire 1
James Hunt Pentwyn, Monmouthshire 1
J. Russell Blaina, Monmouthshire 1
W.Crawshay Cyfarthfa, Merthyr 3
R.Fothergill Aberdare, Glamorgan 1
G.S.Kenrick Varteg, Monmouthshire 1
Thomas Foreman Rhymney 1
J. & C. Bailey Nantyglo and Beaufort 2
R. & C. Hill Plymouth, Merthyr 1
John Crane Yniskedwyn, Glamorgan 1
Source Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Minutes of Ironmasters’ Meeting, King’s 
Head Inn, Newport, 3 December 1836. Four other ironworks including the Coal Brook Vale works near 
Nantyglo and the Neath Abbey Company were to reduce their production by 20 percent.
In May 1837 the Sheffield Mercury reported that the iron market was still 
basically uncertain59 but by August demand had picked up so much that it was 
reported in Newport that ‘The demand for iron of all descriptions made in this 
neighbourhood has become unprecedently great: so much so that many of the makers 
have determined to close their order-books and reject orders at any price’.60
The demand for iron mostly in the form of rails for domestic and foreign 
customers, particularly from the United States,61 held up and prices were generally 
maintained at around £10 per ton for bar iron across the country during 1838 to 1840. 
Despite the relatively sound position of the coke iron trade the remaining charcoal 
iron industry in Monmouthshire continued its decline and the Abbey Tintem Iron and
59 Monmouthshire Merlin, 13 May 1837, The Iron Trade, from Sheffield Mercury.
60 Monmouthshire Merlin, 26 August 1837, The Iron Trade.
61 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 September 1838.
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Wire Works was put up for sale in February 1838.62 In March 1839 tenders were 
invited by the Severn and Wye Railway and Canal Company and by the end of this 
year the iron trade was viewed as an exception to the general state of stagnation that 
affected other branches of British industry.63 It was in this relatively favourable period 
that three further ironworks were erected in Monmouthshire. The Golynos works
below Blaenavon, the Cwm Celyn works below Nantyglo and the Victoria works
below Ebbw Vale were all established in 1839.64
The situation in the iron industry deteriorated in 1841. The Blaina and Cwm 
Celyn ironworks were to be formed into a joint stock company and there were 
periodic sales of shares in the concern in this year. The depression had affected the 
nearby Coalbrookvale ironworks though in February 1841 a proposed sale of the
works was cancelled as the ironmasters had managed to pay the amount of the
execution and distress order placed on the company.65 In October the committee set up 
to look into the affairs of the British Iron Company, that is Abersychan ironworks, 
produced a plan to dissolve the company and replace it with a newly formed one66 and 
in the following month the Victoria ironworks was put up for sale.67 1841 was thus a 
troublesome year for the Monmouthshire iron trade and by October the price of bar 
iron had fallen to £7 per ton.68
1842 was also a very difficult year for the ironmasters if not worse than the 
previous year and another agreement to reduce production was put into effect. The 
directors of Blaenavon ironworks reported to the shareholders in April that only four
62 Monmouthshire Beacon, 24 February 1838.
63 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 December 1839.
64 Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp 1-31 and John Priyeane’s Map o f  
the Ironworks and Collieries in the Counties o f Monmouth & Glamorgan, Newport, 1843.
65 Monmouthshire Merlin, 6 February 1841.
66 Monmouthshire Merlin, 2 October 1841.
67 Monmouthshire Merlin, 6 November 1841.
68 Monmouthshire Merlin, 2 October 1841, Metal Prices.
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furnaces were in blast in accordance the resolution passed by the ironmasters.69 The 
core study group of ironworks fared better than the newer works in that in March of 
1842 31 of 38 furnaces were in blast in the former compared with only 17 out of 30 in 
blast amongst the newer Monmouthshire ironworks.70 In South Wales as a whole only 
112 of the 162 blast furnaces were actually in blast in this month and the Yorkshire 
and Derbyshire ironmasters agreed to reduce production in May.71 It is probably this 
agreement made by ironmasters right across England, Wales and Scotland to reduce 
production by 25 percent that a few of the most powerful ironmasters such as William 
Crawshay of Cyfarthfa, Crawshay Bailey of Nantyglo and J. Dixon in Scotland failed 
at least in part to comply with.72 Nevertheless it appears that the ironmasters went 
from relatively informal attempts to reduce production in times of falling demand to 
quite precise agreements where the reduction percentage was stated. It seems also that 
there was a vetting arrangement in place to ensure compliance even if one or two of 
the big ironworks were excluded from time to time. It demonstrates a remarkable 
degree of co-operation often right across Britain though the agreements were 
essentially voluntary with no system of sanctioning defaulters, as far as one can tell. 
Further it does seem that agreements to reduce production did work at least at times. 
The Monmouthshire Merlin of 7 January 1832 reported that at the impending quarterly 
meeting of the ironmasters an advance in price was anticipated and that this expected 
advance in price originated entirely from a decrease in the production and not from 
any alteration in state of the demand.
69 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book, 22 April 1842.
70 Monmouthshire Merlin, 12 March 1842.
71 Monmouthshire Merlin, 12 March 1842, from Mining Journal.
72 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Harford, Davis and Co. from Bristol to Sir John 
Guest, January 1842, p 14.
73 Monmouthshire Merlin, Saturday 7 January 1832.
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Shutting down furnaces was a major exercise for the ironmasters and 
inevitably when demand fell and especially when it fell suddenly they would have 
been left with stocks of iron that would have had the effect of further depressing the 
price. The concentration on bar iron by the South Wales ironmasters introduced a 
further hazard as stocks of iron built up as bar iron, that is wrought iron sold in bars, is 
more prone to rusting than pig iron and rusting would depress the price more.74 It 
would not be surprising therefore that the ironmasters would be most reluctant to hold 
on to these stocks waiting for better times. The ironmasters’ inclination would have 
been to get rid of surplus iron as soon as they could apart, possibly at times, for one or 
two of the soundest manufacturers financially.75
The price of bar iron continued to fall as the depression deepened in 1842 and 
in June the Monmouthshire Merlin reported distress amongst the people of the hills of 
North Monmouthshire and reported ‘The Abergavenny workhouse has its full 
complement of paupers and the neighbouring iron masters, with the exception of the 
Messrs. Bailey [of Nantyglo ironworks] are discharging their workmen continually 
and those remaining are little better than half employed’.76 The price of bar iron
77stabilised in the second half of the year at around £5.10.0d per ton. The Victoria
7 0
ironworks was put up for sale again in August 1842 and production had been 
suspended at the Varteg ironworks near Blaenavon as in January 1843 engines,
70machinery, coal and mine (iron ore) trams and other items were advertised for sale. 
The Mining Journal in February 1843 reported an eminent ironmaster as describing
74 Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, p 72.
75 Evans, The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, Richard Crawshay to William Stevens and 
William Crawshay, 1 September 1791, p 115; Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, George 
Brewer to J. J. Guest, Coalbrook Vale, Shropshire, 23 September 1831.
16 Monmouthshire Merlin, 11 June 1842.
77 Monmouthshire Merlin, 23 July 1842, 24 December 1842, 7 January 1843.
78 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 August 1842.
79 Monmouthshire Beacon, 7 January 1843, Varteg Iron Works, Sale by Mr H .M .Partridge.
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the current price of iron as ruinous, adding ‘at the present time, almost any description 
of iron may be purchased at less than its cost to the manufacturer’.80 Bar iron prices 
reached as low as £5.5.0d in the spring of 1843 and in June a potential disaster hit the 
people of North West Monmouthshire with the failure of the Harford, Davies 
Partnership proprietors of the Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy ironworks. The 
Monmouthshire Merlin commented on 16 June 1843 that the ruinous state of the iron 
trade in Britain that had already marked the failure of some ironworks in other areas 
has now finally taken its toll on the population of ‘the Hills’ with the stoppage of the 
Sirhowy and Ebbw Vale works.81 The failure of these two works would have been a 
disaster for the area with about 3,400 people employed and nearly 11,000 persons 
dependent on these concerns. Fortunately it was decided at the bankruptcy court at 
Bristol, on the advice of Samuel Homffay of the Tredegar ironworks, himself a 
magistrate, that the works should be carried on as usual.82 The creditors of the Ebbw 
Vale Company met in August and agreed to press for the works to continue until a 
further decision might be arrived at,83 the works thus being saved.
The leading article in the Monmouthshire Merlin in July 1843 put a lot of the 
blame for the present troubles at the door of the Government by keeping the com laws 
to the benefit of the landlords to the detriment of their tenants, by laying an export 
duty on coal and by rejecting offers of free trade with America so losing trade of 
100,000 tons of iron.84 Also in July 1843 the Mining Journal published an article with 
suggestions on how the iron industry might widen demand in this depressed time for 
the industry. The main suggestion was for an institution to be set up representing the
80 Monmouthshire Merlin, 4 February 1843, from Mining Journal.
81 Monmouthshire Merlin, 16 June 1843, Failure of Messrs. Harfords and Davies.
82 Monmouthshire Beacon, 24 June 1843, The Bankruptcy of the Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy Iron 
Company.
83 Monmouthshire Beacon, 19 August 1843, Bankruptcy of Harford, Davies and Co.
84 Monmouthshire Merlin, 1 July 1843, Leader article.
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iron industry in Staffordshire, South Wales and Scotland aimed at publicising the
Of
many uses to which iron was and could be put.
In the second half of 1843 the depression began to ease slightly despite the 
fall in the price of bar iron to £4.10.0d per ton in July and a deputation from the South 
Staffordshire ironmasters indicated at a meeting with the Sir Robert Peel, Mr 
Gladstone and other ministers in the same month that they had no option but to cut the 
wages of their colliers further.86 An article in The Times newspaper however put the 
blame for the troubles in the iron trade firmly on the ironmasters of the country for
• 8*7over production and ‘gambling competition for speculative advantage’. The 
Monmouthshire Beacon saw the iron trade of mid 1843 as a competition between 
South Wales, Staffordshire and Scotland and believed that with its existing contracts 
South Wales should survive in the long run better than Staffordshire.88 Fortunately the 
bar iron price recovered to £5.5.0d per ton by October and the Stafford iron trade 
reported demand as sound in the same month but an expected further advance in price
8Qfailed to materialise by the end of the year.
1844 was a year of consolidation for the ironmasters as bar iron prices and 
demand for iron improved a little but it was not until the end of the year that the 
situation began to change appreciably. The situation for the people of North West 
Monmouthshire was poor in the early part of the year with the Ebbw Vale and 
Sirhowy works being put up for sale by the assignees in January to be followed in the 
same month by the Cwm Celyn and Blaina ironworks.90 These latter works were
85 Monmouthshire Merlin, 22 July 1843, Suggestions to ironmasters on increasing the demand for iron, 
from Mining Journal.
86 Monmouthshire Merlin, 29 July 1843, The South Staffordshire Iron and Coal Trade, from a Times 
Correspondent.
87 Monmouthshire Beacon, 22 July 1843, reproduced article from The Times.
88 Monmouthshire Beacon, 12 August 1843.
89 Monmouthshire Merlin, 4 November 1843, 11 November 1843, Present state of Staffordshire Iron 
Trade, 16 December 1843, The Iron Trade.
90 Monmouthshire Merlin, 13 January 1844, 27 January 1844.
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eventually bought by Mr Stodhart of Bath and other shareholders.91 There was some 
very welcome news in March when it became known that the famous family of the 
Darbys of Coalbrookdale in Shropshire had bought the Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy 
ironworks as going concerns92 fully justifying the decision taken in the previous year 
to continue both works. A shortage of ironworks firemen in late April indicated that a 
recovery of some sort applied and in July it was reported that the ironworks of 
Monmouthshire had obtained orders for rails from German businessmen in addition to 
further rail orders for the United States.93 The price of bar iron was still around 
£5.15.0d to £6.5.0d per ton in the country through the second half of the year when in 
November there was an explosion of railway prospectuses hitting the press.94
1845 was a year of increasing prices and demand such that the price of bar iron 
nationally moved from around £6-10-0d to £6-15-0d in January to around £10 to £11 
by the end of the year.95 The year was one of extensive railway activity with the 
consequent demand for rails96 though the ironworks of England and Wales were 
facing increased competition from the Scottish companies especially for sales of pig 
iron. In June of the year there were 99 blast furnaces in Scotland with another twelve 
under construction.97 The successful Nantyglo ironworks launched one the largest
QQ
sheet rolling machines in South Wales in January at a cost of at least £25,000 
indicating the determination of the ironmasters to make the most of the better climate 
for the iron industry. In fact the industry was so buoyant in the region at this time that 
all stocks would be used up together with new production to satisfy orders already
91 Monmouthshire Merlin, 27 July 1844.
92 Monmouthshire Merlin, 30 March 1844; Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document number 225, 11 
November 1845.
93 Monmouthshire Merlin, 27 April 1844, 6 July 1844,27 July 1844.
94 Monmouthshire Merlin, 10 August 1844, 2 November 1844, 23 November 1844.
95 Monmouthshire Merlin, 4 January 1845, 18 January 1845, 11 October 1845, 29 November 1845.
96 Monmouthshire Merlin, 13 September 1845, 25 October 1845.
97 Monmouthshire Merlin, 5 July 1845, The Scotch Pig Iron Trade.
98 Monmouthshire Merlin, 11 January 1845.
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taken." The Railway Department in Whitehall announced that they had approved a 
number of railway developments in South Wales100 and the price of bar and rail iron 
reached around £8-10-0d to £9 by March 1845.101 In the second half of the year 
railway prospectuses were still being published at a fast rate102 indicating a huge 
demand for rails but the price of iron did not rise dramatically suggesting considerable 
stocks were still in existence or there was great competition from other iron producing 
regions of the country.
The following year started on an optimistic note with the strong possibility that 
British iron companies would have much greater access to the French markets for 
sales of rails there and with 2,400 miles of railways having received the Royal Assent 
in Britain in the last session it was felt that pig iron prices should advance in the 
Spring.103 However in March an article in the Mining Journal indicated that anthracite 
coal was being used by an American works using hot blast to make pig iron and 
warned British makers of the possible competition that might result.104 In general 
1846 was a prosperous year for British manufacturers with bar iron prices holding at 
between £9 and £10 per ton. The Monmouthshire Merlin reported further complaints 
about the duties imposed by the French government on imported iron,105 the Midlands 
ironmasters reported that American orders were holding up106 and domestic demand 
was steady with further railway prospectuses published.107
99 Monmouthshire Merlin, 18 January 1845.
100 Monmouthshire Merlin, 15 February 1845, Railways.
101 Monmouthshire Merlin, 15 March 1845, Metal Prices.
102 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 September 1845, 27 September 1845,25 October 1845, 22 November 
1845.
103 Monmouthshire Merlin, 10 January 1846, The Prospects of the Iron Trade for 1846, from a writer to 
the Mining Journal.
104 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 March 1846, The Iron Trade -  England and America, from Mining 
Journal.
105 Monmouthshire Merlin, 26 September 1846.
106 Monmouthshire Merlin, 12 December 1846, reports from Birmingham.
107 Monmouthshire Merlin, 14 November 1846.
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It was reported in January 1847 that England (and Wales) would need to 
supply iron for 12,314 miles of rails based on railroads now contemplated, 7,494 miles 
of which were for this country108 and so the year commenced favourably for the 
ironworks of Britain. Bar iron prices held up generally well during the year averaging 
around £10.0.0d in the early months to around £9.10.0d to £9.15.0d near the end of 
the year when prices started to decline ending the year at £8.15.0d per ton of bar 
iron.109 The Monmouthshire ironworks were still not working to capacity in this year 
with around 84 percent of the furnaces in blast, on average.110 The advances in prices 
of provisions for the work people had for some time been a real difficulty for the 
working classes and in February the ironmasters of the Beaufort works, Messrs. 
Bailey, granted an addition of 10 percent to their men as a result of this problem.111 
However 1847 saw a number of strikes mostly involving colliers112 and in anticipation 
of such strike action by the workpeople the ironmasters of South Wales met to discuss 
and adopt measures of mutual protection against the strikers.113
The decline in national iron prices continued in 1848 such that in January the 
trade in South Staffordshire and Shropshire was seen as in a depressed state. 58 blast 
furnaces out of 137 were out of blast in that part of the country and the iron trade was 
being compared to the last major depression of 1843 when 69 blast furnaces out of 
141 were not running.114 The national prices fell steadily from around £8-10-0d in 
January to around £6-15-0d per ton for bar iron late in the year115 and some areas were 
again threatened by strikes as the ironmasters attempted to lower the men’s wages as
108 Monmouthshire Merlin, 9 January 1846.
109 Monmouthshire Merlin, Metal prices, weekly reports.
1,0 Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp 1-31.
111 Monmouthshire Merlin, 13 February 1847.
1,2 Monmouthshire Merlin, 17 April 1847, 8 May 1847, 12 June 1847.
113 Monmouthshire Merlin, 3 April 1847.
114 Monmouthshire Merlin, 8 January 1848, 15 January 1848, The Iron Trade.
115 Monmouthshire Merlin, 8 January 1848, 11 November 1848, Metal prices.
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the prices fell. Tredegar was hit by a strike in February as the depression deepened.116 
It is clear that the iron trade was badly affected by the depressed state of the railway 
market at this time.117 There was however some good news from Tredegar in mid 
1848 as the new mill being launched there would provide work for an extra 1,000 
people118 once trade improved. The price of bars in Wales was as low as £5-5-0d in 
December and the year ended on a bad note with 300 colliers and miners being laid 
off at Rhymney ironworks due to the depression in the iron trade.
1849 was an even worse year for the iron manufacturing companies of Britain. 
Early in the year the Welsh and Scottish iron makers seemed to have fared rather 
better than the West Midlands manufacturers and it was reported in February that the 
Welsh houses had taken up the major share of large orders taken at Liverpool.119 In 
March an improvement was expected and some leading houses announced an advance 
in price of bar iron of £1 but there was also concern expressed that any increase in 
production could be improvident.120 By May it was clear that the supposed 
improvement was not real and stocks were accumulating at some ironworks in the 
country with bar iron prices around £7-10-0d nationally. There was concern at the 
uncertainty that existed in the home railway markets and at the depression of foreign 
trade being experienced.121 The South Staffordshire masters were concerned that the 
Welsh houses were selling well below the nominal rates and they resolved to lower 
their prices but they did not wish to enter into ‘ruinous competition’ with other 
districts such as South Wales and Scotland.122 Bars were being sold at as low as £5 per
1,6 Monmouthshire Merlin, 19 February 1848.
117 Monmouthshire Merlin, 21 October 1848, Quarterly Meeting of the West Midlands Ironmasters in 
Wolverhampton.
118 Monmouthshire Merlin, 17 June 1848, Tredegar Ironworks.
119 Monmouthshire Beacon, 17 February 1849.
120 Monmouthshire Beacon, 3 March 1849, The Iron Trade.
121 Monmouthshire Beacon, 5 May 1849, 19 May 1849, The Iron Trade.
122 Monmouthshire Beacon, 7 July 1849, 14 July 1849, from Aris's Birmingham Gazette.
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ton in July although there was a slight improvement by August and in September it 
was reported that there was a fall in production by Welsh manufacturers partly as a 
consequence of the cholera epidemic in the region.123 The Staffordshire ironmasters 
were concerned to get their costs nearer to those of other iron districts such as South 
Wales, Scotland and the North of England.124 The Monmouthshire ironworks were 
operating at about 80 percent capacity throughout the year, on average.125 The average 
price of bar iron nationally was about £5.15.0d late in the year and the uncertain 
conditions continued throughout 1850.
There are two main features that emerge from this account, the continual 
fluctuations in the level of demand for iron and the overall reduction in the price of 
iron over the fifty-year period. The fluctuations in demand for iron must have been a 
major headache for the ironmasters of the country as a whole, the Monmouthshire 
ironmasters being no exception. The demand changes were generally due to factors 
both domestic and foreign, in particular variations in demand for ordnance in the early 
years and rails in the second quarter of the century. Wrought iron rails overtook bar 
iron as the main product for the Monmouthshire ironworks for much of the 1830s and 
1840s and therefore the local ironmasters were particularly vulnerable to the peaks 
and troughs of the railway industry. As soon as the ironmasters increased supply to 
meet increasing demand the market would turn around and they would be left in an 
oversupply situation. They were then faced with the options of either keeping stocks 
which was the less favoured option or selling at lower prices. In fact most local 
ironmasters probably did a mixture of both plus immediate action to cut supply and/or
123 Monmouthshire Beacon, 21 July 1849, The Iron Trade, from Aris’s Birmingham gazette, 4 August 
1849, The Iron Trade, 18 August 1849, The Iron Trade, 22 September 1849.
124 Monmouthshire Beacon, 22 September 1849.
125 Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp 1-31.
126 Monmouthshire Beacon, 20 October 1849, The Iron Trade, 11 May 1850, The Iron Trade, from the 
Wolverhampton Chronicle, 15 June 1850, The Iron Trade, 17 August 1850, The Iron trade, from Aris’s 
Birmingham Gazette.
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wages with the consequent adverse affect on the employees. Nevertheless it is to the 
credit of the local ironmasters who ran their businesses successfully that they were 
able to live with this perpetually uncertain state of affairs and with the general trend of 
falling iron prices over the whole period.
The ironmasters made attempts to deal with falling demand by acting together 
on the supply side. Furnaces were blown out on agreed bases and output cut by set 
percentages. There seems to have been considerable success with these joint actions 
even if certain ironmasters failed to cooperate at times if they felt strong and 
independent enough. In the first quarter of the nineteenth century the local ironmasters 
also attempted to control prices by joint action but with less success as some 
ironmasters were weaker financially and needed to sell their iron as soon as possible. 
Later in the period the ironmasters worked together for mutual protection against 
strikes in times of falling markets when workmen opposed wage reductions by 
threatening strike action.
It is possible however that the ironmasters contributed to some extent to the 
demand problems by creating over supply situations. The new ironworks and 
additional furnaces tended to be erected in good times creating over supply situations 
when demand fell. This result would be expected but the lack of diversification in the 
South Wales iron industry must have contributed to the problems for the local 
ironmasters when demand for bar iron and rails fell, with so much concentration on 
these products. However any criticism of the ironmasters for this should be qualified 
in that they acted for the benefit of not only themselves but for their local 
communities by providing extra employment.
A clear picture of the fluctuations in demand for British iron can be seen in 
Table 3.3 below which gives the prices of English merchant bar iron for every year for
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the period 1799 to 1845. Although there was a downward trend in iron prices 
nationally throughout the period, the depressions of 1816-17, 1821-24, 1830-33 and in 
particular that of the early 1840s are clearly visible.
Table 3.3 Prices of English Merchant Bar Iron 1799-1845
Year £ Year £ Year £
1799 18.25 1817 8.75 1835 6.5
1800 18.5 1818 13.0 1836 10.5
1801 20 1819 12.5 1837 10.5
1802 18 1820 11.0 1838 9.75
1803 19.5 1821 9.0 1839 10.5
1804 17 1822 8.0 1840 9.0
1805 17.5 1823 8.5 1841 8.0
1806 17.5 1824 8.75 1842 6.5
1807 16.0 1825 14.0 1843 5.25
1808 15.0 1826 11.0 1844 4.75
1809 15.5 1827 10.0 1845 6.5
1810 14.10 1828 9.0
1811 15.0 1829 7.85
1812 14.0 1830 6.25
1813 13.0 1831 6.25
1814 13.0 1832 6.25
1815 13.25 1833 6.25
1816 11.5 1834 7.75
Source. Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron & Steel Industry 1784-1879, p 230.
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3.3 The growth in iron output of the ironworks of the North West
Monmouthshire area c.1800 to 1850.
Many of today’s historians view economic growth rates in the industrial 
revolution period as more modest than hitherto believed and in addition they believe 
that Britain was highly commercially developed prior to the industrial revolution.
In fact recent estimates of the rates of annual growth of industrial production are 
around 3 percent or just over this for period 1800 to 1830 and much lower than this 
for the period 1760 to 1800.128 However in the context of the iron industry in Britain 
such modest growth rates seem quite at odds with the reality for this industry. Table 
3.4 below clearly shows that the national growth rate for iron output in the first fifty 
years of the nineteenth century exceeded 3 percent considerably. The table also 
demonstrates the variations in the growth of iron output across the regions of the 
country with Scotland and Staffordshire exceeding the national performance, South 
Wales being close to the national average and the Shropshire and the 
Yorkshire/Derbyshire regions performing below the national growth rate.
Pig iron output in South Wales grew from 72,900 tons in 1805 to 666,000 tons 
by 1852 representing an annual growth rate of 4.8 percent over the forty-seven year 
period. In this section an attempt will be made to isolate what part of this growth was 
due to the ironworks of the North West Monmouthshire area. Unfortunately there are 
no comprehensive sources of iron output for individual ironworks in the first half of 
the nineteenth century but there are figures for individual ironworks for three 
particular years, 1796, 1823 and 1830. The figures for 1796 were supplied by the 
ironworks as part of their campaign against William Pitt’s plan to tax coal at the
127 Joel Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), 
The Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume I  Industrialisation, 1700-1860, pp 1-2.
128 Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’, pp 3-4.
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pithead129 while the figures for 1823 and 1830 were prepared at the request of the 
Government.130 The figures for these three years are presented in Table 3.5.
Table 3.4 Estimates of pig iron output for selected years (‘000 tons) and annual growth rate % between 
the years shown for the period 1805 to 1852.
Britain South Wales Shropshire Staffs Yorks & 
Derby
Scotland
Year Pig
Iron
%
p.a.
Pig
Iron
%
p.a.
Pig
Iron
%
p.a.
Pig
Iron
%
p.a.
Pig
Iron
%
p.a.
Pig
Iron
%
p.a.
1805 250 72.9 55.0 48.5 36.6 22.8
3.4 5.2 0.3 5.8 0.7 0.4
1823 455 182.3 57.9 133.6 41.3 24.5
5.8 6.2 3.4 6.8 1.8 6.3
1830 677 277.6 73.4 211.6 46.9 37.5
7.0 5.6 1.1 6.2 7.1 20.2
1839 1,249 453.9 80.9 364.4 86.8 196.6
11.8 11.3 2.3 17.4 0.2 22.6
1840 1,396 505.0 82.8 427.7 87.0 241.0
-4.5 -3.2 -2.7 -9.0 -8.0 -0.3
1843 1,215 457.4 76.2 322.0 67.8 238.6
13.3 11.5 3.8 4.6 24.5 22.7
1847 2,000 706.7 88.4 385.8 162.8 540.0
6.2 -1.2 6.3 16.1 -1.6 7.5
1852 2,701 666.0 120.0 815.0 150.0 775.0
1805 to 1852 5.2 4.8 1.7 6.2 3.0 7.8
Source Pig iron output figures from Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, 
Table 1.1
Table 3.5 Pig iron output for the ironworks of the North West Monmouthshire area. 1796. 1823 and 
1830.
Ironworks. 1796 1823 1830 %Growth p.a. 
1796-1823
% Growth p.a. 
1823-1830
Blaenavon 5,460 16,882 13,843 4.3 -2.8
Beaufort 1,560 5,243 7,276 4.6 4.8
Clydach 1,820 5,200 10,190 4.0 10.1
Nantyglo 17,750 23,883 4.3
Sirhowy and 
Ebbw Vale
1,820
1,560
20,425 26,020 6.9 3.5
Tredegar 16,385 18,514 1.8
Totals (core group) 12,220 81,885 99,726 7.3 2.9
South Wales 41,000 182,325 277,643 5.7 6.2
Source. Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, pp 96, 134.
129 Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, p 94.
130 Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, p 131.
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The figures supplied for 1796 in Table 3.5 are clearly estimates and can only 
be used as a guide but the table does give an idea of the rate of growth of output of the 
core group of ironworks in the South Wales context. The very high growth figure for 
the core group for the period 1796 to 1823, whilst quite correct, is of course inflated 
by the fact that Nantyglo and Tredegar did not contribute to the output for 1796 but 
did so for 1823. It is important to recognise this feature when examining growth rates 
for particular industries as growth rates are usually calculated for areas, counties, 
regions or countries and as such will be inflated in times of growth as new companies 
emerge in the period under examination.
The core group made up approximately 30 percent of the South Wales output 
of pig iron in 1796, 45 percent in 1823 and 36 percent in 1830 indicating how 
important the area was in terms of the South Wales iron industry. However just 
considering the core group of ironworks in the North West Monmouthshire area 
understates the importance of the area in the first half of the nineteenth century. The 
other ironworks, mostly established lower down the valleys from the ironworks of the 
main group under study, should also be included. A list of these later works is given in 
Table 3.6 plus their approximate year of establishment and their location.
Table 3.6 List of ironworks established in the North West Monmouthshire area after 1800.
Ironworks Year of establishment 
(approximate)
Location.
Rhymney 1805 Rhymney valley, Monmouthshire/Glamorgan border
Varteg 1805 Afon Lwyd valley, below Blaenavon
Coalbrookvale 1823 Ebwy Fach valley, below Nantyglo
Blaina 1825 Ebwy Fach valley, below Nantyglo
Bute 1825 Rhymney valley, Monmouthshire/Glamorgan border
Abersychan 
(British Iron Co.)
1825 Afon Lwyd valley, below Blaenavon
Pentwyn 1825 Afon Lwyd valley, below Blaenavon
Golynos 1839 Afon Lwyd valley, below Blaenavon
Cwm Celyn 1839 Ebwy Fach valley, below Nantyglo
Victoria 1839 Ebwy Fawr valley, below Ebbw Vale
Source. Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp 1-31 and John Priyeane’s 
Map o f the Ironworks and Collieries in the Counties o f Monmouth & Glamorgan, Newport, 1843.
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If the newer works are included in the figures for 1823 and 1830 the ironworks o f the 
area represent approximately 53 percent and 52 percent respectively o f the South 
Wales total output o f pig iron, a remarkable percentage for a relatively small district 
geographically and one where the output o f pig iron was almost insignificant in the 
1770s.
Concentrating on pig iron output however gives a misleading picture o f the 
development of the iron industry in the area for, as has been stressed, the staple 
products o f the area once the ironworks had become integrated works were bar iron 
and, later in the period, wrought iron rails. The growth in iron output, pig and 
wrought, for the core group o f ironworks and for the ironworks o f the county of 
Monmouthshire can be represented approximately by the following graph using Harry 
Scrivenor’s data of pig and wrought iron sent down the Monmouthshire canal. (See 
Table 3.6 below).
Figure 3.2 Iron output o f the core group and o f the county o f Monmouthshire (tons) 
for the years 1804 to 1840 inclusive.
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Source. Scrivenor, The H istory o f  the Iron Trade, pp 127, 258.
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Harry Scrivenor’s data published in his History o f the Iron Trade, is of 
quantities of iron sent down the Monmouthshire Canal and its linking tramroads for 
the years 1802 through to 1840. These totals which represent movements of iron do 
not differentiate between pig iron and wrought iron and they must also be an 
understatement of the actual iron production at each works particularly in the earlier 
years prior to the time when the works of the group had become integrated. It is 
noticeable that Scrivenor left out the Sirhowy works as a separate entity probably 
because this works only produced pig iron that was largely transferred to other works 
in the area and generally not sent down the canal. Scrivenor’s figures also do not 
include iron sold locally by any of the works as castings nor do they include castings 
used by the ironworks themselves. Despite these reservations Scrivenor’s data does 
provide a means of assessing how the various works grew individually over the years 
and as such they do offer a way of comparing output performance in general. The 
fluctuations from year to year are considerable and hence it is prudent to include the 
full data supplied by Scrivenor.
A general point is that the Table 3.7 shows a gradually increasing share of 
output by the later works in the county. For example in 1810 the core group of 
ironworks were responsible for 82 percent of the iron sent down the Monmouthshire 
canal but by 1840 this percentage had fallen to just under 52 percent as iron 
manufacturing spread through the district.
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Table 3.7 Iron carried down the Monmouthshire canal and associated tramroads (tons).
Year Blaen
-avon
Beaufort Clydach Ebbw Vale Tred
-egar
Nanty
-Rio
Total for 
Group
Total for County
1804 8,490 2,950 1,266 2,890 15,596 20,474
1805 7,262 4,605 1,455 1,012 956 15,290 22,431
1806 6,594 3,989 1,599 3,252 3,124 18,558 23,994
1807 6,042 3,947 1,196 2,209 4,138 17,532 23,019
1808 7,163 4,004 963 1,553 5,529 19,212 24,551
1809 9,848 3,566 1,136 786 9,105 24,441 29,741
1810 12,254 3,948 1,372 2,758 7,696 28,028 34,070
1811 12,377 3,910 872 2,633 6,643 77 26,512 30,459
1812 14,579 3,995 1,774 4,648 7,862 1,168 34,026 40,020
1813 13,562 3,204 2,174 5,939 7,597 1,855 34,331 41,822
1814 12,438 3,146 1,472 4,752 9,131 2,292 33,231 41,838
1815 14,002 3,767 2,999 4,953 9,225 4,684 39,630 46,207
1816 11,773 3,146 2,658 2,949 7,499 6,160 34,185 38,443
1817 11,080 2,104 3,162 3,127 10,350 7,242 37,065 43,407
1818 13,868 2,100 3,947 2,476 8,258 7,325 32,877 42,012
1819 11,203 2,124 3,788 1,907 7,140 7,934 34,096 37,709
1820 12,221 3,132 3,397 3,605 8,211 8,826 39,392 45,462
1821 11,811 2,962 3,876 6,041 9,923 10,460 45,073 57,290
1822 9,307 3,786 4,225 5,960 8,102 10,906 42,286 52,432
1823 15,115 4,269 3,651 8,613 9,903 12,723 54,274 66,564
1824 15,782 5,347 3,617 10,101 11,444 15,134 61,425 76,320
1825 13,261 7,091 3,748 10,325 11,012 16,536 61,973 78,800
1826 10,204 6,028 3,660 10,297 10,962 11,512 52,663 69,783
1827 10,701 5,914 4,107 14,403 13,837 18,059 67,021 91,618
1828 12,411 5,701 5,183 15,479 14,341 19,032 72,147 110,918
1829 12,366 6,896 6,967 16,959 13,349 17,433 73,970 116,531
1830 13,051 5,065 6,771 18,133 12,303 17,115 72,438 112,647
1831 13,839 5,150 6,231 18,778 13,340 17,866 75,204 119,165
1832 10,819 6,052 6,542 19,740 13,304 21,333 77,790 124,207
1833 11,885 7,512 7,252 19,226 12,323 21,007 79,205 118,924
1834 10,620 9,808 6,261 20,228 12,858 22,594 82,369 127,554
1835 13,309 12,976 7,618 25,392 13,909 24,957 98,161 155,317
1836 11,863 14,567 7,640 23,120 12,133 25,384 94,707 151,408
1837 12,765 11,145 7,081 22,475 12,641 23,981 90,088 144,277
1838 13,762 10,903 9,283 23,579 15,526 25,263 98,316 169,367
1839 12,426 10,505 9,606 25,342 14,861 24,945 97,685 176,346
1840 14,302 10,049 10,038 24,199 15,288 26,662 100,538 194,661
Source. Scrivenor, The History o f the Iron Trade, pp 127,258. The County totals include all ironworks 
that transported iron down the Monmouthshire Canal and include Clydach and Beaufort.
Using Scrivenor’s data it is possible to make a broad assessment of the relative 
performances of the individual ironworks of the core group using output as a measure 
of success. Only one of the works actually failed following initial establishment that is 
the Nantyglo works. Although originally established in the 1790s there are no entries 
for shipments until 1811, the year that Joseph Bailey and Matthew Wayne took over 
the works. So despite the works being sited in an ideal location and in an area of 
abundant mineral resources as evidenced by the large number of leases and other
79
documents held at the Gwent Record Office it still took the arrival of particular 
entrepreneurs to make the works run successfully. To assist a performance comparison 
of the core group of ironworks a table of average individual growth rates has been 
assembled from Scrivenor’s data. In order to minimise the effect of individual year 
fluctuations, growth rates have been calculated for each five-year period taking the 
average of three years data at the start and three years data at the end of each five 
years. For example the average growth for say 1820 to 1825 was calculated from the 
average of years 1819, 1820 and 1821 to the average of years 1824, 1825 and 1826.
Table 3.8 Average individual growth rates per annum (measured across five year periods) for the 
ironworks of the North West Monmouthshire group for the period .
Years Blaenavon
Inc
Gamdyrris
Beaufort Clydach Ebbw
Vale
Tredegar Nantyglo Group
Totals
County
Totals
1804-1806
to
1809-1811
9.1 0 -4.8 -2.9 30.8 - 9.8 7.1
1809-1811
to
1814-1816
2.1 -2.5 16.1 15.4 2.0 274.6 6.3 6.1
1814-1816
to
1819-1821
-1.6 -4.0 9.2 -1.8 0 15.7 2.1 2.1
1819-1821
to
1824-1826
2.2 17.6 0 21.6 5.7 9.7 8.2 9.9
1824-1826
to
1829-1831
0 -1.5 12.6 11.9 3.1 4.0 4.7 9.1
1829-1831
to
1834-1836
-1.8 16.9 1.5 5.0 0 6.8 4.4 4.5
1834-1836
to
1839-1840
2.3 -3.8 6.5 1.6 3.1 1.2 1.6 5.1
Overall 35 year 
Growth rate p.a. 
1804-1806 to 
1839-1840
1.7 2.8 5.6 6.9 5.9 7.4 5.3 6.2
Note. The overal growth rate or Nantyglo was calculated over 25 years.
The ironworks of the core group and of the county yield growth rates
well over three percent for most of the period of Table 3.8 with overall growth rates of
5.3 percent and 6.2 percent respectively. The overall growth of the county ironworks
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was always likely to be higher than that of the core group because the latter were 
generally established concerns at the beginning of the period whilst the growth figures 
for the county as a whole were aided by new works being set up in the period. This 
factor also affects the growth performance of the individual works as an increase in 
growth is to be expected following an increase in capacity say by the erection of new 
blast furnaces or new puddling furnaces and rolling mills. Nevertheless some analysis 
of actual individual ironworks performance is possible from the table.
The performance of the Blaenavon works is demonstrably the worst of the 
group despite its early high growth rate. The works suffered negative or zero growth 
in three of the five-year periods and it is no surprise that the works was put up for sale 
in 1833. It is also significant that the sale document puts somewhat more emphasis on 
the coal and iron mines than on potential profits from the ironworks. That lack of 
capital was the main problem is confirmed by the following statement in the sale 
document, ‘The price of iron has been lately improving, and to any firm of Capital 
who might feel disposed to enter with spirit into a concern of this Magnitude and 
Importance, there can be no question that an immense and increased Annual Income 
may be derived’.131 A full discussion on capital and the joint stock iron companies of 
the area is given in Chapter 5.
The Beaufort ironworks is the other ironworks with a relatively disappointing 
overall growth rate, only 2.8 percent over the thirty-five year period. The works had 
an oscillating pattern of growth, showing negative or zero growth in four of the seven 
five year periods but dramatic growth in two, one of which, 1830-35, was the period 
when the works was taken over by the Baileys of Nantyglo and their influence on 
Beaufort is clearly demonstrated.
131 GRO. D.7.194. Sale particulars of Blaenavon Iron and Coal Mines (with ironworks etc.), 22 
November 1833.
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The other ironworks all had excellent overall growth rates for the thirty-five 
year period ranging from 5.6 percent for the Clydach ironworks to 7.4 percent for the 
Baileys’ Nantyglo. Nantyglo’s growth rate for 1811 to 1815, 274.6 percent, while 
accurate, is clearly an accident of the fact that the works did not really start production 
consistently until 1811. Nantyglo also was the only works to show positive growth in 
every five-year period once it had truly started, all the other works showed zero or 
negative growth in at least one five year period. In fact, whilst the group and county 
growth rates, though variable, are at least reasonably consistent, the individual 
ironworks’ growth rates show remarkable fluctuations, often inconsistently, some 
showing high growth rates in the same five year period as other show negative 
growth. For example whilst most of the works followed the national trend in the 1820 
to 1825 period with substantial growth, the Clydach ironworks managed no growth at 
all. This degree of inconsistency in performance among the ironworks of the group 
points above all to varying quality of management, instability of management and 
ownership and access to capital.
3.4 Conclusion.
The economic climate for the development of ironworks in the North West 
Monmouthshire area was generally favourable in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. All the ironworks of the group developed in the war period when demand for 
iron was likely to be high and the developments were further assisted by political 
advantages such as government assistance due to imposition of duties on foreign 
imports of iron, such duties steadily increasing as the first quarter of the century 
progressed. The British iron industry also benefited from the effects of the Baltic wars 
and the new ironworks of the study area also benefited from the experience gained at 
nearby Merthyr. As for other industries the iron industry must have benefited also
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from the general developments in the legal, financial and commercial fields that were 
a feature of the British industrial revolution.132
The period following the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the middle of 
the century saw demand for iron in Britain fluctuate considerably. The local 
ironmasters attempted to deal with these demand changes by joint and individual 
actions. At times they worked together to cut the supply side with considerable 
success but for most of the time each ironmaster acted according to their own 
circumstances.
The local ironmasters’ concentration on bar and rail iron made them 
vulnerable to the swings in the fortunes of the railway industries. The vast majority of 
the iron produced in the study area was sent via Newport to other areas and it is likely 
that relatively little was sold or used locally hence the local population had no real 
role in the commercial side of the iron business unlike say other more consumer 
orientated industries. As such they had no opportunity to affect demand for iron when 
externally the demand was low.
However it is possible that the ironmasters contributed to their own problems 
to a limited extent by increasing the supply side too rapidly in boom times for the 
industry. It is difficult to criticise them for this however as their expansion plans were 
generally to the benefit of the local populations in the further provision of 
employment.
The second major economic feature of this period in the iron industry in
Britain and in the North West Monmouthshire area was the trend for falling prices
with the consequent squeeze on potential profits. Despite the problems over
fluctuating demand and the trends of falling prices it is argued that the levels of
132 C. Knick Harley, ‘Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology’, in Floud and Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume I  Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 
2004, p 190.
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growth attained by the local ironworks in an area mostly devoid of proto-industry, 
local population and communications prior to the arrival of the industrial revolution, is 
exceptional and that this warrants considerable credit to the ironmasters. The 
variability in growth rates between the ironworks of the group displayed in Table 3.8 
are almost certainly attributable to different qualities of management and different 
approaches to all the various technological, organisational and business factors that 
were at play throughout the period. The following three chapters study in detail how 
the local ironmasters achieved these growth rates with respect to technology matters, 
to the provision of adequate capital and finally with respect to the recruitment of 
labour.
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Chapter 4 Technological factors facing the ironmasters of the North West 
Monmouthshire Area 1800 to 1850.
4.1 Introduction.
It is argued in this thesis that the ironmasters were the key elements in bringing 
the industrial revolution to the North West Monmouthshire area with the development, 
growth and success of a major iron industry. It is further argued that growth and 
success depended on the ironmasters confronting a range of factors and issues; 
technological, business, organisational and personnel issues, major and relatively 
minor in importance, and that the growth and success of the ironworks was not due to 
any one factor such as a major technological advance. In this sense there is a sharp 
difference between the iron industry in this district and that in Scotland where the 
discovery and successful use of hot blast in the blast furnaces there resulted in a huge 
surge in output of iron such that Scotland’s share of British pig iron production went 
from under 6 percent in 1830 to nearly 16 percent nine years later.1 The introduction 
of hot blast in furnaces in South Wales had no such dramatic or immediate outcome.
Innovations were of course vital in the industrial revolution period but 
innovation does not just mean major technological change but can also mean 
continuous adaptation of technological processes and developments in organisational 
structures and in business processes.2 This chapter looks at the whole range of 
technological and technologically related factors that faced the ironmasters in the first 
half of the nineteenth century and at the approach the ironmasters of the area took to 
these issues.
The chapter looks at the technological changes that were evident in the iron 
industry in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century. Unlike the eighteenth
1 Philip Riden and John G. Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Cardiff 1995, p lxv.
2 Pat Hudson, ‘Industrial organisation and structure’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume I Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 
2004, p 46.
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century, the technological innovations in the first half of the nineteenth century with 
the possible exception of hot blast were more modest and generally involved slight or 
gradual improvements in techniques or methods.
The approach of the local ironmasters to technologically related issues is 
examined, possibly the main point of importance being their attitude to hot blast with 
an explanation of why it was not introduced with the same urgency as the Scottish 
masters. The use of hot blast was related to the use and value of particular ores and the 
whole subject of iron ores is discussed in detail separately in the chapter. Iron does not 
exist as such in nature but exists only in the form of chemical compounds such as 
ferric oxide or ferric carbonate and the importance of iron ores in a study of the iron 
industry cannot be understated.
The role of the inventors is also analysed in the chapter and how this role 
related to that of the ironmasters. J. R. Harris believes that there is more research 
needed to examine the role of the ironmasters as innovators3 and it will be contended 
in this section that the ironmasters tended to take advantage of inventors in the study 
area and nationally. In the context of the British iron industry as a whole the main 
inventors whose work affected the industry greatly in the first half of the nineteenth 
century were Henry Cort, who is credited with the invention of the puddling and 
rolling process, Joseph Hall who is known for his work in connection with the 
introduction o f 6 wet puddling’, and James Beaumont Neilson, inventor of the hot blast 
process, but in the area under study the most prominent inventor was Samuel Baldwin 
Rogers who is best known as the inventor of the cast iron bottom to the puddling 
furnace in about 1818. A clear pattern emerges with regard to the long term fortunes 
of these inventors in that they rarely obtained appropriate reward for their discoveries.
3 J. R. Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, Basingstoke and London, 1988, p 73.
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As the local inventor, particular attention is given to the life of Samuel Rogers of 
Nantyglo. No discussion on the inventors of the period in the iron industry would be 
complete without mention of David Mushet. Mushet was an expert metallurgist who 
regularly gave advice to ironmasters and is probably best known as the discoverer of 
the blackband ironstone in 1801. Although not used greatly until after Neilson’s hot 
blast process came into use, blackband, in conjunction with hot blast, contributed 
dramatically to the success of the Scottish iron industry from the 1830s, with great 
credit due to Mushet,4 a Scot himself. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of the 
reasons for the technological changes introduced by the ironmasters.
4.2 Blast furnaces.
There were two fundamental technological innovations in the British iron 
industry in the eighteenth century, the use of coke in the blast furnace used widely 
after mid century following its introduction by the Darby family of Shropshire and the 
production of malleable iron using the puddling and rolling process patented by Henry 
Cort in 1784. There were no innovations in the industry in the first half of the 
nineteenth to match these but there were substantial technological improvements in 
the manufacture of iron in this period.
With regard to the smelting process the most obvious way to raise output of 
pig iron was to build additional blast furnaces and this was done by most of the 
ironmasters in most regions of the country in the first half of the nineteenth century. 
Table 4.1 shows the numbers of blast furnaces in existence in the main iron 
manufacturing regions of Britain together with the numbers of ironworks.
4 Fred. M. Osborn, The Story o f the Muskets, London et al., 1952, pp 13-26.
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Table 4.1 Blast furnaces in Britain. 1805 to 1852.
Year South Wales Shropshire South Staffs and 
Worcestershire
Yorks & 
Derbyshire
Scotland
N o . o f  
W o rk s
F u r n a c e s
B u i l t
N o .  o f  
W o rk s
F u r n a c e s
B u i l t
N o .  o f  
W o rk s
F u r n a c e s
B u i l t
N o .  o f  
W o rk s
F u r n a c e s
B u i l t
N o .  o f  
W o rk s
F u r n a c e s
B u i l t
1805 26 46 19 42 22 39 26 46 12 27
1823 23 72 16 38 43 84 24 41 8 22
1830 34 113 20 48 56 123 24 45 10 27
1839 41 127 14 34 53 126 22 45 18 55
1843 42 168 15 36 52 129 20 48 21 98
1847 46 193 15 34 57 139 25 58 24 130
1852 48* 197 14* 40 64 159 26* 61** 27* 144
Source. Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Table 2.1. 
*1849 **1854
From the table it can be seen that the ratio of blast furnaces to the number of
ironworks rose throughout the first half of the century. This ratio went from 1.9 and
2.3 in 1805 and 1823 respectively to 3.3 and 3.4 in 1847 and 1852 clearly indicating 
that the ironmasters saw the building of new furnaces as a primary, though expensive, 
way of increasing output.
The most obvious method of increasing output of pig iron was the building of 
an extra furnace at a particular ironworks site and the ironmasters of the North West 
Monmouthshire area ironworks certainly did this as can be seen from Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Numbers of blast furnaces at the ironworks of the North West Monmouthshire group.
Year Blaenavon Beaufort Clydach Ebbw
Vale
Sirhowy Tredegar Nantyglo Total
for
Group
1805 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 16
1810 5 2 2 1 2 4 2 18
1823 5 3 2 3 3 5 5 26
1825 5 4 3 3 4 5 7 31
1830 5 4 3 3 3 5 7 30
1839 5 6 4 3 4 5 8 35
1841 5 6 4 4 5 7 7 38
1843 5 8 4 4 4 7 8 40
1847 5 7 4 4 5 7 8 40
1854 5 7 4 4 5 8 7 40
Source. Riden and Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, pp 1-31.
Compared with the approximate industry average numbers of furnaces per ironworks 
as demonstrated from Table 4.1 it is clear that the ironworks of the group were larger
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concerns even in 1805 with an average of 2.3 furnaces per works as compared with 
1.9 for the country. This average increased to 3.7 by 1823 (2.3 for the country) and 
reached 5.7 furnaces per works in the late 1840s and early 1850s (3.3 to 3.4 for the 
country). Hence the ironworks of the group were larger concerns than the national 
average throughout the first half of the nineteenth centuiy and the greater tendency to 
expand and build additional furnaces is an indication that there was more of an 
inclination to reinvest profits in their businesses than in some other regions of the 
country.
Prior to the general use of hot blast the usual method of improving the yield 
per furnace was to build larger ones.5 The height of furnaces tended to increase and, 
whilst there were regional differences, the average height of blast furnaces prior to 
1832 was in the region of 35 to 40 feet, those built after this date tended to be higher.6 
It is believed that there was a tendency for the Welsh furnaces to be larger than those 
of their competitors in the Midlands as the latter generally required better quality pig 
iron, more of their iron going to foundries.7 The Welsh ironworks could thus produce 
a larger volume of pig iron of slightly lower quality per furnace as the vast majority of 
Welsh pig iron went to forges for the production of malleable iron. The extra refining 
done in the puddling furnaces meant that pig iron used in forges need not be of the 
quality of that used in foundries where no further refining process was normally 
carried out. Although the Welsh furnaces were not particularly taller than those of 
other areas they may have been of greater capacity due to extra width and a generally 
wider shape. By the 1850s some of the furnaces in the study area had capacities
5 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987, p 43.
6 H. R. Schubert, ‘Extraction and Production of Metals: Iron and Steel’, in Charles Singer, E. J. 
Holmyard and A. R. Hall (eds.), A History o f Technology Volume IV  The Industrial Revolution c l 750- 
1850, Oxford, 1958, pp 111-4.
7 A. H. John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, Cardiff, 1995, p 155.
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greater than 5,000 cubic feet.8 For example the Number 3 furnace at Ebbw Vale had a 
capacity of 5,890 cubic feet, the Number 2 furnace at Cwm Celyn had a capacity of 
5,360, the Number 1 furnace at Blaenavon, 5,540 and the planned Number 3 furnace 
at Cwm Celyn was to have a capacity of 16,560 cubic feet.9
Probably the major technological innovation in the first half of the nineteenth 
century was the application of hot blast to the blast furnace. The inventor of the hot 
blast process was James Beaumont Neilson who took out a patent in 1828 and in the 
following year the method was employed at the Clyde ironworks.10 The key advantage 
with the successful use of hot blast was that much less fuel was required than with the 
cold blast process to produce the same amount of pig iron11 and the method was 
particularly important in Scotland as raw coal could be used and the Scottish coals had 
never made good coke.12 This point was well made in a letter to Thomas Evans of the 
Dowlais Ironworks in Merthyr in September 1831 ‘Have you heard they are making
pig iron in Scotland from raw coal by the hot air blast. If you could do this in all the
1 ^iron districts you would be able to spare half your colliers’.
However there were differing opinions amongst experts of the day as to 
whether the hot blast procedure was a truly great invention. David Mushet certainly 
thought so and in the context of the creation of wealth he thought the hot blast process 
might rank with that of Arkwright for cotton spinning.14 John Percy, the great 
nineteenth century writer on metallurgy, did not regard the procedure as a great 
invention in the sense that there was no intricately complicated process or machinery
8 John Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, London, 1864, pp 559-64.
9 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 559-64.
10 Schubert, ‘Extraction and Production of Metals: Iron and Steel’, pp 109-11.
11 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 425.
12 Schubert, ‘Extraction and Production of Metals: Iron and Steel’, pp 109-11.
13 Madeleine Elsas (ed), Iron in the making: Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Glamorgan 
County Council, 1960, p 60-1, Thomas Bell to Thomas Evans, Newcastle, 3 September 1831.
14 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 396.
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involved and ‘without wishing in the smallest degree to distract from the spirit to 
which Mr Neilson is justly entitled, I may nevertheless express my opinion that the 
hot blast was a lucky hit rather than an invention properly so called’.15 William 
Truran, another metallurgist of the mid nineteenth century who had worked under J. J. 
Guest at the Dowlais works as engineer, was even more sceptical about the merits of 
the hot blast process. Writing in 1855 Truran believed that writers on the process had 
greatly exaggerated its effects. He thought that Mushet, in his claims about the savings 
of fuel, had foiled to take account of the improvements that had taken place over the 
years in the iron industry, including those that had involved savings in fuel. Truran 
also questioned the claims that the hot blast process had permitted the application of 
certain types of coals, such as anthracite, to the blast furnace that had been believed 
inappropriate earlier. He claimed that the key to the use of such coals was the density 
of the blast, whether this blast was cold or hot. However Truran did concede that hot 
blast was about 12 percent superior to cold.16 Mushet, apparently, was greatly 
involved in the proving of the use of anthracite17 and the use of this type of coal in the 
blast furnace benefited other regions of the country as well as the Scottish region, and 
ironworks sprang up in the anthracite areas such as in the more western part of the 
South Wales coalfield.18 For example, George Crane, the manager or proprietor of the 
Yniscedwin iron works near Swansea, commented that while his early attempts to use 
anthracite had not worked, he found that by availing himself of Mr Neilson’s hot blast 
patent he had completely succeeded in the application of anthracite to the smelting of 
ironstone and ore. Crane further stated that he had used a cupola blast furnace for
15 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 397.
16 William Truran, The Iron Manufacture o f Great Britain, London, 1855, pp 85-7.
17 Samuel Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers, London, 1884, p 147.
18 Laurence Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, Merton, 1993, p 3.
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these experiments which he had patented, and he was now preparing to use the 
method in his three blast fiimaces.19
Whether the hot blast process was strictly a great invention or not and 
accepting that its effects might have been somewhat exaggerated by Mushet and 
others, there can be no doubt that the process did affect the Scottish iron industry quite 
dramatically and over a relatively short space of time. There can also be no doubt 
about its long-term effect on the iron industry of not just Scotland but of Britain as a 
whole, the process being adopted eventually throughout the country. Percy believed 
that some of the resistance to it was due to the misguided view of most ironmasters 
when cold blast dominated the industry that the blast needed to be as cold as possible, 
a view arrived at because it was generally known that production of iron was higher in 
winter. Percy states that although this latter state of affairs was true it was nothing to 
do with the temperature of the atmosphere but a result of different levels of moisture 
in the air in summer than in winter.
As the discoverer of blackband ironstone, David Mushet was especially 
interested in the hot blast process and its suitability to be used in conjunction with 
blackband. Mushet claimed that the output per furnace with blackband and cold blast 
never exceeded 60 tons per week whilst a furnace with the same ore could produce 50 
percent more iron if hot blast was used.21 New fields of blackband were discovered in 
Scotland in the mid 1830s and most of the large ironworks there used the ore in 
conjunction with other ores or on its own and this, according to Mushet, contributed 
greatly to the rapid expansion of the Scottish iron industry in this decade.22
19 Monmouthshire Beacon, 20 January 1838, Smelting of iron ore with anthracite or stone coal, Article 
by George Crane of Yniscedwin iron works.
2 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 397.
21 David Mushet, Papers on Iron and Steel, Practical and Experimental, London, 1840, p 127.
22 Osborn, The Story o f the Mushets, pp 25-6.
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With regard to the inventor himself, Neilson does not seem to have benefited 
greatly. Neilson was short of capital and required partners and as a result he retained 
for himself only three-tenths of the value of the royalties from his invention. In 
addition there was litigation and it was some years before Neilson’s rights were 
established and although he had had to cede more that two-thirds of the profits of his 
invention he did retain sufficient to have a comfortable life thereafter.23
It has already been established how this innovation improved the Scottish iron 
industry but hot blast did not have the same effect in South Wales. The advantageous 
qualities of the bituminous coal affected the apparent need to rush into the use of the 
hot blast process as it was questionable whether the savings in fuel would even offset 
the royalty payments for its use.24 The ironworks of the study area were certainly slow 
to introduce hot blast. For example the Beaufort and Blaenavon ironworks had not 
introduced its use in 1832 and 1833 respectively25 and Tredegar was just 
experimenting in its use in 1835.26 Table 4.3 gives the number of furnaces in the area 
utilising hot and cold blast in July 1839.
The Sirhowy and Ebbw Vale works had most of their furnaces using hot blast 
by 184427 though it is believed that the Blaenavon works continued to use cold blast in 
at least one of its furnaces longer than any other ironworks in Wales.28 Neilson’s 
patent expired after 184229 and it is probably no coincidence that most of the works of 
the area seemed to have adopted hot blast in the 1840s probably assessing that the
23 Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers, pp 149-59.
24 Alan Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784-1879, London, 1967, p 
185; Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 19.
25 GRO. D.397.1677. Letter to C. Bailey re. Valuation of Beaufort ironworks 1832; GRO. D.7.194. 
Sale/Auction Document for Blaenavon, 22 November 1833.
26 Evan Powell, History o f Tredegar, (Subject of Competition at Tredegar Chair Eisteddfod, 25 
February 1884), Newport, 1902, pp 49-50.
27 GRO. D.749.508. 18 April 1844, Sirhowy and Ebbw Vale Auction Particulars.
28 Arthur Clark, The Story o f Monmouthshire, Volume 2, Monmouth, 1979, pp 77-8.
29 Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron workers and tool makers, p 157.
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Table 4.3 Furnaces with cold or hot blast in July 1839.
Ironworks Furn­
aces
erected
Hot
Air
Cold
Air
Out
Of
Blast
Nantyglo & Beaufort 14 10 4
Ebbw Vale & Sirhowy 7 3 4
Blaenavon 5 - 5 -
Tredegar 5 - 5
Clydach 4 - 4
Pontypool 3 2 1 1
Pentwyn & Golynos 5 3 2 -
Abersychan 6 - 4 2
Varteg 5 4 1 -
Coalbrook Vale 3 — 3
Blaina & Cwm Celyn 2 - 2
Victoria 2 - - 1
Rhymney & Bute 6 2 4
Dowlais 15 5 10
Penydarren 7 - 6 1
Cyfarthfa 14 - 12 2
Hirwaun -
Plymouth 7 - 7
Aberdare 6 2 4
Pentyrch 2 - 2
Source. Monmouthshire Beacon, 6 July 1839, Monmouthshire works are listed first followed by 
Dowlais and other works in East Glamorgan.
savings in fuel more than justified the capital cost of the change once royalty 
payments were not a factor.
If the Welsh ironmasters were slow to move to hot blast compared with some 
other regions they were among the first, if not the first, to cap successfully the furnace 
tops and were to the forefront of developments to capture and reuse the waste gases 
from the blast furnaces. The installation of the cup and cone device in about 1850 to 
the top of the furnaces was credited by John Percy to George Parry of the Ebbw Vale 
works30 though it is believed by certain current historians that the method was 
collectively invented.31 Percy believed that Parry had derived the idea of this method 
from material published by Mr. Jessop who had worked at the Butterley and Cognor 
Park ironworks in Derbyshire. The main result was the retention of heat and an even
30 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 470-1.
31 Hudson, ‘Industrial organisation and structure’, p 46.
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distribution of the charge of the minerals.32 There is no evidence whatsoever that 
furnaces were capped in this period with environmental considerations in mind, the 
process was carried out for purely economic reasons.
Related to the capping of furnaces was the capture and reuse of the hot furnace 
gases. For example in the 1850s at the Number 1 furnace at Ebbw Vale, the hot waste 
gases from the furnace were captured and reused to heat the hot blast stoves.33 There 
was a similar process being installed at the Blaina ironworks a few miles down the 
Ebbw Fach valley from Nantyglo. The ironmaster at Blaina, Mr Levick, claimed that 
this application of the blast furnace waste gases to heat the hot blast ovens and steam 
boilers saved the equivalent of around 600 tons of coal a week.34 Mr Percy was 
impressed by these innovations at Ebbw Vale and Blaina:
At Blaina and Ebbw Vale I saw the application of the waste gases 
of the blast furnaces carried out to perfection. I have never 
witnessed any metallurgical operation with more pleasure than that 
of these hot-blast stoves; and I have felt no small degree of 
commiseration for ironmasters who still pursue the old plan of 
using solid fuel, such as coal-stack, however cheaply it may be 
obtained.35
Hence the South Wales ironworks and in particular the works of the North 
West Monmouthshire area were not slow to build additional blast furnaces and 
introduce innovations to blast furnace processes when such innovations were seen as 
cost effective at the particular time.
32 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 470-1.
33 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 366-7.
34 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 366,410; Charles Wilkins, History o f the Iron, Steel and 
Tinplate Trades, Merthyr, 1903, pp 292-3.
35 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 410.
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4.3 The Refining processes.
With regard to the refining side of iron making the fundamental breakthrough 
was the successful use of Henry Cort’s puddling and rolling process in the late 
eighteenth century. The puddling process was perfected at Merthyr with Richard 
Crawshay of Cyfarthfa credited with much of the experimenting whilst Samuel 
Homfray of the Penydarren works completed matters by suggesting that the puddling 
furnaces should be charged with finer s’ metal rather than pig iron. Hence pig iron 
from the blast furnace was processed in a finery furnace prior to the puddling stage. 
Although Cort took out his patent for the puddling and rolling process in 1783 and 
178436 it was not until the early years of the nineteenth century that the ironworks of 
the study area were integrated organisations. It should be mentioned that it was the 
Shropshire ironmasters in the late eighteenth century who led the way in establishing 
the integrated structure for coke fired ironworks and the Welsh industrialists and those 
of other regions followed their example.37 For the remainder of the pre-steel industry 
period the local ironworks concentrated on the manufacture of malleable iron by their 
own puddling furnaces and rolling mills by Cort’s processes and later modifications of 
these processes. In fact the puddling process became so identified with South Wales 
compared with other regions that it became known as the ‘Welsh Method’.38
The other iron producing districts of Britain made similar use of Cort’s 
method also with improvements as time went on. However Cort died in poverty as he 
was ruined financially in 1790 as a result of the death of the father of his partner who 
had been financing Cort in exchange for Cort’s patent. Cort himself died in 1800 
having received virtually nothing for his work in the form of royalties. His family took
36 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 629.
37 Barrie Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, Chichester, 2000, p 40.
38 Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, p 47.
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legal action but it seems that William Crawshay of Cyfarthfa claimed that they had not 
entirely followed Cort’s plans and Samuel Homfray of Penydarren and later Tredegar 
ironworks, thought that the process was not original, the use of finer’s metal in the 
puddling furnace being the key to the success of puddling. The issue was further 
complicated by James Cockshutt, Richard Crawshay’s partner at Cyfarthfa, who wrote 
attributing the process to Cort and claiming that Crawshay would not have agreed to 
pay 10 shillings a ton for patent rights if he had not accepted Cort’s rights. It appears 
however that Cort did not receive royalties from Crawshay.39 On the subject of 
puddling it should also be mentioned that Peter Onions of Merthyr took out a patent in 
1783 and Percy accepted that a method of puddling was described in it but the method 
still required a blast unlike Cort and it was the latter’s method that was generally 
followed.40
As with the iron smelting processes there were no further dramatic 
technological advances in refining in the first half of the nineteenth century though 
there were a few substantial improvements to these processes. Under Cort’s process 
the base of the puddling furnace was of sand but apparently Crawshay experimented 
with the use of an iron bottom to the puddling furnace as early as 1789 but did not 
continue with it.41 It was not until 1818 that an iron bottom was successfully used 
instead of a sand one in the puddling furnace. The inventor was Samuel Baldwin 
Rogers later of the Nantyglo ironworks. The iron bottom which was water cooled had 
a much longer life than sand based ones and was cleaner. Rogers claimed that his 
invention improved the weekly yield of iron produced in the puddling furnace by two
39 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 629-39; Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool 
Makers, pp 116-25.
40 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 638-39; Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool 
Makers, pp 115-16.
41 Chris Evans (calendared by), The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshaw 1788-1797, Cardiff, 1990, p 34, 
Richard Crawshay to James Cockshutt, 1 January 1789; Birch, The Economic History o f the British 
Iron & Steel Industry 1784-1879, pp 40-1.
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or three times42 however this does appear a little optimistic in a commercial sense in 
view of the labour intensive nature of the puddling process.
Rogers was bom in Chepstow in 1778 and before the age of twenty he owned 
a bookshop in the town but unfortunately he was forced to move on by creditors.43 He 
moved to Pontypool and though it is not known how he became interested in 
chemistry or metallurgy he certainly worked at a laboratory in Pontypool in 181544 
and it is believed he moved to an ironworks at Pontymister in l815or l816as  furnace 
manager.45 It was while he was at Pontymister that Rogers made and announced his 
discovery, the use of the iron bottom to the puddling furnace, and this discovery 
ensured he would be remembered in the history of iron making. He did not patent his 
invention probably because of lack of funds and offered it freely to various 
ironmasters in South Wales but initially only Richard Harford of the Ebbw Vale 
works adopted the procedure, other masters followed later and it came into general 
use.
Rogers was a determined writer of pamphlets and treatises, and in about 1832, 
he started working at J. and C. Bailey’s Nantyglo ironworks where he was able to 
make a number of improvements, much of his work there being concerned with the 
use of raw materials.46 In and prior to 1838 he was involved in analyses of iron ores 
and other minerals and in the planning and erecting new coke ovens and in 1844 he 
published a note on ‘The use of a new Flux for iron-making, generally or particularly, 
is herein recommended to the notice and patronage of the iron-masters of
42 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 652.
43 Famous People o f Blaenau Gwent, Blaenau Gwent Borough Council, 1989, p 109.
44 Newport Library, pqm 330 012, Samuel Rogers, Advertisement for Genuine Westphalian Essence 
prepared by Samuel Rogers, Newport, 1815.
45 T. G. Grey-Davies, ‘Iron-Bottom Rogers’ in Presenting Monmouthshire, No. 12 (Autumn 1961), 
Monmouthshire Local History Council, 1961, pp 23-4.
46 Grey-Davies, ‘Iron-Bottom Rogers’ in Presenting Monmouthshire, No. 12 (Autumn 1961), p 26.
98
Monmouthshire and South Wales’.47 These are just a few examples of the work he did 
while he was at Nantyglo and while still there he seems to have carried out analyses of 
minerals for other ironmasters,48 such was the way the ironworks of Monmouthshire 
freely communicated and helped each other at this time.
Rogers was a man of great vision well ahead of his time and he produced 
pamphlets on a variety of issues. The late nineteenth century Welsh historian, Charles 
Wilkins, when writing of Rogers, said of his ideas of 1815 for railways that ‘had his 
ideas been practically adopted, the earlier and more methodic development of the 
mineral district would unquestionably have been brought about’.49 In 1845 Rogers 
produced a pamphlet on ‘An Early Victorian Severn Bridge’ that was to be 
magnificent, toll-free and built of stone50 and in 1841 he published a letter on ‘A new 
mode of supplying London, and other populous places,-and also, the “Great Western” 
and other railway companies with GAS’.51 Rogers also devised a ‘New and 
exceedingly beneficial system of Commerce’ in 184852 indicating that his range of 
interests was practically unbounded. Rogers lived to an old age and after he died on 5 
September 1863 he was buried in the churchyard at Llanfoist, near Abergavenny 
though unlike his former boss, Crawshay Bailey, whose monument in the same
47 Newport Library, qm 330 672, Letter from S. Rogers to Thomas Brown, Cwm Celyn ironworks, 20 
October 1838.
48 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Letter from S. Rogers to Samuel Homfray (of 
Tredegar ironworks), copy to Dowlais ironworks, Nantyglo, Monmouthshire, 6 June 1844, pp 203-4, 
Letter regarding Rogers’ analysis of Abersach ironstone (blackband).
49 Charles Wilkins, History o f the Iron, Steel and Tinplate Trades, pp 213-16.
50 Newport Library, pm 425.3 625.1, Memorandum relative to a Magnificent Toll-free Stone Bridge 
across the River Severn between The New Passage in Gloucestershire and The Black-Rock in 
Monmouthshire, Abergavenny, 1845.
51 Newport Library, M l60 665.7, S. B. Rogers, Mineral and Metallurgical Chemist, Nantyglo, A Letter 
to the Coal Owners and Workers o f Coal Mines in Monmouthshire, and certain parts o f 
Glamorganshire and to the Directors and Shareholders o f Gas Light Establishments, situate on a route 
extending from Cardiff to London, via Gloster, etc. (and others) On a new mode o f Supplying London, 
and other populous places, -and also, the “Great Western ” and other railway companies with GAS.
52 Newport Library, qm 330 672, Samuel Baldwin Rogers, Outline o f a NEW and exceedingly 
beneficial SYSTEM OF COMMERCE, etc., to be established generally throughout the United Kingdom, 
under legal, and i f  possible, Royal authority, Nantyglo, 14 October 1848.
53 Grey-Davies, ‘Iron-Bottom Rogers’, pp 29-30.
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churchyard is grand and very prominent, visible immediately one enters the 
churchyard, Rogers’ grave is unmarked.54
The next substantial improvement to the puddling process was an innovation 
introduced by Joseph Hall known as ‘wet puddling’. The procedure, which took some 
years to perfect in the second half of the 1820s and much of the next decade, involved 
a further change to the bottom of the puddling furnace. Hall lined the bottom of the 
furnace with cinder and with solid oxidised compounds of iron, which in contact with 
pig iron released carbonic acid, which escaped giving the appearance of boiling. The 
process was also known as ‘pig boiling’. Hall’s process, which he developed at the 
Bloomfield ironworks in Staffordshire, contributed greatly to the improved position of 
the Staffordshire iron industry.55
Hall got little reward for his invention even failing to secure a patent. Hall did 
obtain a patent for a further improvement to the bottom of the puddling furnace, the 
application of tap-cinder, but made little financially from this procedure either.56 
Unfortunately there is no evidence to indicate when the ironworks of the study area 
adapted their puddling furnaces with this innovation but as the production of wrought 
iron was their main activity it can be assumed that the process was soon taken up in 
the area.
Although the puddling process which was based on coal as fuel was the 
general method of producing malleable iron in South Wales in the first half of the 
nineteenth century the ironmasters were still cautious individuals and would not 
readily give up an older method entirely unless this was clearly beneficial to them. 
Thus the Clydach ironmasters were still making finished iron using charcoal blooms
54 Grey-Davies, ‘Iron-Bottom Rogers’, p 30.
55 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 669-70 and Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron 
and Steel Industry 1784-1879, pp 152, 191.
56 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 670-1.
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as much as by the puddling process as late as 1825 for in the four week period from 21 
May to 18 June of that year they made an average of 18 to 19 tons of malleable iron 
by each process.57 This is not to suggest that the ironmasters of the area were not 
continually striving to improve their puddling procedures. The Tredegar works took 
out a patent in connection with puddling probably in 1824 and the Ebbw Vale 
Company were quick to point out to Tredegar that their own plan resulting from their 
trials was not an infringement of the Tredegar patent.58 The Clydach Company also 
took out a patent in 1841 aimed at improving their puddling procedures59 and 
probably there were many more attempts to improve the puddling methods than the 
above examples.
William Neale Clay took out patents in which he set out a method of 
producing wrought iron direct from ore, that is without the smelting process in blast 
furnaces. Clay’s approach was one which used rich haematite ore mixed with 
powdered charcoal, coke or other carbonaceous matter in a reverberatory furnace. 
This type of furnace is one, like a puddling furnace, in which the ore is separated from 
the fuel to stop the reintroduction of impurities into the reduced metal. Clay’s method 
also required a further process in a balling furnace and trials were made at a small 
forge near Glasgow and on a larger scale at Liverpool.60
John Percy, writing in 1864, stated that Clay’s process and that of other 
attempts to produce malleable iron directly in a reverberatory or puddling furnace 
even if successful in practice were not viable commercially. Percy made no mention 
of such a process being in operation at Nantyglo.61
57 NLW. Maybery MSS 3421-2, Make reports at Clydach Ironworks May/June 1825.
58 GRO. D.2472.2. The Ebbw Vale Letterbook for the years 1824-1827, Letter to Tredegar Co., Bristol, 
31 July 1824.
59 NLW. Maybery MSS 348, April 1841, Clydach Ironworks Patent.
60 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 330-1.
61 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 330-5.
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However the Nantyglo works, the most successful of the works in the group in 
the 1830s and 1840s, was in the news in the early 1840s both for improvements made 
in the production of malleable iron and in connection with the blackband ironstone. 
The blackband ironstone first identified by David Mushet in 1801 in Scotland was 
found to exist in substantial amounts in the neighbourhood of Beaufort in about 1838, 
confirmed personally by Mushet in a letter to the Monmouthshire Merlin.62 Blackband 
ironstone was very rich in carbonaceous matter and it was reported in December 1843 
that Clay’s process had been adopted at Nantyglo using blackband ironstone to make 
malleable iron directly in a reverberatory furnace, with success. S. B. Rogers, 
famous for inventing the iron bottom for the puddling furnace as recorded above, took 
great exception to this report and wrote to the Monmouthshire Merlin strongly 
asserting that the process being carried out at Nantyglo using blackband ore directly in 
the puddling furnace ‘is neither a piracy, nor an imitation of Mr Clay’s or any other 
man’s patent or invention’. Rogers claimed that Nantyglo’s method was new in 
principle and practice and that it could herald a new era in iron manufacture.64
Truran in his book, The Iron Industry o f Great Britain published in 1855, 
stated that ‘The Beaufort blackband was thus converted into malleable iron (without 
smelting the ore in a blast furnace), though after a few experimental trials the 
operation was discontinued’65 and so it appears that the process described by Rogers 
was not carried out for any length of time or was commercially viable. Percy suggests 
that some users of this type of process modified it and included pig iron with the 
carbonaceous ore66 and this may have been done at Nantyglo.
62 Monmouthshire Merlin, 14 January 1843, Letter to Monmouthshire Merlin from David Mushet.
63 Monmouthshire Merlin, 23 December 1843, Nantyglo, Clay’s Process.
64 Monmouthshire Merlin, 6 January 1844, S. B. Rogers’ letter of 26 December 1843.
65 Truran, The Iron Manufacture o f Great Britain, p 165.
66 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, p 331.
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With the concentration on malleable iron production it is no surprise that the 
ironworks of the group were to the forefront of rolling mill developments and with the 
use of steam engines to drive the rolls. The Tredegar ironworks had only one rolling 
mill engine in 1821 but had increased this number to four by 186267 and the records of 
steam engines built by the Neath Abbey works and supplied to the works of the group 
show that they were regular buyers especially for their rolling mills. Tredegar was 
one of the first works to introduce a guide mill in 183469 and the works built a huge 
new mill in 1849, the opening of which in March that year was an occasion of much 
celebration.70 The Baileys of Nantyglo ensured that their works remained in the 
forefront of rolling mill developments and in January 1845 it was reported that one of 
the largest sheet rolling machines in South Wales had been set up at the works71 and a 
year later the Monmouthshire Merlin reported with regard to Nantyglo that ‘above 
8,000 tons of rolled iron were made in this stupendous manufactory within the last 
month’.72 In feet John Lloyd, the nineteenth century historian, believed that the 
Baileys had sought to acquire the Beaufort ironworks in 1833 to get access to more 
pig iron for the new mills they were developing for the rail age that was dawning at 
that time.73
There were also improved procedures to the rolling mills themselves such as 
the introduction of reversing mills74 which increased the throughput of iron rolled 
considerably and in August 1844 it was reported that The Times newspaper had noted
67 David Morris, The History of Tredegar from the Beginning of the Iron Works up to present day, 
Unpublished, Winning entry in the Eisteddfod of the Cymrodorion of Tredegar in 1862, p 21.
68 Laurence Ince, Neath Abbey and the Industrial Revolution, Stroud, 2001, Appendix 2 (Stationary 
steam engines built by the Neath Abbey Iron Company).
69 Morris, The History of Tredegar from the Beginning of the Iron Works up to present day, p 21.
70 Monmouthshire Beacon, 17 March 1849, Tredegar, Opening of the new mill at the Tredegar Iron 
Works, Grand Demonstration.
71 Monmouthshire Merlin, 11 January 1845, Nantyglo Iron Works.
72 Monmouthshire Merlin, 3 January 1846.
73 John Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Ironworks (1760-1840), London, 1906, p 174.
74 Aubrey Byles, The History o f the Monmouthshire Railway and Canal Company, Cwmbran, 1982, p 
5.
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that ‘The application of electricity, to supersede several of the expensive processes, 
has, it is stated, been tried in the Welsh and Derbyshire furnaces with satisfactory 
result’.75
In summary it is clear that following their decision early in the nineteenth 
century to concentrate on bar iron products, and later these products plus railway iron, 
the works of the group were heavy investors in puddling furnace developments, in 
rolling mills and associated steam engines, with the Baileys often leading the way.
4.3 Steam engines and locomotives.
Economic historians debate the true effect of steam power in the British 
industrial revolution in the second half of the eighteenth century and first half of the 
nineteenth century,76 some historians believing that the benefits of steam power in the 
industry revolution have been overstated.77 In general the opinion is that the use of 
steam power only became a major factor in the economy of the country during the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century. G. N. von Tunzelman wrote in his book
Steam Power and British Industrialisation to 1860, ‘steam power did not start the
75>
industrial revolution but opened up vastly expanded production possibilities’.
In the context of the North West Monmouthshire area iron industry there is 
evidence that the impact of steam power may indeed have been exaggerated to some 
degree and the continued use of waterpower underestimated. In chapter 2 it was 
demonstrated that the use of steam engines to power the blast in blast furnaces was in 
general delayed and it seems that some of the ironworks of the group were not using
75 Monmouthshire Merlin, 24 August 1844, Application of electricity to improving the manufacture of 
iron.
76 Joel Mokyr, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), 
The Cambridge Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, 
Cambridge, 2004, pp 12-16.
77 Kristine Bruland, ‘Industrialisation and technological change’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson 
(eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, 
Cambridge, 2004, pp 142-5.
78 G. N. von Tunzelman, Steam Power and British Industrialisation to 1860, Oxford, 1978, pp 4-7.
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steam engines for blowing purposes before the 1820s. The ironmasters were pragmatic 
and were happy to use water-power for, or to assist in, the blast if the flows of nearby 
rivers or streams were strong enough to supply this power. In general, though, the 
ironworks of the group were heavy users of steam engines by the second quarter of the 
nineteenth century for various uses in addition to powering the blast, for example for 
powering the rollers and for winding and pumping machines at pits and mines.79 It 
could be argued that steam engines were more important for the development and 
expansion of puddling and rolling processes than they were for the production of the 
blast in blast furnaces.80 This must be the case for South Wales with the concentration 
there on bar iron but was probably also the case throughout the country.
If there were some reservations over the introduction of stationary engines 
amongst some of the local ironmasters in the early years of the nineteenth century 
there was no such hesitation over the introduction of locomotives in the second 
quarter of the century. The Tredegar ironmaster, Samuel Homfray led the way by 
purchasing one of Stephenson’s engines in 1828.81 The intention was to use the 
locomotive to carry iron from the Tredegar works right down to the docks at 
Newport82 and the locomotive, named ‘Britannia’, succeeded in this on 17 December 
1829. The Tredegar Company had a second locomotive in service in about 1832 and a 
further nine by mid century. All these locomotives were for use on tramroads.83 
Homfray’s early interest in locomotives must in some way have resulted from that of 
his father, also Samuel Homfray, who had connections with the first Trevithick 
locomotive run early in the century when he was at Penydarren. That Samuel Homfray
79 Ince, Neath Abbey and the Industrial Revolution, Appendix 2 (Stationary steam engines built by the 
Neath Abbey Iron Company).
80 von Tunzelman, Steam Power and British Industrialisation to 1860, p 99.
81 W. Scandrett, Old Tredegar Volume 1, Newport, 1990, pp 85-6.
82 Monmouthshire Merlin, 26 Dec 1829, Tredegar Ironworks.
83 Geoffrey Hill and Gordon Green, Industrial Locomotives o f Gwent, London, 1999, pp 115-16, 154.
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I had a detailed and technical understanding of steam engines was demonstrated by 
the correspondence between himself, William Smith and Richard Trevithick in the 
years 1804-1806.84
The Harfords of Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy ironworks were not far behind 
Homfray and on 2 February 1831 they applied for permission to connect their 
Newport wharves by tramroad to the Monmouthshire Canal Navigation tramroad at
Of
Ynysnewydd Bridge near Newport for the use of a locomotive of their own. The 
Ebbw Vale Company ran their first two locomotives, ‘Lark’ and ‘Industry’, in 1832 or 
1833 with a third by about 1836.86 The Ebbw Vale sale document of 1844 stated that 
the company had five tramroad locomotives at that time.87 Other ironmasters in the 
area were not slow to follow Homfray’s example and the Blaina ironworks were 
operating a locomotive over the canal tramroads from about 1830 and the Baileys of 
Nantyglo and Beaufort ironworks were having a locomotive built for them in 183288 
and a locomotive was recorded on the Beaufort to Llangattock line connecting to the 
canal wharf at Llangattock from about 1840.89 These examples indicate how keen the 
local ironmasters were to improve their transport facilities once locomotives were 
established.
Hence with regard to the use of stationary steam engines the conclusion must 
be that in general the ironmasters of the group were heavy users from about the 1820s 
onwards for a variety of purposes when they felt that the introduction of steam power 
would improve the efficiency of their enterprises. While it was still cost effective to
84 Joan M. Eyles, ‘William Smith, Richard Trevithick and Samuel Homfray: Their Correspondence on 
Steam Engines, 1804-1806’, Transactions o f the Newcomen Society, Volume XLIII, (1970-71).
85 Hill and Green, Industrial Locomotives o f Gwent, p 91.
86 Hill and Green, Industrial Locomotives o f Gwent, p 94.
87 GRO. D.749.508. Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy Ironworks Auction, 18 April 1844.
88 Elsas , Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, R Jones to J. J. Guest, Birmingham, 11 August 
1832,p 182.
89 Hill and Green, Industrial Locomotives o f Gwent, p 141.
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use waterpower for particular tasks, for example to power the blast, they were content 
to continue to utilise this source of power in addition to steam. Water was still a vital 
commodity for the ironmasters whether they still used waterpower or not as evidenced 
by the Ebbw Vale Company’s excuses to customers in August 1825 when they 
blamed the delay in an order for iron on the dry weather.90 The rather conservative 
approach of the ironmasters to the use of steam power before 1820 is not out of line 
with that of other industries in the British industrial revolution91 and this slight 
conservatism must be judged in the light of the normally ample supply of water in the 
hills of Monmouthshire. The local ironmasters however were far from conservative 
with the introduction and use of locomotives on the tramroads and it appears that the 
use of locomotives for the transport of iron to Newport or for the transport of minerals 
to the ironworks was general in the area by the 1840s.
4.4 Iron ores.
The coalfields of Britain became possible sites for the development of iron 
industries in the second half of the eighteenth century following the successful use of 
coke in the blast furnaces, provided an ample supply of iron ore was readily 
accessible. In the early parts of the period under study, from 1780 to approximately 
the 1820s, the ironmasters of the study area did not have any major difficulties over 
ores but from around 1830 and in particular following the use of hot blast in the blast 
furnaces in other areas, they became much more concerned about the whole issue of 
ores and some ironmasters started to import ores and use mixtures of imported and 
local ores in their blast furnaces. This was not because of any shortage of local ores, as 
will be explained below, and whilst most of the ironmasters of the area strove to deal
90 GRO. D.2472.2. The Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827, Geo Eaton and Sons, Bristol, 16 August 
1825.
91 Bruland, ‘Industrialisation and technological change’, p 145.
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with their iron ore issues, one particular partnership, that of the Baileys of Nantyglo 
and from 1833, Beaufort, had a stroke of fortune in the discovery on their lands of 
blackband, a particularly valuable ore.
In Britain iron ores found in substantial amounts can be classified into three 
broad groups as in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4 The Iron Ores of Britain
Ores % Iron Areas where the ores 
are found In greatest 
quantities
Red Haematite c.70% when pure Lancashire, Cumberland
Brown Haematite c.60% when pure Forest of Dean
Argillaceous ores, 
Clay-band ironstone, 
Carbonaceous ores.
Usually 30-40% but 
sometimes less.
Coal fields of Britain
Source. Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 197-202; William Truran, The Iron Industry o f  Great 
Britain, p 5. Other ores such as magnetite are not found in great quantities in Britain.
Iron does not exist freely in nature but only in chemical compounds with oxygen and
sometimes other elements such as carbon. Magnetite, chemical formula Fe304,
although an important ore is not common in Britain whilst Red Haematite, the
anhydrous ferric oxide, Fe203, and Brown Haematite, hydrated ferric oxide, are rich
in iron compared with argillaceous ores such as those found in the South Wales
coalfield. These latter ores are really ferrous carbonate, FeC03 or Fe0.C02, and are
found in mixtures with clays and other earthy material and contain only 30 to 40
percent metal at best.92 Iron, unlike most metals, has a variable valency which
explains its ability to exist in chemical compounds in different proportions to other
elements.
Hence the local ores, or ironstones as they are known, of the Monmouthshire 
area were relatively low in iron content. This was demonstrated by the famous 
metallurgist, David Mushet when he produced a report in 1841 on the Victoria
92 Percy, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, pp 197-202
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ironworks, situated slightly lower down the Ebwy Fawr valley than the Ebbw Vale 
works. The owners of Victoria ironworks, The Monmouthshire Iron and Coal 
Company were considering selling the works and asked Mushet to produce a report on 
it. Mushet established that a large problem for the company was the cost of its pig iron 
production. He concluded that because of the ‘poverty of the Iron-Stone used in the 
Furnaces’ it was taking nearly 5 tons of ironstone to make a ton of pig iron. Mushet 
analysed samples of the different ironstones available to the company on their sites 
and found that one of the main ironstones used in the furnaces had an average of only 
10 percent metal. The company had access to ironstones having around 30 to 40 
percent iron and he advised the company to use only these in the furnaces. That 
Mushet was able to come to this straightforward conclusion does tend to suggest that 
the ironmasters of this works did not analyse accurately the iron content in the ores 
they were using themselves.
This relatively low iron content in Welsh mine that is iron ore extracted in 
South East Wales, was clearly a matter of concern to the ironmasters though it was not 
until the 1870s that imported ores with higher iron content were used in furnaces in 
anything like the same volumes as local ores.94 Right up to the middle of the century 
at least and probably much later local ores were still in abundant supply95 though it is 
likely that in some areas access was becoming more difficult as ore levels were 
deeper. Possibly competition from other regions caused the ironmasters most concern 
especially from Scotland where the advent of hot blast and the fact that they had
93 David Mushet, Report on Victoria Iron Works & Mining Grounds, Bath, 1841.
94 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 32.
95 GRO. D.591.19.384. Sale particulars of the Clydach ironworks, 17 July 1833; GRO. D.7.194. 
Sale/Auction document for Blaenavon, 22 November 1833; GRO. D.43.6328. Sale particulars of 
Rumney Iron Works and estates, 17 July 1835; GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Minute Book, 2nd Meeting 
of the Shareholders 15 September 1837; GRO. D.749.508. 18 April 1844, Auction particulars, Ebbw 
Vale and Sirhowy.
109
supplies of the blackband ironstone, a carbonaceous ore rich in carbon,96 resulted in 
the Scottish ironmasters being able to produce their pig iron more cheaply than the 
ironmasters of South Wales.97 David Mushet pointed out in 1840 that some 
ironmasters had experienced difficulties in producing good iron from mixtures of ores 
in their blast fiimaces98 however it is known that a number of the ironworks of South 
Wales were importing ores from Barrow and Ulverston in the North of England from 
1825," and it must be assumed that they had managed to use mixtures of imported 
and local ores at least to the extent that their furnace yields were improved. There is 
direct evidence of the importation of ores by certain Monmouthshire ironmasters. The 
Harfords of Ebbw Vale, for example, were importing foreign ores as early as the 
1820s100 and the huge Dowlais ironworks in Merthyr was importing large volumes of 
haematite ore in the 1840s.101 The Abersychan and Victoria ironworks were using 
mixtures of ores in the 1840s for the Abersychan accounts for the month ending 21 
September 1844 show that 8,488 tons of local ore was used in the furnaces together 
with 2,469 tons of imported red ore (haematite) and the Victoria accounts for the four 
weeks ending 25 March 1848 show that 2,173 tons of local ironstone was used in their 
furnaces with 394 tons of imported ore.102
However there is no evidence in the Blaenavon Minute Book103 that the 
company used any appreciable amounts of imported ores in the 1836 to 1849 period 
and it is likely that there were other works that also had huge reserves of local ores
96 Truran, The Iron Manufacture o f  Great Britain, p 5.
97 Monmouthshire Merlin, 6 May 1843, Latest Current Prices of Metals, Pig iron in Wales 70s per ton, 
Pig iron in Clyde, 45shillings per ton.
98 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 34.
99 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 96.
100 GRO. D.2472.2. Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-7, Letter to E. Frere & Co. Clydach, 6 December 
1825.
101 Elsas, Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, pp 95-6, Letter from Henry William Schneider to 
Thomas Evans, Ulverston, 14 July 1842 and p 98, Copy of Contract, Dowlais Co. and Messrs. Tulk and 
Ley, 22 January 1846.
102 GRO. D.454.939. Abersychan Iron Work Accounts.
103 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Minute Book.
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like Blaenavon that used only local mineral resources. In some cases it might have 
been the particular products that affected the decision whether to use imported ores or 
not. Ironworks specialising in the production of wrought iron rails might have wanted 
to use haematite ore as it was believed that pig iron from this ore allowed greater 
control over the product than was possible using only Welsh ironstone.104
In conclusion it would seem that the ironmasters again took a pragmatic 
approach over the use of ores in their blast furnaces. Where they had extensive 
supplies of ore that were reasonably easy to extract they may have been more likely to 
use solely local ores but where the costs of producing pig iron from local ores that 
were relatively low in metal content was a problem for them the ironmasters were 
more likely to experiment in the use of mixtures of local ores and imported ores, 
usually haematite. When mixtures of local and imported ores were used in the blast 
furnaces the largest portions in the mixtures were still likely to be the local ores and so 
local ores remained the main source of iron throughout the period. In some cases 
ironmasters might have used haematite ores for the production of iron required for 
manufacturing particular products such as rails. In all circumstances the ironmasters 
were striving to improve their productivity even calling in consultants such as David 
Mushet if they had become worried about the cost effectiveness of their operations.
That the ironmasters of the North West Monmouthshire area were all 
concerned about the efficiency of their enterprises cannot be doubted but the element 
of luck often played a part as well. David Mushet discovered the blackband ironstone 
in Scotland at the start of the nineteenth century and later this ore plus the invention of 
the hot blast process meant that output of the Scottish ironworks expanded rapidly. 
Blackband ironstone was clay-like in appearance and existed in coal measures. It
104 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, pp 34-5.
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could contain up to around 40 to 50 percent iron oxide and the coaly matter in the 
ironstone was such that it could be worked with hot blast with much less addition of 
coal.105 Until around 1838 blackband ironstone does not appear to have been 
discovered at least in any workable volumes in the study area but it was reported in 
the Monmouthshire Merlin that blackband ironstone was first smelted at the Bailey’s 
Beaufort works in August 1838 but abandoned.106 The newspaper reported an article 
from The Cambrian two weeks later that stated that Messrs. Bailey had discovered the 
vein or seam known as ‘Mushet’s Blackband’ and introduced the subject saying that 
‘a great sensation has been created in this part of the principality’.107 However it 
appears that Messrs. Bailey believed that they had been working blackband for the 
past twenty or twenty-five years, a belief that was not shared by the Mushet family. 
The issue seems to have been settled in a letter written by Robert Mushet, David’s 
son, from Coleford, Gloucestershire, on 10 January 1843. It seems that the Baileys 
had been using an ironstone for many years which was ‘black stone’ and not the true 
carboniferous blackband. However Mushet confirmed that the recent blackband 
identified in 1838 at Beaufort was indeed the true blackband discovered by David 
Mushet in 1801.108 Hence the Baileys had the great fortune to have large quantities of 
this valuable ironstone on their lands, an ironstone that maybe did not contain as high 
a proportion of metal as haematite but one that required much less fuel especially with 
hot blast. The Baileys used their blackband in their attempts to obtain malleable iron 
directly from the ore in the puddling furnace.109 The Baileys of Nantyglo and Beaufort 
were undoubtedly the most successful of the ironmasters for many years but it would
105 Smiles, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers, pp 145-6; Percy, Metallurgy: Iron 
and Steel, pp 202-3.
106 Monmouthshire Merlin, 17 December 1842.
107 Monmouthshire Merlin, 31 December 1842.
108 Monmouthshire Merlin, 14 January 1843, Letter to the Editor of the Monmouthshire Merlin from 
Robert Mushet, Coleford, 10 January 1843.
109 Monmouthshire Merlin, 23 December 1843, Nantyglo, Clay’s Process.
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be incorrect to attribute this success over their rival ironmasters largely to their 
supplies of blackband. As Mushet pointed out they did not have supplies of true 
blackband until the end of the 1830s and they were greatly successful in the decades 
prior to that.
4.5 Conclusion.
It has been claimed in this chapter that the ironmasters of the North West 
Monmouthshire area strove to improve the efficiency of their enterprises throughout 
the period and, in the context of technology, that they achieved such improvement by 
dealing with a variety of issues in a pragmatic manner. To increase output they were 
prepared to build extra furnaces when this seemed appropriate possibly a little more 
readily than ironmasters in some other areas, a good indication of their will to reinvest 
in their businesses. There is evidence also to support the view that the Monmouthshire 
ironmasters were eager to innovate if this was cost effective, some taking out patents 
on occasions. They displayed this pragmatic approach to technological matters in their 
attitude to hot blast and to steam power as they did to other innovations and in the 
second quarter of the nineteenth century they strove to overcome the difficulties 
associated with the relatively low iron content in local iron ores by various means 
according to their own particular circumstances with regards to the quality of their 
mineral resources and ease of access. There are indications that some of the 
ironmasters may have occasionally delayed implementing particular innovations to 
avoid royalty payments and the evidence clearly shows that the British inventors of 
the iron industry as a group failed to benefit either in recognition in their lifetime or 
financially through royalties in the manner that might have been due to them.
In the context of technological issues it has been argued that the ironmasters of 
the North West Monmouthshire area helped to achieve increases in output and
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improvements in productivity by a series o f incremental improvements rather than via 
any one major technological change. One objective way to demonstrate this 
substantial and steady progress would be to measure how much the efficiency o f their 
blast furnaces changed over the years. In other words a good objective measure of at 
least the smelting side o f the businesses would be to assess the output o f pig iron per 
furnace where data allows. Unfortunately the data available makes it possible only to 
give a general indication o f the trends.
Figure 4 .1 . An indication o f the improvements in efficiency o f the furnaces o f the ironworks o f  
the North West Monmouthshire Area.
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Source H. Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, London, 1854, pp 127, 258; Riden and Owen, British 
Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980 , pp 1-31 plus other random sources. Note that the resulting figures 
have been smoothed so that five year estimates can be obtained.
Over the period there is every reason to suppose that the improvements in producing 
finished iron via puddling and rolling processes followed a similar trend.
This approach of gradual improvements in technological processes adopted by 
the Monmouthshire ironmasters with more generalised knowledge was common in
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Britain compared with the continent where science was further developed.110 There is 
however no substantial evidence that the ironmasters of the study area strove to 
introduce technological changes with the prime aim of reducing labour. In fact when 
new and technologically advanced mills were built it was a reason for the whole area 
to celebrate, hardly an indication that the people felt their jobs were threatened by the 
new developments. The ironmasters wanted their works to succeed and only made 
changes when they believed their businesses would benefit fairly quickly.
The approach of the ironmasters to technological change in general was 
therefore essentially a pragmatic one. When there were clear advantages in investing 
in new furnaces or new processes they were not slow to invest but when they saw 
economic advantages in continuing with existing procedures they did not rush into the 
latest technological innovations. The approach coupled with the advantages that the 
district had in terms of geography and geology contributed to the overall success of 
the works of the area. However by the 1830s some of these advantages began to slip 
away. The discovery of the hot blast process was a particular benefit to the Scottish 
iron producers and the relatively low iron content in local ores meant that ores richer 
in iron were being imported to the area in increasing quantities.
110 Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution, London, 1992, p 24.
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Chapter 5 Capital and capital structures of the ironworks of the North West
Monmouthshire Area.
5.1 Introduction.
The most important business issue facing the ironmasters of the area and in 
fact all the ironmasters of the country was the supply of capital to set up the 
businesses in the first place, to ensure that the necessary innovations could be fimded 
thereafter and finally to ensure that the enterprises had sufficient fimds to deal with 
situations caused by the frequent fluctuations in demand for iron, that is to ensure that 
they had sufficient working capital. It has been generally accepted that the iron 
industry of Britain required a higher level of capital investment than say the copper or 
the coal industries1 and shortages of capital were problems for some of the 
ironmasters at times and undoubtedly held these companies back when compared with 
some of the others. There are two forms of capital needed for any industrial enterprise, 
fixed and working capital, and in the industrial revolution period it is generally 
accepted that working capital was the more important of the two but within the iron 
industry fixed capital was also a major element.2
The various sources of capital available to the ironmasters are discussed in 
turn. All the ironworks of the core group were partnerships until the Blaenavon 
Company became a joint stock company in 1836 and the partnership itself was the 
main source of fixed capital. Each partner, whether an active partner or a silent 
partner, had to bring capital to the company although not necessarily in equal 
proportions. A second source of fixed capital was a legacy under a will and there are 
examples of this within the group.
1 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987, pp 46-7.
2 M. D. Matthews, ‘Small and medium enterprise in the eighteenth century: financing local enterprise in 
south-west Wales’, National Library o f  Wales Journal, 32:4 (2002), p 447.
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The reinvestment of profits was the main source of working capital and the 
financial factors affecting the profits of the ironworks, other than sales of iron and 
payments of wages, are discussed. Such items included payments of rents for land 
leased, payments of royalties on minerals used and miscellaneous profits such as those 
from company shops and sales of cod.
Loans or mortgages served to provide both fixed and working capital 
especially for the weaker companies financially. Loans were granted within the iron 
communities, especially in the earlier period, whereas incidences of loans from banks 
tended to increase as the period progressed. The role of the banks in the area is 
discussed together with that of local solicitors who often played a key part in 
arranging supplies of capital.
The final source of finance to be discussed is that provided by the joint stock 
company capital structure. Although the Blaenavon Company was the only one of the 
core group of companies to convert to this structure before 1850 some of the newer 
ironworks of Monmouthshire were either set up as joint stock companies or were 
converted to this capital structure. An account is given of the experience of joint stock 
iron companies in the area.
These two alternative capital structures within the iron industry, that is the 
partnership and the joint stock company, will be compared in the chapter and an 
assessment will be made as to which was the more appropriate structure for the South 
Wales iron industry in the first half of the nineteenth century.
5.2 Partnerships.
Apart from the Blaenavon Company from 1836 all the ironworks of the core 
group were partnerships into the second half of the nineteenth century. The 
partnership was the main source of fixed capital for the ironworks concerns, the
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number of partners in each enterprise being just a few individuals. Each concern had 
one, occasionally two, active partners sometimes supported financially by one or more 
silent or sleeping partners who provided capital but who were not directly concerned 
in management. As such, this method of funding was quite different from that of other 
major industrial developments in the same district such as in the funding of canals 
early in the period and funding of railways later. The Monmouthshire canal in 1792 
for example had a very impressive list of promoters including the Duke of Beaufort, 
William Barrow and Co. of Sirhowy iron works, John Cockshutt of Cyfarthfa 
ironworks, Sir Charles Gould Morgan of Tredegar Park near Newport, the Hanburys 
of Pontypool, the Harfords of Nantyglo ironworks, Ebbw Vale ironworks and Bristol, 
Samuel Hopkins and Thomas Hill of Blaenavon ironworks, Jonathan Kendall of 
Beaufort ironworks, and many others.3 Hence major landowners did invest in canal 
developments but they were never partners in any of the local group of ironworks.
The active partners in the ironworks concerns were largely industrialists who 
had already accumulated capital in the iron industry elsewhere, in the West Midlands 
or in the Merthyr area. The exceptions were the Harfords, a family of Bristol 
merchants with other iron interests in South Wales such as at the Melingriffith works4 
and the initial partners at Sirhowy were merchants in the tea trade.
The capital invested in the ironworks by the early partners in the late 
eighteenth century was relatively modest. The Sirhowy partnership had a capital of 
slightly less than £12,000 in 17955 and in the same year the Beaufort ironworks had 
capital of £16,000. At Beaufort ironworks the leading partner, Edward Kendall
3 Sir Joseph Bradney, A History o f Monmouthshire, Volume 5, The Hundred o f Newport, Madeleine 
Gray (ed.), Cardiff and Aberystwyth, 1993, p 37.
4 Chris Evans, ‘Global Commerce and Industrial Organization in an eighteenth-century Welsh 
enterprise: The Melingriffith Company, Welsh History Review 20, (2000-1), pp 416-17.
5 John Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), London, 1906, pp 
147-8.
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supplied £8,500, Jonathan Kendall, £6,500 and Joseph Latham, £1,000.6 This pattern 
of unequal shareholdings was not uncommon. The capital was even less in the Ebbw 
Vale concern in 1792 after the Harford, Partridge partnership joined Jeremiah 
Homfray at Ebbw Vale. The capital was only £7,000, two-thirds supplied by the 
Harford partnership and one-third by Homfray.7
The initial Blaenavon ironworks partners in 1789 were Thomas Hill, a banker 
from Stourport, Thomas Hopkins and Benjamin Platt, both industrialists from the 
West Midlands with previous experience of the iron industry.8 Thomas Hill must have 
been a wealthy man in this period as he had one of the largest holdings in the 
Monmouthshire Canal Navigation Company with 74lA shares of £100 each.9
The Union Ironworks Company at Rhymney on the Monmouthshire- 
Glamorgan border had a capital of only £4,000 when it was established in the early 
years of the nineteenth century. There were four partners each investing £1,000 but 
they agreed to invest a further £6,000 when required again in equal amounts.10
The development of Tredegar ironworks in around 1800 was partly financed 
by Samuel Homfray who had made a success of the Penydarren ironworks in Merthyr 
with his brother, Jeremiah. At Penydarren the brothers had financial support from 
Richard Forman, a London merchant, as they were not thought to be wealthy men 
when this works was set up in 1784.11 Samuel Homfray and the two ironmasters from 
Sirhowy, Matthew Monkhouse and Richard Fothergill, had the financial support of 
London merchants, William Thompson and William Forman when they set up the
6 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 180.
7 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 152.
8 A. H. John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, Cardiff, 1995, p 25.
9 ‘A List of the Proprietors and Committee of the Monmouthshire Canal Navigation’, Reginald Nichols 
(ed.), Monmouthshire Medley, Volume 3, Pontypool, 1978, pp 37-43.
10 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 130.
11 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, p 33.
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Tredegar ironworks in 1800.12 The landowner, Sir Charles Morgan possibly reacting 
to the modest initial capital at some of the other ironworks of the group insisted that 
the five partners at Tredegar spend at least £10,000 in erecting the works. Morgan 
remained concerned that the works should develop quickly and a covenant stated that 
by 29 September 1808 the partners must invest a sum of at least £40,000.13 In fact the 
original capital was £30,000, very substantial for the date.14
Despite the relatively modest amounts of initial capital in some of the 
ironworks further investment was required as the works sought to expand. For 
example the capital at Tredegar ironworks had grown such that in 1817 it was 
£100,000 and the partners sought to increase the capital by a further £20,000 by 
allowing profits to accumulate.15 It was by allowing profits to accumulate that Richard 
Crawshay saw the capital at Cyfarthfa works in Merthyr rise dramatically from 
£14,369 in 1790 to £103,908 only eight years later.16 The capital at the Beaufort 
ironworks had risen from £16,000 in 1795 to £36,000 by 1816 and the works was 
valued at £45,000 when it was sold to the Baileys of Nantyglo in 1833.17 The capital 
at Ebbw Vale had reached £62,440 in 1820-1 and it is also suggested that as much as 
£250,000 had been expended on the Blaenavon ironworks by 1816.18 Possibly 
because of the continuing need for further finance there were regular changes within 
some of the partnerships. By 1794 William Barrow was the only survivor of the 
original four partners at Sirhowy and he left the firm in 1797 and the Ebbw Vale 
partnership changed twice in its first ten years.
12 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 140.
13 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 141.
14 John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 34.
15 John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 35.
16 John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 43.
17 B. Caswell, J. Gaydon, M. Warrender (edited and compiled.), Ebbw Vale ‘The Works ’ 1790-2002, 
Ebbw Vale, 2002, p 48; GRO. D.397.1679. Sale of Beaufort Ironworks to the Baileys, 17 January 1833.
18 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, pp 35-6.
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The early life of the Nantyglo works however was the most unusual of all. 
Thomas Hill of Blaenavon ironworks decided to break off the Nantyglo part of the 
lands he had leased from the Earl of Abergavenny and in 1791 sought to set up a new 
partnership for this works with Harford, Partridge and Company of Bristol. A formal 
deed of partnership was agreed on 30 April 1792, each side to pay half of the cost of 
erecting the ironworks. The manager of the new works was to be Richard Summers 
Harford. Apparently Messrs. Hill and Company believed that their share of the cost of 
the works should not exceed £10,000 but by 1793 the Harford partnership had already 
expended £16,831 compared with Hill’s contribution of £10,483. Much 
correspondence took place between the two sides without agreement and on 27 
January 1795 Messrs. Harford and Co. decided to lay off the miners and to put the 
furnaces in blast only to run down the stocks of iron ore that had been mined by that 
date. The Harfords obtained legal advice from Lincolns Inn, the advice confirming 
their right to use the proceeds of the sales of pig iron to offset their over supply of 
capital to the partnership. The works were stopped in 1796 and it appears that the 
Harfords gave up the interest in the Nantyglo works around 1800 presumably 
accepting a settlement from Hill. Hill made a further attempt to start up the works with 
new partners but this apparently came to little.19 The Nantyglo works did not really 
take off until Thomas Hill and his then partner, Samuel Hopkins, son of one of the 
original Blaenavon partners, sold the Nantyglo works to Joseph Bailey and Matthew 
Wayne in 1811.20 It must be assumed that Thomas Hill’s reluctance to invest more 
heavily in the Nantyglo concern was a shortage of capital. He had lost both his 
original partners at Blaenavon, both had died before or during his dispute with the
19 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 165-70.
20 GRO. D.7.12. Lease of Nantyglo Iron Works, Hill and Hopkins to Bailey and Wayne, 25 March 
1811.
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Harfords and he might have felt vulnerable with respect to capital for his main 
concern, the Blaenavon works.
After this early period there was more stability within the partnerships. The 
senior active partner at Tredegar for a large part of the first half of the nineteenth 
century was Samuel Homfray II, son of one of the founder partners and Messrs. 
Joseph and Crawshay Bailey retained ownership of the Nantyglo ironworks well past 
mid century. The Ebbw Vale partnership involved the Harford family from 1791 right 
through to 1843 when the partnership went bankrupt. There were other partners from 
time to time but one or more members of the Harford family were always the active 
partners. Similarly the Clydach partnership had stability of management with just two 
different managing partners throughout the first half of the nineteenth century though 
this works was known to be short of capital continually.21
Barrie Trinder in The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire states that, in 
addition to the capital raised within the iron industry and from merchants as in South 
Wales, capital was also raised in Shropshire from the local coal industry.22 There is 
little evidence of any sizeable amounts of capital raised by this source in the study 
area. The coal industry was always subsidiary to the iron industry in the study area at 
least until the mid nineteenth century.
5.3 Legacies under wills.
A source of capital that arose from time to time was a legacy under a will. The 
iron districts were close communities with family connections sometimes across 
different ironworks as well as within a unit with generations of the same family. The 
most prominent such family was the Crawshay family of Cyfarthfa ironworks in 
Merthyr. The first in the generation of Crawshays was Richard Crawshay who, by the
21 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 192.
22 Barrie Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, Chichester, 2000, p 38.
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time of his death in 1810, had amassed a fortune. Amongst the many beneficiaries 
under Crawshay’s will were his son William, Benjamin Hall, of the Rhymney 
ironworks and Joseph Bailey, later of Nantyglo. Apart from certain specific bequests 
to family and others the whole Cyfarthfa business was to be divided between these 
three in proportions of three-eighths, three-eighths and two-eighths respectively. 
However Bailey elected to sell his interest in the Cyfarthfa works to the other two and 
left for Nantyglo in 1811. John Lloyd stated that Joseph’s brother Crawshay Bailey 
was one of the witnesses of Richard Crawshay’s will and, if this was so, he could not 
have been a beneficiary of the will himself.23 However John Addis in The Crawshay 
Dynasty wrote that Crawshay Bailey received £1,000 under the will.24 Matthew 
Wayne, who was Joseph’s initial partner at Nantyglo, was also given a modest legacy 
under the will.25 Benjamin Hall was the executor of the will. He was Richard 
Crawshay’s son-in-law having married Crawshay’s daughter, Charlotte, in 1801. In 
addition to the three-eighths share in the Cyfarthfa enterprise Hall and his wife were 
also left the residue of Crawshay’s estates,26 the clear implication being that Crawshay 
was much closer to Hall than to his own son, William, at the time he drew up his will. 
Hall had been a partner with Crawshay in the Union ironworks at Rhymney but he 
died in 1817 aged only 39.27
As would be expected the main beneficiaries under the wills of the ironmasters 
of the area were their sons. There were three generations of Thomas Hills associated 
with the Blaenavon ironworks. The first Thomas Hill, one of the founder partners, 
bequeathed most of his assets to his two sons, Thomas and Waldron and his grandson,
23 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 65-7.
24 John P. Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, Cardiff, 1957, p 13.
25 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 65.
26 Chris Evans (calendared by), The Letterbook o f  Richard Crawshay1788-1797, Cardiff 1990, p 185.
27 Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, p 13.
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Thomas.28 Thomas Hill II left the bulk of his assets to his son, Thomas Hill III though 
he also made generous provision for his daughters.29 Unfortunately both the first and 
second Thomas Hills died within a few years of each other in the 1820s. The first 
Thomas Hill must have been related to one of the other founding partners, Thomas 
Hopkins, as the latter’s son, Samuel left his fourth part and other interests in the 
Blaenavon concern to his cousin, Thomas Hill. This will was dated 13 April 1813. 
Samuel also made generous provision for his sister, Sarah,30 well known for her work 
amongst the poorer people of the Blaenavon area especially with regard to the 
provision of a school. Thus the Hill family together with the Hopkins family early in 
the period, managed to keep the Blaenavon concern largely to themselves from the 
inception of the works right through to 1836 when the company became joint stock. 
Thomas Hill III was still involved after this being one of the directors of the new 
company.31
When Samuel Homfray of Penydarren ironworks and later Tredegar ironworks 
died in May 1822 he left his shares to his sons, Samuel, of Tredegar ironworks and 
Watkin.32 Similarly Frederick Levick, ironmaster of Blaina ironworks bequeathed his 
share in the partnership by leaving three shares to Frederick Levick, two shares to
'X'XGeorge Levick, two shares to Thomas Levick and the final share to Robert Simpson.
There was a similar history of family control at another of the earliest 
ironworks of the group, Beaufort, though the picture there was more complicated than 
at Blaenavon. Two of the founder partners were the brothers, Edward and Jonathan 
Kendall. Edward was the managing partner and in his will of 16 December 1793, he
28 GRO. D.751.295. Will of Thomas Hill, Will proved in London, 2 June 1825.
29 GRO. D.751.295. Will of Thomas Hill, 1 April 1824.
30 GRO. D.591.23.109. Will of Samuel Hopkins of Blaenavon, 13 April 1813.
31 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Company Minute Book.
32 GRO. D.917.316. Homfray Partnership documents, 15 December 1824.
33 GRO. D.397.916. Abstract of the will of Frederick Levick of Wain Warn Co. Monmouth, 25 
September 1855.
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bequeathed the bulk of his estate to his son, Edward on the occasion of his twenty- 
fourth birthday. Edward also willed that his son ‘be brought up to the iron trade’ and 
that his concerns in Scotland, Breconshire and Monmouthshire should be carried on 
until his son was able to take over at the age of twenty four.34 Kendall therefore not 
only left the bulk of his estate to his son but ensured that his son would continue with 
his iron making concerns. The will of Kendall’s brother Jonathan is even more 
intriguing. Jonathan left the bulk of his assets to his wife, Mercy, while she was alive. 
Mercy was to have his interests and share in the Beaufort ironworks as well as his 
share of the profits of the concern. However on her death Jonathan’s interests were to 
pass to his nephew, Edward Kendall.35 However Jonathan added a codicil to this will 
following the death of his brother, Edward. By this codicil he removed his nephew, 
Edward as a main beneficiary on the grounds of the fortune he had been given 
following his father’s death. Instead Jonathan promoted the interest of the eldest son 
of his brother-in-law, John West. William Henry West was to benefit on the death of 
Mercy Kendall and he was ‘to be brought up to the iron trade’, become a manager in 
the works with a salary of £100 per annum and be entitled to a small share in the 
profits. West would inherit Jonathan’s share of the business once Mercy died. 
Jonathan’s wishes came about and William Henry West became one of the partners of 
the Beaufort ironworks with Edward Kendall II and William Hibbs Bevan, the son-in- 
law of Edward Kendall I.37
Hence quite a large amount of capital was circulated over the period within the 
ironworks families and within the ironworks communities as a result of legacies under 
wills of relatives. It is clear that the managing partners sought to keep control within
34 GRO. D.397.1667. Will of Edward Kendall, 16 December 1793.
35 GRO. D.397.1670. Will of Jonathan Kendall, 10 April 1805.
36 GRO. D.397.1670. Codicil to the will of Jonathan Kendall.
37 GRO. D.397.1074. 1 May 1824; GRO. D.397.1675/9. Documents showing the co-partners of 
Beaufort Ironworks.
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their families as much as possible, in some cases declaring in their wills that the 
beneficiaries whilst below certain ages were to be raised up into the industry to ensure 
they would follow in their ancestors’ shoes. There are just a few cases where 
beneficiaries were not related but were employees. One example is the case of 
Matthew Wayne who received a modest legacy under the will of Richard Crawshay.38 
Wayne had been a bookkeeper and a manager at Cyfarthfa ironworks under Richard 
Crawshaw in the period from 1791 to 1810.39
5.4 Reinvestment of profits and financial factors affecting profits.
The numbers of partners of the ironworks companies of the area never 
exceeded a small number of individuals and so it appears that acquiring extra capital 
by increasing the numbers of partners was not a policy favoured in general by the 
principal partners. They wished to keep the control of their concerns to themselves as 
much as possible. The greatest source of additional capital was the reinvestment of 
profits.40 The majority of the working capital of the ironworks came from this source 
and in a few cases profits reinvested were allowed to accumulate over the years 
providing a strong capital structure for these particular companies. This section also 
discusses the sources of profits for the ironworks companies, the financial factors 
affecting profits and how the profits might have been distributed.
Unfortunately only a very limited amount of source information on the profits 
made by the local ironworks companies has survived but it is safe to assume that 
majority of the profits made would have arisen through sales of iron and iron 
products. However profits were made from other sources in addition. The majority of 
the coal mined by the ironworks companies in the district would have been used for 
the works themselves with possibly relatively small supplies sold locally. However by
38 Lloyd, The Early History o f  the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), pp 65-7.
39 Evans, The Letterbook o f  Richard Crawshay, p 195.
40 John, Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 40; Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, p 158.
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the 1840s some of the iron companies were shipping coal as well as iron. In the 
Merthyr area there is no evidence that the sale of coal was a substantial factor in the 
profits of the ironworks there in the late 1830s as none of the four Merthyr ironworks 
were sending any substantial amounts of coal down the Glamorgan canal in 1838.41 
However in the early 1840s Samuel Homfray of the Tredegar ironworks company was 
sending coal as well as iron down the Monmouthshire Canal Company’s tramroads for 
shipment at Newport.42 Later in the same decade the Ebbw Vale Company shipped 
relatively modest amounts of coal down to Newport, however in both these cases the 
amounts of coal sent down the canal were very small compared with that shipped by 
dedicated coal mining companies. For example in October 1847 the Ebbw Vale 
ironworks company sent down 301 tons of coal whereas Thomas Powell of the Gaer, a 
coalmaster, sent down 6,845 tons in the same month.43 Crawshay Bailey of the 
Nantyglo ironworks seemed to have been one of the first ironmasters to recognize the 
value of coal deposits independently of iron making and he invested accordingly.44
The local ironworks also made some profits from sales in the company shops. 
Although all the ironworks companies ran shops the level of profits from them were 
never likely to be large but might have helped the ironmasters in bad years. An 
example is the Clydach Company which made a profit of £571 from its shop in the 
year ending 31 March 1824.45
Further sources of income for the ironmasters were rents from the lands they 
had acquired either leasehold or freehold. There are examples where the ironmasters 
leased or subleased land to farmers and others. They sometimes subleased mineral
41 Monmouthshire Beacon, 6 July 1839, Iron and Coal sent down the Glamorganshire canal from 1 
January to 31 December 1838.
42 Monmouthshire Beacon, 10 December 1842, 18 February 1843, 6 March 1844.
43 Monmouthshire Beacon, 6 November 1847, Coal sent down the Monmouthshire Canal tramroads, 
October 1847.
44 E. Phillips, Pioneers o f  the Welsh Coalfield, Cardiff 1925, pp 70-2.
45 NLW. Maybery MSS. 363, Clydach Iron Company, Year ending 31 March 1824.
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lands to other ironmasters. The Blaenavon Ironworks subleased land to the Nantyglo 
ironworks46 and to the Varteg ironworks company.47 Similarly the Beaufort ironworks 
company subleased land to the Clydach ironworks.48 The Ebbw Vale Company 
acquired much freehold land, as this company had not leased large tracts of land from 
one major landowner. There are records of this company leasing land to farmers, 
tradesmen and workmen.49 The Baileys of the Nantyglo works were major acquirers 
of land and leased mineral and building land to other ironmasters and farmlands to 
local farmers.50
All the costs associated with the manufacture of iron had to be taken off the 
sale proceeds. These costs included wages to all employees, costs of extraction and 
purchase of minerals, all maintenance costs of capital equipment, building and 
maintenance costs of workers’ houses, building of roads and transportation costs of all 
sorts especially the costs of transporting iron to the docks at Newport, commissions to 
agents and many other costs. Occasionally the ironmasters were faced with costs made 
necessary because of unusual circumstances. The Ebbw Vale Company found it 
necessaiy to build a tunnel through parts of the hill between Sirhowy and Ebbw Vale 
to move iron and minerals between the two works after the Ebbw Vale Company 
acquired the Sirhowy works in 1818. The tunnel was not completed until the early 
1830s. Similarly the Blaenavon works built a tunnel to connect its furnaces with Pwll 
Du and on by railroad to the company’s forge at Gamddyrys. However the two major 
financial drains on profits were interest payments on loans and rents payable on the
46 GRO. D.7.12. Lease of Nantyglo iron works, Hill and Hopkins to Bailey, 25 March 1811.
47 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Company Minute Book, 12 Shareholders Meeting, 26 April 1844.
48 GRO. D.397.1671. Deed of Copartnership between Messrs. Kendall and Bevan, 12 August 1816. 
Lists underlease of Clydach Ironworks at £780 per annum as an asset.
49 Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 129. Lease, 20 March 1813 and others; GRO. D.2472.1. 
Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, 23 January 1800, Agreement between Richard S. Harford 
of the Ebbw Vale Company and John Davies for the latter to rent the Duffryn farm.
50 GRO. D.397.20.19. November 1825, Lease J. and C. Bailey to Leah Needham (widow) of Beaufort 
Iron Works; GRO. D.397.834. 4 July 1849, Lease of mineral land, J. and C. Bailey to Robert Cruttwell 
and others; GRO. D.397.1659/1660. Farmlands, cottages etc. leased by J. and C. Bailey.
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major leases of land on which the ironworks were built and from which the minerals 
were extracted. Loans are discussed in the next section.
The lands on which the ironworks and their associated mineral resources lay 
were leased from major landowners in most cases and the rental and lease terms were 
issues of considerable concern to most of the ironmasters, the rents being a real drain 
on working capital. The issue of the lease terms was a matter where luck played a part. 
The early ironmasters of the region, that is those of the Merthyr area, were fortunate in 
that the landlords did not fully appreciate the value of the minerals on their lands and 
consequently the lease terms were sometimes very favourable to the ironmasters. The 
Dowlais Company for example had to pay just £31 per annum, the clearest example of 
a landowner not realizing the value of the minerals on and under his land when the 
lease was granted. However when J. J. Guest, the Dowlais ironmaster, entered into 
negotiations with the then Marquis of Bute for renewal of the lease in March 1848 the 
Marquis not only knew the value of his minerals but resented the ‘princely fortunes’ 
Dowlais had made under the old lease.51 The core group of ironworks of the North 
West Monmouthshire area had started up somewhat later than their Merthyr 
counterparts and the lease terms for the Monmouthshire masters were considerably 
less favourable as can be seen in Table 5.1 where the lease terms are given through the 
first half of the nineteenth century.
Of the earliest Monmouthshire iron companies the Sirhowy works appears to 
have had the easiest lease though the Tredegar works and the Beaufort works also had 
fairly light terms. The Clydach and the Nantyglo ironworks were at a disadvantage as
51 Monmouthshire Merlin, 11 March 1848, The renewal of the lease of the Dowlais Iron Works.
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Table 5.1. Lease terms in the early nineteenth century
Ironworks Year
works
founded
Duration 
of lease
Terms of lease in the period 1800 tol850.
Dowlais,
Merthyr
1763 to
1862
£26 p.a. plus £5 p.a. to previous lessee
Plymouth,
Merthyr
1763 to
1862
£60 p.a.
Cyfarthfa,
Merthyr
1765 to
1864
£100 p.a. (plus £5,000 p.a. and 15s per ton until 1814)
Pendarren,
Merthyr
1784 to
1883
£140.8.0 p.a. plus 6 Vid per ton on coal paid to Dowlais
Sirhowy 1778 to
1818
£134.9.0 p.a. Sirhowy ironworks was acquired by Ebbw 
Vale in 1818, the latter having acquired the Sirhowy freehold 
earlier.
Beaufort 1779 to
1878
£406 p.a. plus 2s for each dozen of ironstone used
Blaenavon 1789 to
1810
£1,300 p.a.
to
1869
£5,200 p.a. plus £500 a year for each additional blast furnace 
over nine furnaces.
Ebbw Vale Cl 790 See note below
Clydach Cl 800 £780 p.a. plus 9d per ton of coal not used by Clydach, all 
payable to the Beaufort ironmasters.
Tredegar Cl 800 to 1899 £300 p.a. for 5 years then £500
Nantyglo 1790s
reopened
1811
1811 to 
1859
£2,050 p.a. plus £750 p.a. for each extra furnace in blast over 
the two that existed in 1811. The Baileys were granted a 
lease directly from the Earl of Abergavenny from 1855 rental 
£3,000 p.a.
Abersychan 
(British Iron 
Co.)
Cl 825 1827 on £400 p.a. ground rent, £2,000 (£3,000 from 1829) mineral 
rent plus a royalty of 7/6d on each ton of pig iron used plus 
an extra l/3d on refined iron.
Varteg Cl 805 £2,600 p.a. payable to Blaenavon
Cwm Celyn & 
Blaina
1839
1825
After 
merger 
in 1841
£3,450 p.a. plus 6s per ton up to 10,000 tons of iron then 
5s per ton.
Sources. Lloyd, Early history o f the old South Wales ironworks (1760-1840); Atkinson and Baber, The 
Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, pp 21-5; Alan Birch, The Economic 
History o f the British Iron & Steel Industry 1784 -1879, London, 1967, p 114; GRO. Lease documents. 
Note. The Ebbw Vale Company held no one major lease but acquired a number of freehold and 
leasehold tracts of land.
they had sub-leases each paying rental to other ironworks. The terms experienced by 
the later works established lower down the valleys such as the Varteg, Abersychan, 
Blaina and Cwm Celyn ironworks were more severe and no doubt contributed to the 
fact that all these works were up for sale at some stage in their existence.
That payment of rents under leases was an important cost to the ironmasters is 
demonstrated by the example of the Blaenavon Company when in 1837 they
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considered the site for a new works. The site was chosen on freehold land to avoid any 
additional rents to the Earl of Abergavenny as under their existing lease they would be 
charged an extra rental of £500 p.a. for each new furnace at the old site. The 
Blaenavon directors were also most concerned at the loss of £2,600 per annum rent 
after the Varteg Company failed in 1843.53 The payment of royalties, or galeages as 
they were termed, was also of major concern to some companies such as the 
Abersychan ironworks situated a few miles lower down the valley from Blaenavon. 
This company was so concerned about the effect of royalties that they wrote to some 
neighbouring ironmasters seeking details of the galeages paid by them presumably to 
see if their own burden was in line with that of others.54 The British Iron Company 
that had become the New British Iron Company was the owner of the Abersychan 
works and the severe rent and royalty terms of the ironworks must have contributed to 
the failing company’s predicament. The Abersychan ironworks was bought up by the 
Ebbw Vale Company in 1852 for the trifling sum of £8,500 which was more than 
covered by the stock left on the site.55
Rents and royalties on minerals or iron manufactured as illustrated in Table 5.1 
were thus major concerns for the ironmasters and undoubtedly had an impact on the 
cash flow situations within their accounts. However it is possible to identify the 
element of luck in the context of these leases. The later ironworks had the 
disadvantage of dealing with landowners who had a better idea of the value of their 
minerals. Some ironworks were even so lucky as to benefit from sub-leases where 
newer ironworks had to pay rents to ironmasters holding the first lease and not directly
52 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book, 2nd Meeting of the Shareholders, 
9 March 1837.
53 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book, 12th Meeting of the 
Shareholders, 26 April 1844, at No.4 Pancras Lane, London.
54 GRO. D.454.939. Correspondence and notes, accounts etc. associated with Abersychan Ironworks 
especially galeages 1843-1850.
55 Caswell, Gaydon, Warrender, Ebbw Vale 'The Works’ 1790-2002, p 194.
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to the landowner. With regard to royalty payments associated with the use of patented 
processes, the ironmasters appear to have escaped the payment of large amounts. The 
most well known patent was the puddling and rolling process of Henry Cort. However 
it is not certain if the South Wales ironmasters ever paid any royalties to Cort.
In profitable years the actual amount reinvested in the ironworks companies 
would also depend on the amounts taken out of profits by the partners for their own 
use. In unprofitable years the partners would have had to stand the losses. It is 
impossible to assess the proportions ploughed back into the businesses compared with 
that taken out but it is certain that the more successful of the ironworks managed to do 
both over quite long periods. For example the Nantyglo works was the most 
successful of the group after the Bailey brothers took over yet Joseph Bailey acquired 
extensive lands and estates such as Glan-Usk near Crickhowell, his principal estate 
and residence. However with regard to investing in their own businesses, Messrs. 
Bailey, as they were known, had a reputation for keeping their works running even in 
bad times. This is summed up in the following comment that was part of a speech 
made at a public meeting held in the Nantyglo area in January 1855, in the context of 
trade depressions, ‘But at Nantyglo the works were carried on with the greatest 
regularity whether the iron was made at a profit or loss, and the workmen were 
constantly employed at a rate of wages, at least that enabled them to support 
themselves and their families’.56 It is likely that in most cases and for most years the 
majority of any profits made were ploughed back with the ironmasters taking the 
smaller share. This appears to be confirmed by the steady growth rates of the 
companies of the group, though at differing levels, and by the records of investment in
56 Monmouthshire Merlin, 19 January 1855, Public Meeting -  Workmen’s Wages.
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innovations such as steam engines from the Neath Abbey works.57 Thus it is most 
likely that the amounts taken out of the businesses by the partners for their own use 
were related to the size of the profits made and to the success of the enterprise as a 
whole.
As regards the actual distribution of profits taken out of the businesses it was 
likely that these monies were paid in proportion to the shares held in the partnerships 
by the individual partners. This is clearly stated in the Blaenavon Articles of 
Partnership of 1827 between Thomas Hill and Waldron Hill both of Blaenavon, 
Charles Wheeley of Abergavenny and William Morgan also of Abergavenny, partners 
in the Blaenavon business at that time.58
So while it is likely that a sizeable proportion of the profits made by the 
ironworks of the group were actually reinvested in the businesses it is also likely that 
few of the companies of the North West Monmouthshire group, Nantyglo a possible 
exception, built up large capital accumulations such as at the Dowlais works in 
Merthyr.59 This was due in no small part to the fluctuations in demand leading to 
similar fluctuations in profits and other sources of capital would have been required 
from time to time.
5.5 Loans.
Loans played an important part in the financing of some of the ironworks of 
the group both in terms of fixed and ordinary working capital. These ironworks were 
often low on capital and this section attempts to examine in detail the extent of the use
57 Laurence Ince, Neath Abbey and the Industrial Revolution, Appendix 2 (Stationary steam engines 
built by the Neath Abbey Iron Company).
58 GRO. D.591.3.217. Articles of Partnership, Blaenavon, 1822.
59 Chris Evans, ‘The Labyrinth o f Flames \ Work and social conflict in early industrial Merthyr Tydfil, 
Cardiff, 1993, p 20.
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of loans within the group.
The iron works communities were a close group and not surprisingly loans 
were sometimes granted by one ironmaster to another. The Clydach ironworks was 
usually short of capital60 as evidenced by the fact that it was offered for sale in 1813 
and again in 1833.61 The Crawshays of Cyfarthfa made loans to the Clydach 
ironmasters, Edward Frere and Thomas Cooke, to enable them build a new forge and 
mill in 1810.62 Frere and Cooke had worked under Richard Crawshay at Cyfarthfa, 
Frere in charge of the fineries in the early 1790s and Cooke as works manager in 
1791-92.63
The Harford partnerships of Ebbw Vale ironworks seem to have obtained a 
succession of loans. In 1820 they had a loan of £30,000 possibly from Robert 
Thompson an ironmaster. The sum was raised on the security of the Ebbw Vale and 
Sirhowy ironworks and associated land.64 The Ebbw Vale Company had a loan of 
£20,000 from William Crawshay II in 1826.65 Crawshay’s father William Crawshay I, 
criticised his son over this loan suggesting that he would have done better to have 
invested his money at the Crawshays’ George Yard house in London.66 Later the 
Harfords had a mortgage debt of £40,000 from J. and C. Bailey of Nantyglo 
ironworks. The Harfords also had loans from their bankers. It is not known if these 
loans were all outstanding simultaneously or if some were taken out to redeem others.
60 Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 192; NLW. Maybery 
MSS 349, Clydach ironworks, 1842-1846.
61 John van Laun, The Clydach Gorge, Abergavenny, 1979, p 9; GRO. D.591.19.384. Particulars of 
freehold and leasehold estate comprising the Clydach Iron Works, South Wales, 17 July 1833.
62 NLW. Maybery MSS. Letter from Robert Thompson (Abbey Tintem Works) to Walter Powell 
solicitor (Brecon), 27 November 1810.
63 Chris Evans, The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, pp 124, 128, 181, 184.
64 Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 149, 1 December 1820, Deed to secure £30,000.
65 Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 185, 27 January 1826, further legal charge to secure £20,000 
from William Crawshay on the security of properties.
66 Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, p 156.
67 Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 173, 15 May 1829 and 181, 23 March 1837.
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It does not appear to have been difficult to obtain loans in this period and 
solicitors played a key role in arranging them. They are many examples of solicitors 
advertising potential loans in local newspapers, some of these loans being quite 
sizeable. For example the following advertisement appeared in the Monmouthshire 
Beacon of 8 February 1839:
Money. £20,000; £10,000 and various smaller sums. Ready to be
advanced on landed security at 4%. Apply post paid to GABB and
SECRETAN, Abergavenny.69
There were no banks in Wales until the 1770s and 1780s but by 1815 there 
were four banks in Monmouthshire.70 None were in the iron districts; the nearest 
banks at this time were in the market towns of Abergavenny and Brecon. Because of 
the shortage of banking facilities in this early period it is not surprising that the main 
sources of new capital were the partnerships themselves and loans on the security of 
property or land privately arranged within the iron communities.71 As the century 
progressed some of the ironworks companies obtained credit and loans from the local 
banks. The Clydach ironworks company was assisted by Messrs. Wilkin and Co. of 
Brecon continuously and was usually in debt to the bank for amounts ranging from
five to twenty thousand pounds.72 The Ebbw Vale Company had loans from their
bankers, Jones, Jones and Davies of Abergavenny. These bank loans reached £20,000 
by the mid 1820s.73
68 Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 186, 28 September 1825, Loan of £14,000 from Jones, Jones 
and Davies, Abergavenny, Document 188, 1 May 1823, Loan of £6,000, from the same bank.
69 Monmouthshire Beacon, 8 February 1839.
70 R. O. Roberts, ‘Financial Developments in Early Modem Wales and the Emergence of the First 
Banks’, Welsh History Review, 16 (1993), pp 296, 303.
71 M. D. Matthews, ‘Small and medium enterprise in the eighteenth century: financing local enterprise 
in south-east Wales’, p 447.
72 John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 48; Lloyd, The Early History o f the 
Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), p 192.
73 Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 186,28 September 1825, Loan of £14,000 from Jones, Jones 
and Davies, Abergavenny and Document 188, 1 May 1823, Loan of £6,000, from the same bank.
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In 1825 during the banking crisis of that year the Ebbw Vale Company was 
one of the ironworks companies that had difficulty obtaining day-to-day finance from 
their bankers. The situation for the company did not improve over the following two 
years such that in 1827 Richard Summers Harford appealed to William Crawshay not 
to call in the loan the Ebbw Vale Company had from him.74 In the 1830s and 1840s 
there was a strengthening of the local banking system in the area and the prospectus 
for the Monmouthshire Banking Company was published in June 1836. This joint 
stock bank was to have capital of £500,000 in £20 shares.75 Further consolidation of 
the banks in the region took place on 16 July 1836 when the Cardiff and 
Glamorganshire Bank agreed to merge with the Monmouthshire Banking Company to 
form the Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Bank.76 It is believed that this bank 
formed a branch in Tredegar around this period.77 Also around this time certain 
national and provincial banks moved into the region such as the West of England and 
South Wales Bank with branches at Newport, Merthyr and Cardiff and the National 
Provincial Bank with a branch at Cardiff.78 A branch of this latter bank was to be 
opened in Brecon in March 1834.79 It should be noted that in the 1830s and 1840s 
there were savings banks in Monmouthshire but generally these banks did not grant 
loans and the majority of the depositors’ funds were invested with the Commissioners 
for the Reduction of the National Debt.80
74 Caswell, Gaydon, Warrender, Ebbw Vale ‘The Works' 1790-2002, pp 51-2.
75 Monmouthshire Merlin, 4 June 1836, Prospectus of the Monmouthshire Banking Company.
76 Monmouthshire Merlin, 16 July 1836, The Cardiff and Glamorganshire Bank have agreed to merge 
with the Monmouthshire Banking Company to form the Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Bank.
77 Evan Powell, History o f Tredegar. (Subject of Competition at Tredegar Chair Eisteddfod 24 Feb 
1884), Newport, 1902, p 50.
78 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1760-1840, p 52.
79 Monmouthshire Merlin, 8 March 1834, National Provincial Bank to open a branch at Brecon.
80 Monmouthshire Merlin, 23 January 1830, Monmouth Savings Bank, 30 January 1830, Chepstow 
Savings Bank, 1 January 1831, Monmouthshire Savings Bank, 24 January 1835, Abergavenny Savings 
Bank.
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The Monmouthshire and Glamorganshire Banking Company provided a loan 
of £40,000 out of the purchase price of £77,000 so that the new partners of the firm 
Cruttwell, Allies and Company were able to take over the Blaina and Cwm Celyn 
ironworks near Nantyglo in May 1846.81 This bank also supported some of the railway 
issues of 1843 and 1844 in the region such as the Newport and Nantyglo Railway and 
the South Wales Railway to Pembrokeshire providing a link by boat to the south of 
Ireland. The committee for the latter venture included Joseph Bailey of Nantyglo 
Ironworks, J. J. Guest of the Dowlais Ironworks and Anthony Hill of the Plymouth 
Ironworks in Merthyr. It appears that Messrs. Bailey had formed their own banks by 
this time as these two railway ventures were also supported by the bank of Messrs.
JOBailey and Co. and Messrs. Bailey, Morgan and Co respectively.
From this discussion it can be seen that generally there were good 
opportunities for the ironmasters to obtain loans from different sources throughout the 
first half of the nineteenth century and the weaker companies financially certainly 
used these facilities. The loans in the early part of the period were often arranged 
within the iron communities but the banks soon took up the major role in granting 
financial support to the iron companies. The Bank of England itself made loans to 
some ironworks, particularly in South Wales83 and the stronger of the iron companies 
such as Messrs. Bailey of Nantyglo went farther and set up their own banking 
concerns.
81 GRO. D.397.917. Deed of Partnership, 14 May 1846, Blaina and Cwm Celyn ironworks.
82 Monmouthshire Beacon, 21 January 1843, Newport and Nantyglo Prospectus, 1 June 1844, South 
Wales railway to South of Ireland.
83 Alan Birch, The Economic History o f  the British Iron & Steel Industry 1784-1879, London, 1967, p 
209.
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5.6 Joint stock companies.
In 1836 the first of the core group of ironworks converted from the partnership 
capital structure to joint stock company status. This was the Blaenavon Company and 
although most of the Monmouthshire ironworks remained partnerships through the 
middle of the nineteenth century five other ironworks of the county were set up or 
were converted to joint stock status in the first half of the century. These were The 
Monmouthshire Iron and Coal Company at Victoria near Ebbw Vale, the Varteg 
Company near Blaenavon, The British Iron Company at Abersychan, the Rhymney 
Iron Company and the Blaina and Cwm-Celyn Iron Company.
Following the unsuccessful attempt to sell the company in 1833 the Blaenavon 
Company partners decided to float the company as a joint stock concern and the 
prospectus of May 1836 stated that a capital of £400,000 was to be raised by issuing
8.000 shares of £50 each. It is significant that Thomas Hill, the previous ironmaster 
was to be one of the directors of the new company84 suggesting shortages of capital 
were behind the conversion to joint stock status. By July 1837 the directors had still 
failed to make this target as 6,633 shares out of 8,000 had been allocated at that time. 
There might have been reluctance by investors to risk their money at this time because 
the liability of such companies was not yet limited. This protection for shareholders 
did not come in until 1855-56.85 Eventually 8,000 shares were in issue as the directors 
reported in April 1841 that £45 (out of £50) had been called on 8,000 shares. However 
at the same meeting further capital was sought by an issue of 2,000 new £50 shares, 
this capital being needed partly to pay for the planned new furnaces, forges and mills 
and partly to repay earlier debentures. By April 1843 only 668 new shares out of
2.000 had been subscribed. A resolution seeking further capital was passed in April
84 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 May 1836, Prospectus, Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company, London, 23 
May 1836.
85 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, p 53.
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1845 this time by the means of an issue of scrip certificates of £25 each.86 The 
conversion to joint stock company status does not seem to have improved the situation 
with regard to the raising of capital for Blaenavon ironworks and they had the extra 
problem of attempting to pay dividends to shareholders. They did pay dividends for a 
few years but soon found it impossible to maintain them. One of the main purposes of 
the conversion of the Blaenavon Company to joint stock status was presumably to 
fund the new furnaces, forges and mills but these developments did not appear until 
after the period under study, that is until well after 1850.
The Mining Journal reported in July 1855 that ‘a most unsatisfactory, not to 
say extraordinary statement relative to the affairs of the Blaenavon Iron and Coal 
Company’ had reached them. The report produced by a committee of investigation 
into the company contained an array of severe criticisms including the following: 
firstly there had been poor attendances at the London Board meetings, the committee 
even suggesting that some of the directors’ fees should be returned to the company; 
secondly there was unproductive work on the company’s freehold property in 
particular in connection with the three furnaces, the erection of which had been started 
in 1839, and on which £71,000 had been spent over the years and yet none were 
completed; thirdly the company had previously sub-leased land on which the Varteg 
ironworks now stood idle and was suffering dilapidation and plunder but the company 
was still paying rental for the land to the Earl of Abergavenny; and finally the 
committee also criticised the amount of money wasted on the mill and forge amongst 
other issues.87 Harry Scrivenor who was appointed manager of the Blaenavon 
company in early 1841, staying only for a few years,88 and who was the author of the
86 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book.
87 Monmouthshire Merlin, 11 July 1855, The Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company -  its past management 
and future prospects, (from the Mining Journal).
88 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book.
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History o f the Iron Trade, wrote to the Monmouthshire Merlin following this paper’s 
publication of the Mining Journal report, giving ‘three essentials to the successful 
operations of such a work -a  London Board, consisting of men of business, with unity
O Q  #
of action, a sufficient working capital, and a good manager at the works’. It is 
probably no coincidence that in 1855, the year of the Mining Journal’s unsatisfactory 
report, the Baileys of Nantyglo got themselves out of the sub-lease they had held with 
the Blaenavon ironworks since 1811.90 This sub-lease involving an annual rental of 
£2,050 plus £750 for each additional furnace in blast91 would have been valuable to 
Blaenavon providing the ironmasters there with a sound regular income every year but 
apparently they needed capital in 1855 possibly associated with the new works and 
forge that had been planned since the formation of the joint stock company in 1836.
The majority of the joint stock iron companies of South Wales were loss- 
making concerns in this period92 and many of the problems identified at Blaenavon 
also affected these companies. The Monmouthshire Iron and Coal Company, owners 
of the Victoria works situated a mile or so down the Ebwy Fawr valley from the Ebbw 
Vale works, was established in 1836 but there were no furnaces running at Victoria 
two years later and although one furnace was blown in, in late 1838. David Mushet 
reported that £193,848 had been expended by 1841,93 and the Victoria works was up 
for sale in the same year, the sale re-advertised the following year.94
The Varteg ironworks, situated lower down the Afon Lwyd River from 
Blaenavon, was converted to a joint stock company in 1836 but failed and in January
89 Monmouthshire Merlin, 18 July 1855, Letter to the editor. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company.
90 GRO. D.7.213. Marquis of Abergavenny and Nantyglo Company.
91 GRO. D.7.12. Lease of Nantyglo Iron Works, Hill and Hopkins to Bailey 1811.
92 Birch, The Economic History o f  the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784-1879, p 204.
93 Caswell, Gaydon, Warrender, Ebbw Vale ‘The Works' 1790-2002, pp 53-4.
94 Monmouthshire Merlin, 20 August 1836, Monmouthshire Iron & Coal Company, also 5 May 1838, 
24 November 1838, 6 November 1841,2 April 1842 and 20 August 1842.
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1841 there was a sale of the company’s stock in trade.95 In 1839 the Blaina and Cwm 
Celyn ironworks were consolidated into a joint stock company but these works also 
were up for sale in January 184496 and the concern seems to have reverted back to 
partnership structure.97 The Rhymney Company seems to have fared reasonably until 
the mid 1840s, judging by the share price, but in November 1846 the directors stated 
that no dividends were payable, blaming labour costs, and the company sought 
authority to raise more capital to pay off a £40,000 mortgage.98 If the experiences of 
these joint stock companies seem disappointing the British Iron Company and its 
works at Abersychan a few miles south of Blaenavon fared even worse. In May 1838 
there was considerable apprehension following a House of Lords ruling against the 
company in favour of Mr Attwood who was in dispute with the company and who was 
awarded a considerable sum. Despite this the company felt able to grant a dividend of 
ten shillings in the pound on profits of £19,400 in December 1838. In 1841 a second 
investigation into the company’s affairs recommended dissolution whilst action was 
taken against certain shareholders who were refusing to pay calls on their shares. The 
company was still trying to collect calls in 1842 and in July 1843 an action was taken 
in the Vice-Chancellor’s Court over a £25 call. In August of the same year dissolution 
of the company was again proposed, the aim being to sell the interests and works with 
the formation of a new company that was to have share capital of £400,000. The new 
company was set up and in February 1845 it was reported to be profitable ‘to some 
extent’ though the defaulting shareholders from the original company were still being 
chased for outstanding calls as late as May 1846, the old company finally being
95 Monmouthshire Merlin, 30 July 1836, Varteg ironworks, also 2 January 1841.
96 Monmouthshire Merlin, 13 July 1839, Blaina and Cwm Celyn ironworks, also 30 January 1841 and 
27 January 1844.
97 GRO. D.397.917. Deed of partnership, Blaina and Cwm Celyn ironworks, 14 May 1846.
98 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 November 1846, Rhymney Ironworks, also 30 December 1846.
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dissolved in April 1847. At the same time the new company was able to declare a 
dividend of 20 percent with a pick up in the market and orders pouring in."
The capital of these joint stock companies as shown in Table 5.2 was quite 
substantial and cannot be regarded as the main reason for their apparently weaker 
performance than that of the works still run as partnerships in the years up to 1850. 
This weak performance was also reflected in the share prices which for Blaenavon, the 
British Iron Company and Rhymney had been £42, £9 and £36 respectively in August 
1839 but by early 1844 Blaenavon’s share price was below £10, Rhymney’s £12 with 
no price being available for British Iron Company.100 It must be assumed that the 
management structure of the early joint stock companies in the iron industry was, on 
average, much less successful than that of the companies still run as partnerships.
Table 5.2 Capital of the Joint Stock Iron Companies of Monmouthshire 1844.
Company Capital (£)
Rhymney 650,000
Blaenavon 500,000
Blaina 320,000
Pentwyn 220,000
Victoria 170,000
Source Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron & Steel Industry 1784-1879, p 204.
The general conclusion to this discussion on the relative merits of ironworks 
partnerships and joint stock companies in the 1830s and 1840s seems clearly to point 
in favour of the former, at least at this time. The continuity of the partnerships, control 
often remaining within the same family for decades, and the skill of the main partners 
or ironmasters were critical in these difficult times. Assuming they had sufficient 
capital they could decide what they wanted to do themselves and do it immediately 
whether this be introducing a particular innovation or expanding their operation in
99 Monmouthshire Merlin, 14 April 1838, British Iron Company, Also 5 May 1838, 19 May 1838, 8 
December 1838, 17 July 1841,2 October 1841, 5 February 1842, 8 July 1843, 5 August 1843, 12 
August 1843, 2 September 1843,23 November 1844, 8 February 1845, 30 May 1846. 5 September 
1846, 10 April 1847.
100 Monmouthshire Merlin, 3 August 1839, 6 January 1844, Share Prices.
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some way. When the Tredegar Company and the Nantyglo works each decided to 
invest in new mills they just got on with it but the Blaenavon Company struggled for 
years with plans for new works, forges and mills without success. If loans were 
required to achieve some of their aims such loans seemed relatively easy to come by. 
One of the risks of partnerships was that the death of one of the partners might lead to 
a period of uncertainty101 and no doubt this did arise on occasions but the active 
partners made every effort to allow control to pass smoothly to descendents or other 
relatives.
The joint stock iron companies of Monmouthshire were often unable to raise 
sufficient capital. The shareholders were eager to invest in good times but less so in 
bad times especially if dividends were suspended, hence the battles over calls. This 
desire for dividends displays a conservative attitude amongst the shareholders many of 
whom would have never seen an ironworks in their lives, the board meetings generally 
being held in London or Bath. There is also evidence that some of the joint stock 
companies were not well managed as committees of enquiry into the running of the 
companies were sometimes set up. Hence better management; freedom of action and 
generally better access to capital seems to have given the partnership ironworks of the 
study area the edge. The fret that the two great Merthyr iron companies, Cyfarthfr and 
Dowlais, remained partnerships until late in the nineteenth century102 suggests that the 
partnership capital structure might also have been appropriate in other iron districts of 
South Wales in the first half of the nineteenth century.
101 Jeremy Knight, ‘The Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company, 1836-1864, A Victorian Joint-Stock 
Venture’, Bulletin o f the Board o f  Celtic Studies 1980, Volume 28, part 4 (May 1980), p 632.
102 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 63.
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5.7 Conclusion.
Although the iron industry and its associated mineral extractive activities were 
highly labour intensive a substantial amount of both fixed and working capital was 
always required for the works to function. In general the success of the ironworks of 
the area in the first half of the nineteenth century enabled the ironmasters to reinvest 
substantial proportions of their profits back into their businesses. The greater ratio of 
furnaces to works within the Monmouthshire core group of works compared with the 
national average as indicated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 in Chapter 4 seems to confirm this. 
There is no evidence that particular ironmasters took untoward amounts of profits out 
of their companies leaving their businesses vulnerable. It appears that ironmasters, 
such as Messrs. Bailey who clearly did take out large amounts of money, did so 
because their companies were the most successful, generating the most profit. At 
times some of the ironworks of the area did suffer from shortages of capital that might 
have held back the progress of their businesses.
Table 5.3 Profits and losses at the Clvdach ironwork, 1838 to 1850
Profits (£) Losses (£)
1838 111
1839 4,032
1840 2,994
1841 2,926
1842 3,322
1843 6,737
1844 9,069
1845 1,535
1846 15,008
1847 12,485
1848 12,309
1849 2,175
1850 5,275
Source. W. E. Minchinton, ‘Brecknock and the Industrialization of South Wales’, (ed.) D. J. Davies, 
Brycheinog, Volume 7 (1961), p 22.
The obvious example is the Clydach ironworks, a works that was up for sale
more than once. Some of the problems of the Clydach ironmasters however might
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have been due to its location in the fairly narrow Clydach gorge. Expansion would 
have been more difficult there as a result. The difficulties of the Clydach ironworks 
are illustrated in Table 5.3, the company’s fortunes varying between profit and loss 
situations in the period 1838 to 1850.
The level of rentals payable by the ironworks companies on the land they 
leased was a concern for some of the ironmasters as high rents were a major drain on 
working capital. There was a considerable element of luck involved with the level of 
these rents, in general the later established ironworks had the harsher lease terms, and 
the ironmasters were always looking for freehold opportunities as they expanded their 
operations.
Loan capital was vital for some of the works such as Clydach and Ebbw Vale 
though there may have been some reluctance to rely on loan capital within the core 
group. The Blaenavon directors were intent on limiting debentures and other loans as 
the chairman reported to the shareholders on 6 April 1841 that the capital he hoped to 
raise from a new share issue was in part to redeem the debentures.103 A. H. John stated 
that the Ebbw Vale Company in the period 1810 to 1842 was financed up to about one 
half by loans104 and this reliance on loans and mortgages seems to have been a major 
factor in the eventual bankruptcy of the Ebbw Vale partners in June 1843. It was 
reported in July of that year that the Ebbw Vale partnership had unsecured debts of 
£349,000 whilst the available assets of the company were then only £93,000. There 
was also a further secured debt of £100,000 that included the £40,000 mortgage debt 
they had to Messrs. J. and C. Bailey of the Nantyglo works. The Ebbw Vale and
103 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book, 7th Meeting of the Shareholders, 
6 April 1841.
104 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales, pp 46-7.
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Sirhowy works had been valued in 1841 at £270,000.105 The company was saved as 
the creditors agreed that the works should continue to run and in just over six months 
the company was running successfully again under a new partnership lead by 
Abraham Darby of Coalbrookdale.106
The partnership was still the most appropriate capital structure for ironworks 
of the area in the first half of the nineteenth century. Despite apparently having 
adequate share capital initially, the joint stock companies of Monmouthshire were not 
a success and they often found that shareholders were reluctant to pay calls or take up 
new share issues when times were difficult, making innovations and future 
developments hard to achieve. However the continuity of control and the better and 
simpler management structures of the partnership companies were probably as least as 
important as capital when comparing the success of the partnership companies with 
the relative failure of the joint stock ironworks companies in the period before 1850.
105 Monmouthshire Beacon, 8 July 1843, The bankruptcy of the Harford, Davies partnership, reported 
from the Bath Chronicle, also Monmouthshire Beacon, 21 October 1843.
106 Monmouthshire Merlin, 19 August 1843, Harford, Davies Company’s Bankruptcy, 13 January 1844, 
Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy Ironworks for sale, 30 March 1844, Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy ironworks bought 
by Messrs. Darby of Coalbrookdale.
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Chapter 6, The recruitment of the workforce and the population of the Iron 
Districts of the North West Monmouthshire Area,
6.1 Introduction.
Labour was a vital element in the growth and success of the ironworks of the 
North West Monmouthshire area and this chapter is a study of the workforce, how 
they were recruited and from where they originated. The consequence of the 
recruitment of large numbers of workers to the area over the first half of the 
nineteenth century was a dramatic growth in population. The rates of this growth in 
population are compared with those of other regions and districts of Britain. The rapid 
inward migration was a particular problem for the ironmasters in that they were 
responsible for providing housing for the workpeople. A summary is given of the 
types of housing built by the ironmasters in the early period and later, in the second 
quarter of the century.
In 1780 the North West Monmouthshire area was thinly populated. Edmund 
Jones writing in 1779 in his The History o f Aberystruth believed that there were about 
150 houses in the whole parish but some were uninhabited and some had only one or 
two people living in them. Jones felt therefore that there were not more than 500 
people in the parish at that time, fewer than in earlier times.1 There is no reason to 
suppose that the parts of the area under study in other parishes were any more thickly 
populated. In fact a maximum of only three place names usually appear on eighteenth 
century maps of Monmouthshire in the North West part of the county, Blaenagwent or 
Blaena Gwent, Bedwellty and Llanhilleth. All three were locations of parish churches, 
Bedwellty and Llanhilleth being well down the valleys and outside the study area 
geographically. Only Blaenagwent, the alternative parish name for Aberystruth, could
1 Edmund Jones, The History o f  Aberystruth, 1779, Facsimile edition, J. E. Owen (ed.), 1988, p 60.
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Illustration 2 A view  o f  the Parish o f  Aberystruth c l 830
Source. South Wales Illustrated in a Series o f  Views, (adjacent to) p 131. The book has no 
author or date stated. The engraving is from a drawing by Henry Gastineau with colouring 
added later.
be considered to be inside this area, the actual village and parish church being sited 
where the town o f Blaina is today. See Illustration 2 for an early view o f Aberystruth.
Hence, when the ironworks o f the study area were established in the last two 
decades o f the eighteenth century, there would not have been a pool o f potential 
labour in the area apart from the relatively small number o f farm labourers. The 
ironmasters therefore were presented with a labour recruitment problem at the start. 
This problem of labour recruitment would have continued well into the nineteenth 
century as the works expanded. The way the ironmasters dealt with the recruitment of 
managers, senior employees, skilled and unskilled workmen is examined together with 
an assessment o f the extent of the employment of women and children. Unskilled
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labour had to be attracted to the area and analyses have been produced to show the 
districts of the country from which the workforce originated. It will be demonstrated 
that the ironmasters attracted workers from near and afar. Many came from nearby 
farming areas, others from neighbouring Welsh counties and many from West Wales 
and the western counties of England. Attempts have also been made to indicate 
changes in the patterns of the inward migration of workpeople.
As a result of the inward migration of workpeople to the area over the whole 
period of the study there was a dramatic increase in the population. The extent of the 
increase is demonstrated and compared with that of other districts of the country, 
confirming that the growth of population in the study area was truly exceptional for 
Britain in the industrial revolution period. This growth was almost entirely due to the 
requirements of labour arising from the development of the ironworks and the 
associated mineral extraction industries as no other substantial industry existed there 
in the period.
The ironmasters had the responsibility for housing their workforce and the 
study follows the various patterns of housing developments that arose over the years. 
It will be shown that as the nineteenth century progressed the housing developments 
around the ironworks gave rise to an array of new towns, the actual position of the 
ironworks often dictating the layouts of the towns.
6.2 The workforce.
This section is a study of the workforce, of the status levels within the 
workforce and in particular how the differing levels of the workforce were recruited. 
Essentially there were three levels within the overall workforce of the ironworks 
companies. The highest level was the managerial level that included works managers, 
section managers such as furnace managers and senior people such as engineers. The
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second level is that of the skilled workmen. This group includes puddlers, rollers, 
refiners, furnace keepers and others where considerable skill and experience was 
needed. There were also groups of artisans that could be included in this group. 
Examples of these are masons, blacksmiths and carpenters. The last group were the 
unskilled workers, a mixture of labourers and others who lacked the experience of the 
skilled workers and generally did more routine tasks. Women and children would be 
included in this group. Iron ore miners and colliers were numerous and also were 
skilled and unskilled though the distinction may not have been so clear as for iron 
workers. Where evidence permits an indication is also given of the salary or wage that 
applied to the particular category of worker at different times within the period of the 
study.
Industrial managers as such only really came into being from the mid­
eighteenth century,2 and in the early days of the ironworks of the area when the works 
were relatively small concerns the manager was often the active partner or a member 
of his family. In the period 1791 to 1796 Jeremiah Homfray was both one of the 
partners and the works manager of the Ebbw Vale ironworks company, his annual 
salary in 1793 being £150 per annum.3 Ignoring external workers such as ore miners 
and colliers the numbers of men at the ironworks site in this period probably 
numbered in the region of 40 to 60.4 The ironmasters worked closely with the 
workmen, often signing individual agreements. For example on 19 May 1796 the 
Ebbw Vale ironmaster, John Harford, agreed with George Jones that the latter would 
be employed by the works as a blacksmith for one year from the day the furnace was 
put into blast. Until this time Jones was to do whatever other work was allocated to
2 Sidney Pollard, ‘The Genesis of the Managerial Profession: the Experience of the Industrial 
Revolution in Great Britain’, Studies in Romanticism, Volume IV Number 2 (Winter 1965), p 57.
3 GRO. D.2472.3. Ebbw Vale Company Journal 1791-96, Entries for June 1793.
4 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Company Memorandum Book 1796-1819. The estimate is based on the 
day labourer schedules for April 1796 and June 1796.
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him. He was to receive a wage of twelve shillings a week rising to twenty four 
shillings when the furnace was in blast. In addition he was to receive a house and 
firing for which he was to be charged one shilling a week.5
The salaries of the early partner/managers seem modest but were probably 
competitive for relatively small industrial concerns in the last years of the eighteenth 
century.6 The managing partners could improve their income by their share of profits 
not reinvested. This pattern of works management continued into the nineteenth 
century though the salaries tended to increase. In 1816 William Hibbs Bevan, son-in- 
law of the original Beaufort ironmaster, Edward Kendall, received £200 per annum as 
manager of the Beaufort ironworks and in 1825, Richard Summers Harford, the 
managing partner of the Ebbw Vale works, had his salary increased from £200 per 
annum to £300. At the same time younger members of the Harford family were also 
involved in the management of the company. Summers Harford had a salary of £200 
in 1825, increased to £300 in 1830 and Charles Lloyd Harford had a salary of £200 
per annum from 1824 until 1833.7
By the 1830s and 1840s the ironworks were large organisations with 
management structures approaching those of modem times. At the time of the boom in 
1843 the huge Dowlais ironworks in Merthyr employed 7,300 persons and had a 
comprehensive managing team. In about 1845 Thomas Evans, the agent for sales was 
the highest paid receiving £1,000 per annum whilst the works manager, John Evans 
received £750 per annum. Amongst the other members of the team were the engineer,
5 GRO. D.2472.1 Ebbw Vale Company Memorandum Book 1796-1819, Agreement between John 
Harford for the Ebbw Vale Company and George Jones, blacksmith, 19 May 1796. There are numerous 
similar cases of individual agreements between the ironmasters and particular tradesmen or workers in 
the Memorandum Book.
6 Pollard, ‘The Genesis of the Managerial Profession: the Experience of the Industrial Revolution in 
Great Britain’, p 61. Whereas managing partners and top managers in the largest firms had salaries of 
£300 to £1,000 per annum in 1750 to 1790 and £500 to £2,000 in 1790 to 1830 the salaries of typical 
managers in the same two periods were £50 to £100 and £100 to £250 per annum.
7 F. J. Ball, Glyn Ebwy to Ebbw Vale, written in the 1950s, unpublished, p 74.
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Samuel Truran who received a salary of £200 per annum, the mine agent, who 
received £200 per annum and the shipping agent who received the same sum.8
As the ironworks of the region were large concerns in the 1830s and 1840s the 
method of recruitment of managers and senior people became more open and not 
restricted to family and contacts of the partners as had generally been the case in the 
early years of the industrial revolution.9 Advertisements for senior posts appeared in 
the local press. Examples of some of these advertisements are listed in Table 6.1.
These advertisements illustrate the dramatic change that had taken place in the 
iron industry since the early days of the industry in the late eighteenth century. In 
some cases there were plenty of applicants. When the Blaenavon directors advertised 
for a works manager on the retirement of the existing manager, James Askwell, on 1 
January 1841, they had 120 applicants. The successful person was Harry Scrivenor 
who wrote the History o f the Iron Trade published in 1841.10
Unfortunately information on the recruitment of skilled workers in the iron 
works is less prevalent. The introduction of Henry Cort’s puddling and rolling process 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries did not result in a decrease in 
skilled ironworkers compared with that under previous processes and skilled workers 
such as puddlers, bailers, refiners and rollers increased in number as the works 
expanded in the first half of the nineteenth century. It is estimated that as many as 
thirty to forty percent of the workforce were skilled in the large ironworks.11 In the 
early days it is most likely that industrialists coming to the area from ironworks in
8 John A. Owen, A Short History o f  the Dowlais Ironworks, Merthyr Tydfil, 1972, pp 23-4.
9 Pollard, ‘The Genesis of the Managerial Profession: the Experience of the Industrial Revolution in 
Great Britain’, pp 62-3.
10 GRO. D.751.356. Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book.
11 A. H. John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, Cardiff, 1950, p 59.
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other regions of the country such as the West Midlands, brought some key workers 
with them.12
Table 6.1 Advertisements for managers and senior positions in South Wales Ironworks. 1830s and 
1840s.
Monmouthshire
Merlin
Newspaper.
Advertisement.
26 November 
1831
Advertisement. To Furnace Managers and Engineers.
Wanted -  A steady respectable Man, to manage blast furnaces and fineries: 
also a good practical engineer who can make our drawings and fit up machinery 
in a proper and workmanlike manner. Applications (post paid) to be addressed to 
“X.Y.Z.”, “Post Office, Newport, Mon, 23 November 1831.”
10 January 1835 Wanted. -  A respectable MAN who well understands his business, principally to 
take charge of superintending the Masters of the Levels and Patches, and generally 
to direct the working of the Iron Stone at an Iron Work in South Wales. A 
knowledge of both the Welsh and English languages will be indispensable.13 The 
party must be capable of keeping a good account. Apply (post paid) to X, Y Box 
No. 11 Post Office, Swansea.
6 February 1836 Wanted. A Person to take charge of the Engines and Machinery of an extensive 
Ironwork. To be a competent person, a liberal salary will be given. Apply by letter 
(post paid) to A.Z. Post Office, Newport.
5 November 
1836
To Mine and Coal Agents. Wanted. A person who has had some experience in 
Mining, to undertake the Superintendence of the Underground working at the 
Blaina iron works. It is requested that no person will apply who cannot produce the 
most satisfactory references to his sobriety and competence -  Apply by letter to 
Thomas Brown, Blaina ironworks.
12 November 
1836
Wanted. A steady young man as secondary clerk in an Ironmaster’s office who 
writes a good hand and is capable of keeping general accounts. Apply at the 
Merlin’s Office, Newport.
19 May 1838 To engineers. Wanted at an Iron Work in Monmouthshire -  a practical engineer, 
competent to the erection of blast furnaces, and a Forge and Mill etc. on a large 
scale:: also the construction of Winding and Blowing engines and all the machinery 
used in Iron Works.
testimonials needed of their ability to make specifications for contracts and 
superintend their execution in masonry, carpentry and machinery.
Salary £200 p.a. and upwards with a house and coals.
28 December 
1839
Wanted Principal Manager of Extensive Iron Works in the county Of 
Monmouthshire.
20 February 
1841
To Furnace Managers. A good practical manager who can undertake the 
management of several blast furnaces (in Wales), may have a permanent 
engagement and good wages, on application to Mr Thomas Evans of Dowlais 
Works. None need apply who cannot give testimonials for sobriety, integrity and 
industry -  Dowlais 15 February 1841.
1 May 1841 Coalbrook Vale iron works. Wanted -  Furnace Manager who is capable to 
undertake the management of four blast furnaces -  apply to T. LL. Brewer.
12 Chris Barber, The Story o f Torfaen, Abergavenny, 1999, p 127. It is believed that founders of the 
Blaenavon iron works, Thomas Hill and Thomas Hopkins came to the area with certain key workers 
and housed them in good quality cottages.
13 William Coxe, An Historical Tour in Monmouthshire, London, 1801, p 248. In 1800 the area was 
predominantly Welsh speaking as Coxe attests when visiting the parish church in Aberystruth ‘In this 
church the service is always performed in Welsh’; Monmouthshire Merlin, 18 September 1841, Tea 
party at Tredegar, the speeches were made in English and Welsh. Both languages were spoken in the 
area by the 1830s and 1840s. See Section 6.3, ‘Where the workforce came from’.
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It is also likely that skilled workers came to the Monmouthshire ironworks 
steadily throughout the study period from Merthyr, as the ironworks of this town were 
so close by.14 In fact it is believed that the majority of skilled ironworkers were 
recruited within the neighbourhood of new ironworks set up in the country15 and 
throughout the period there was a continual, if slow, transference of skilled workers 
from one ironworks in the area to another and, in fewer numbers from other iron 
districts of the country.16 This latter situation would most likely have applied where 
special needs arose as a result of new processes rather than because of a shortage of 
labour.17 Artisans such as smiths, carpenters and masons were more likely to have 
moved to the area from outside the neighbourhood as such skills were more widely 
dispersed around the country.18 In the early years of the ironworks of the area there 
was considerable use of contracts presumably to lock in skilled men to the particular 
company. Contracts were used extensively at Ebbw Vale throughout the period of the 
Memorandum Book of 1796 to 181919 but according to A. H. John it is unlikely that
9 0the practice continued when the works were large concerns.
There is no evidence that the ironmasters advertised for skilled workers in 
local newspapers21 and the majority of the skilled ironworkers in the area, and 
probably in the country, became skilled after periods of unskilled work in the same 
ironworks. For example, young men worked with skilled puddlers for a number of
14 Oliver Jones, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, Tredegar, 1969, p 31. Jones believed that the 
majority of the workers in the early years at Sirhowy came from Merthyr.
15 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, p 60; Barrie Trinder, The Industrial 
Revolution in Shropshire, Chichester, 2000, p 82.
16 David J. V. Jones, Before Rebecca: Popular Protests in Wales 1793-1835, London, 1973, p 71. Jones 
stated that some skilled workers were brought to South Wales from other iron districts including 
Scotland -  attracted by wages of twenty five shillings a week.
17 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, p 62.
18 1851 census returns for Superintendent Registrar’s District 578, Abergavenny, Registrar’s District 5, 
Enumerator’s District 11, Nantyglo. Analysis of places of birth of heads of households and lodgers who 
were artisans indicated that nearly two-thirds were bom outside the neighbourhood.
19 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819.
20 John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 74.
21 No such advertisements have been identified in the Monmouthshire Merlin in the period 1829 to 
1850.
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years until they themselves became skilled. To prove this point an analysis was carried 
out utilising the 1851 census enumerators’ returns for a zone in the Nantyglo area,22 
identifying cases where sons living in the same household as their fathers had similar 
occupations. In the particular survey 116 households were identified where one or 
more sons of working age were living with their fathers. It was found that thirty-seven 
sons had followed similar skilled occupations to their fathers within the ironworks 
environment and thirty sons of miners or colliers had followed these occupations. In 
addition to sons of skilled workers following in the footsteps of their fathers there 
were also many cases of young skilled men bom in the same area indicating that they 
probably had progressed from unskilled status to skilled status in the area in which 
they were brought up. Whether there were ever planned apprenticeship schemes or not 
these workers served their time under skilled men.
An index of average wages across the country published by B. R. Mitchell and 
Phyllis Deane in Abstract o f British Historical Statistics indicates that wages 
improved little over the first half of the nineteenth century23 and Pat Hudson stated 
that ‘various quantitative studies have failed to prove the existence of any major 
increases in real incomes for the mass of the population before the 1820s’.24 However 
recent studies have estimated that the cost of living declined by fifty-one percent 
between 1810/14 to 1849/51 and this has resulted in an assessment that the overall 
increase in real full-time earnings over the period of the study, 1780 to 1850, was just 
over 30 percent.25 There is some evidence though that the money wages of skilled 
ironworkers, colliers and miners did increase over the period of the study. In the early
22 1 851 census returns for Superintendent Registrar’s District 578, Abergavenny, Registrar’s District 5, 
Enumerator’s District 11, Nantyglo.
23 B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract o f British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, 1962, p 343.
24 Pat Hudson, The Industrial Revolution, London, 1994, p 31.
25 Hans-Joachim Voth, ‘Living standards and the urban environment’, Roderick Floud and Paul 
Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700- 
1860, Cambridge, 2004, p 273.
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1790s furnace keepers were paid in the region of ten to thirteen shillings a week, they 
received about twenty one shillings in 1817, around thirty five shillings in the mid 
1840s falling to under twenty seven shillings by 1850.26 Skilled men in the forges and 
mills were paid by the ton and information on weekly wages is sparse. Records are 
available for the Abersychan ironworks in Monmouthshire for the years 1844 to 1850 
and weekly rates for skilled forge and mill men are given in Table 6.2 together with 
the national average bar iron prices for comparison.
Table 6.2. Weekly wage rates for skilled forge and rolling mill men, Abersychan Ironworks, and the 
national average bar iron prices (per ton) for comparison. 1844-1850
1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850
Refiners 37/8 39/3 51/2 40/7 48/9 39/6 31/-
Puddlers 23/7 30/6 35/8 32/4 30/11 25/7 23/-
Bailers 26/2 32/7 45/1 38/8 31/7 23/- 18/-
Rollers 33/7 58/10 72/- 80/- 60/9 35/6 32/-
Bar iron price (£) 4.15.0. 6. 10.0. 9. 10. 0. 9.15.0. 7. 0.0. 6. 5. 0. 5. 17. 6.
Sources. Wage rates: Kim Colebrook, ‘A History of the British Ironworks, Abersychan’, Gwent Local 
History Journal, Volume 54, p 23. Average bar iron prices; B. R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract o f  
British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, 1962, p 192.
The figures in Table 6.2 show that in good years for the iron industry wage rates for 
these skilled workers were high but such rates invariably did not last and fell swiftly 
with falls in price of iron. The high degree of variability in the rates is due partly to 
the rates being for one company but it does indicate that for short periods at least 
skilled ironworkers experienced wage increases. Another factor that affects any view 
of real incomes is that certain workers in the iron industry had subsidised housing and 
coal for their fires. This benefit was particularly prevalent in the early period.27
The most comprehensive wage rate data available is for colliers and Table 6.3 
indicates the progression of these wage rates through the first half of the nineteenth
26 John A. Owen, The History o f  the Dowlais Iron Works, 1790-1970, Risca, Newport, 1977, pp 16,23; 
Chris Evans (calendared by), Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, Cardiff, 1990, p 107; 
Madeleine Elsas (ed.), Iron in the Making: Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782-1860, Glamorgan 
County Council, 1960, pp 3-4; Ball, Glyn Ebwy to Ebbw Vale, p 14.
27 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, various contracts include provision of 
housing and firing.
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centuiy in the South Wales coal industry. Although not great, there was a general 
improvement in wages of colliers over the first half of the nineteenth century.
Table 6.3 Weekly wage rates for colliers in the South Wales Coal Industry.
Year Wage Year Wage Year Wage
1796 12/- 1833 18/- 1840 21/-to 27/-
1801 15/- 1834 19/- 1841 25/-
1807 20/- to 30/- 1835 17/- 1842 19/-
1815 15/- 1836 16/- 1843 18/-to 24/-
1829 20/- 1837 22/-to 23/- 1845 c25/-
1831 20/- 1838 19/- 1850 c20/-
1832 17/- 1839
Source. All years except 1815, 1845 and 1850, P. W. Evans, ‘The History of Industrial Relations in the 
South Wales Coal Industry to 1912’- a thesis presented to the University of Wales, Ph.D. 1955; 1815 
and 1845, Owen, The History o f the Dowlais Iron Works, 1759-1970, p 23; 1850, Roger Burt, ‘The 
extractive industries’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f  
Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004, p 435.
There were clearly two principal sources of unskilled labour for the ironworks 
and associated mines. These were young men, boys and occasionally girls and 
women, already living in the area and farm workers and others moving to the area. A 
detailed study of immigrants to the area is contained in Section 6.3 however analyses 
have been carried out for this section to assess the extent of employment of women, 
boys and girls in the study area.
To assess the pattern of female employment in the area and the extent that 
women were employed in the iron and mining industry the Nantyglo sample identified 
above was analysed for women aged 14 and over who were not classed as housewives 
in the 1851 census enumeration and the results are shown in Table 6.4.
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Table 6.4 Jobs analysis -  Females aged fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen and eighteen and
over. Housewives excluded.
1851 Census, 578 Abergavenny, 5 Aberystruth, Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo)
Occupation 14 15 16 17 18+ Totals Average
age
Servants, house servants, maids etc. 6 2 3 5 21 37 22.3
Dressmakers - 2 1 - 13 16 21.5
Housekeepers, - - - - 15 15 43.7
Washers, washer women - - - 3 8 11 26.7
Annuitants - - - - 11 11 54.1
Labourers, out-door employment etc. 2 1 1 - 7 11 20.3
Working in a forge/iron works - - 1 1 8 10 19.5
Piling in an iron works 1 - 1 - 7 9 18.9
Relieved by parish - - - - 6 6 63.0
Hauliers etc. - 1 - - 3 4 20.0
Laundresses - - - - 4 4 31.0
Dependent on son - - - - 4 4 65.3
Miscellaneous industrial jobs - 1 1 3 5 10 19.1
Miscellaneous non-industrial jobs - 1 - - 16 17 33.1
No job stated 6 7 6 4 52 75
Totals 15 15 14 16 180 240
Women were prohibited from being employed underground in mines under the 
1842 Mines Act28 and no women were recorded definitely working in collieries or 
mines but 33 women (13.8 percent) worked in physical industrial roles and a further 
11 were classed as labourers (4.6 percent). The large number of women listed as 
having no job is also suspect as some of these women may have worked in manual 
jobs in the ironworks but possibly did not wish to admit this. The average age of these 
female industrial workers was low being around 19 with only a few 14 to 16 year olds 
employed in industry. The majority of the females who were employed were in 
‘female’ jobs such as servants, dressmakers, housekeepers and washerwomen and the 
small number of women working directly in the iron industry probably meant that 
their role within the industry locally and in the activities of the workforce was unlikely 
to have been significant. However most of the women not classed as housewives were 
earning and therefore they must have made a useful contribution to the average family 
income.
28 Roger Burt, ‘The Extractive Industries’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge 
Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004, p 441.
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Further analyses were carried out to see how many children appeared to be 
employed in the ironworks and associated industries. Again the target Nantyglo area 
was selected and 1851 census data again analysed for children aged seven to 13. 
Unfortunately the 1841 census enumerators’ data could not be used because of the 
tendency of the enumerators to record ages to the nearest multiple of five years. Apart 
from establishing the numbers of children employed it was also decided to compare 
these results with numbers of children recorded in the census enumeration as 
‘scholars’. The Factory Act of 1833 restricted the hours that children aged between 
nine and thirteen could work to 48 in a week and in addition children were to attend 
school during working hours for not less than two hours a day.29 This presented a 
difficulty with the reliability of the data. For example if children who worked also had 
to attend school for two hours a day there is the question as to what would be entered 
as the occupation in these circumstances. It was not possible to deal with this problem 
and so the occupation entered has to be taken at face value with obvious reservations.
The sample overall consisted of 179 boys and 154 girls aged seven to 13 and it 
was found that 38 percent of the boys were listed as working but only 6lA percent of 
the girls. Both figures appeared to be lower than might have been expected and it must 
be questioned whether there was a tendency to under record the feet that children were 
working with a corresponding overstatement of the numbers of children ‘at home’ and 
a considerable reluctance of parents to give any answer to the occupation question 
thus the large number of blank entries. It is also not clear how accurately the 
enumerators tried to establish the occupation of children compared with those of 
adults.
29 E. Royston Pike, Human Documents o f  the Industrial Revolution in Britain, London, 1966, p 138-9.
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Table 6.5 Jobs/school attendance analysis -  Children aged seven to thirteen.
1851 Census. 578 Abergavenny. 5 Aberystruth. Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo)
Age Boys Girls
At work Scholars At home Blank At work Scholars At home Blank
7 1 7 5 7 - 9 13 10
8 5 11 5 7 - 7 7 5
9 6 17 4 2 1 12 3 8
10 10 10 5 5 3 8 5 5
11 14 5 2 3 - 8 3 2
12 14 6 - 4 2 6 6 9
13 18 1 - 6 4 6 6 6
Totals 68 56 21 34 10 56 43 45
Seven of the ten girls with jobs were servants of one sort or another and only three had 
jobs indisputably industrial in nature. As for the boys Table 6.6 gives an analysis of 
the jobs undertaken as listed in the census.
Table 6.6 Boys job analysis.
1851 Census. 578 Abergavenny. 5 Aberystruth. Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo)
Occupation Age
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total
Colliers, miners 1 3 2 5 1 2 3 17
Firemen, fire work - 1 2 - 5 6 1 15
Working in forge - - - 2 3 2 1 8
Hauliers - - - - 2 1 4 7
Puddlers, rollers 1 4 5
Labourers etc. - - - 1 - 1 3 5
Miscellaneous ironworks jobs - 1 2 2 3 1 2 11
Totals 1 5 6 10 14 14 18 68
As stated above it is likely that many more children were working than it 
appears from census data but even from the entries given it is clear that some boys as 
young as seven to nine were working in the ironworks and in the mines. However in 
the case of mines the children may not have been working underground but might 
have been employed on surface work. As would be expected only older boys worked 
in more skilled roles such as puddling. These results even taking occupations at their 
face value in the census data tend to reflect badly on the ironmasters of this area for 
even if they were not directly responsible for the employment of young children they 
should have set up procedures to check that children were not so employed.
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Owing to the rather uncertain nature of some of the data for children’s 
occupations in the census for Nantyglo a second area was studied for a comparison* 
The town of Tredegar was chosen for this second study and the sample consisted of 
176 households in enumeration district 3 of Registrar’s District 6 (Tredegar) of 
Abergavenny. The aim behind this second study was to test the suggestion made 
above that there was a clear tendency to avoid recording occupations of children 
and/or that the enumerators varied considerably in their attempts at establishing 
occupations for children. This should be seen in the context that blank occupation 
entries for men were rare in the 1851 census, only four percent for adult males in the 
Nantyglo target sample.
Although the Tredegar sample was small compared with the target Nantyglo 
sample, being only 130 children, the results were remarkable in comparison. Only 
eight of the children, all boys, were listed as having jobs and all these were 10 or over. 
Thus the Tredegar sample yielded only 6.1 percent of children having jobs (Nantyglo 
23.4 percent). The percentages of seven to 13 year olds in school or at home were not 
dissimilar. 30.8 percent of Tredegar children were listed as scholars (Nantyglo 33.6 
percent) and 17.7 percent of Tredegar children were described as ‘at home’ (Nantyglo
19.2 percent). However the percentages of blank occupation entries were quite 
different for the two areas. 45.4 percent of Tredegar entries were blank compared 
with only 23.7 percent for Nantyglo.
Table 6.7 Jobs/school attendance analysis -  Children aged seven to thirteen.
Age All children
At work Scholars At home Blank
7 - 10 4 5
8 - 9 3 9
9 - 3 3 10
10 2 10 2 8
11 1 4 2 8
12 2 4 6 13
13 3 - 3 6
Totals 8 40 23 59
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The stark differences between the two samples in the numbers of children 
where entries for occupation were left blank could suggest either a greater reluctance 
amongst Tredegar parents to admit that their young children were working, or it could 
suggest that more young children were employed at Nantyglo, or that the enumerator 
was less thorough at Tredegar. With such an unsatisfactory conclusion to this 
particular problem it was decided that a third and quite different area was to be studied 
for the same issue. In this case a sizeable sample of households were studied in the 
vicinity of the Clydach ironworks in the county of Brecon.
Table 6.8 Jobs/school attendance analysis -  Children aged seven to thirteen.
1851 Census. County of Brecon. Crickhowell. Clydach Village
Age Boys Girls
At work Scholars At home Blank At work Scholars At home Blank
7 - 8 - 2 - 5 - 6
8 - 10 - 2 - 6 - 3
9 1 5 - 5 - 7 - 4
10 3 4 - 1 - 6 - 6
11 4 3 - 1 1 11 1 3
12 6 2 - 3 - 6 - 4
13 9 4 - - 3 4 - 8
Totals 23 36 0 14 4 45 1 30
The results for Clydach at least seem to confirm that the enumerators did vary 
in their treatment of children’s occupations in that virtually no children were described 
as ‘at home’ in this sample, only one out of a total of 153. At Clydach 23 boys were 
described as in work, mostly aged 10 to 13, this being 32 percent of boys compared 
with 38 percent boys in work at Nantyglo and only 11 percent at Tredegar. These 
results all seem quite incompatible. Whilst it is possible that differences in the 
management and in the practices at the three works may have some effect the 
differences found cannot be explained in this way. It is also possible that parents in 
Nantyglo felt more able to admit that their children were working and there might just 
have been more work there for children. All the above points coupled with the
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inconsistency amongst the enumerators seem likely to have played some part in the 
substantial differences in the three samples.
Conclusions therefore from this work must be treated with much caution. 
However it is probably fair to claim that there was considerable employment of 
children in the area, probably more at Nantyglo and Clydach than at Tredegar. The 
numbers of the children working increased from relatively few at age seven to large 
numbers at ages 11 to 13. Boys were much more likely to be employed in the 
ironworks, in connection with mineral extraction or in haulage than the girls. Most of 
the girls in work were servants of one sort or another. It seems very likely that the 
numbers of children actually working were considerably understated in the 1851 
census for the region. A sizeable minority of the children ages seven to thirteen were 
at school though for how long each day it is impossible to state nor is it known if these 
scholars also had outdoor work from time to time. It is likely that many did have such 
work. The Children’s Employment Commission of 1842 produced analyses of 
children and young people at work in the study area. It was reported that there were 
160 boys and 31 girls under thirteen employed at the Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy 
ironworks and associated mines. The corresponding figures for the Nantyglo, 
Tredegar and Blaenavon works were 131 and eleven, 179 and twelve and 148 and 37 
respectively.30
In summary the patterns of recruitment of managers and senior employees, 
skilled workmen and unskilled workpeople were quite different. The principal 
partners or members of their family often filled the function of works managers early 
in the period and even later, works managers, section managers and senior employees 
or professionals were often recruited from within the ironworks local network.
30 Children's Employment Commission 1842. Volume XVI1, pp 594, 614, 62land 624.
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However recruitment by advertisements became more common for management and 
senior roles. In the very early days some skilled men may have accompanied the 
industrialists to the area and in the early days and later some may have been recruited 
from outside the district for particular needs such as the implementation of new 
machinery. However the vast majority of skilled men were either recruited from 
within the neighbourhood of the particular works or by promotion from within. Many 
skilled men had followed the trade of their fathers. Wage rates of skilled ironworkers 
slowly increased over the period but with considerable fluctuations according to the 
prosperity of the various ironworks and the demand for iron at the time. Colliers’ 
wages followed a similar pattern but with less fluctuation. In addition the position of 
the workers in the iron districts had improved further to some extent because of the 
fall in the cost of living in the 1830 to 1850 period.31
In the very early days unskilled workers were mostly recruited from the small 
pool of local farm workers. However the vast majority of unskilled labour was 
recruited from descendents of previous immigrants to the area or were themselves 
immigrants. It was established that late in the period about twenty percent of females 
aged fourteen and over were employed in an industrial capacity. Women classed as 
housewives were excluded from the analyses. Following various attempts to assess the 
numbers of boys and girls aged seven to thirteen who were working in an industrial 
capacity it was concluded that the 1851 census returns for the area were unreliable 
however it could be concluded that a considerable number of boys were so employed 
po ssibly in the region of thirty to forty percent. Only a small proportion of young girls 
were working in industry possibly around five or six percent.
31 Jlohn, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, p 83.
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Pat Hudson poses the question whether whole families tended to work together 
in any sense in industrial districts.32 The data above suggests that in the study area this 
might have arisen but was limited. Most of the women had ‘female’ jobs whilst 
relatively few were employed industrially where they might have worked with their 
husbands. As regards their children the analysis earlier indicating that many boys or 
young men followed the profession of their father does suggest that some families 
worked together though not usually including the mother. However as stated earlier 
the census data for the employment of children in the area was both variable by 
enumeration district and suspect in general and it might be that many more children at 
young ages worked with their fathers than it would appear from the analyses above.
6.3 Where the workforce came from.
The ironmasters manned their ironworks, mines and collieries with migrant 
workers and the descendents of these workers and it will be shown that they attracted 
people from both near and afar, from other industrial areas and from farming areas. In 
order to obtain a detailed picture of the patterns of migration the enumerators’ returns 
for the 1851 census were studied for the same target area around Nantyglo and for the 
first analysis the birthplaces of heads of households were examined. Inevitably there 
were difficulties using the 1851 census data and compromises were necessary. Using a 
data set as late as 1851 is likely to give a picture of migration biased towards the later 
decades of the period of the study but none of the previous censuses gave details of 
places of birth. A further problem encountered was that at times the enumerators only 
inserted the county of birth. This did not present a difficulty except in the cases of 
Monmouthshire and Breconshire when more precise data was needed to establish if
32 Pat Hudson, ‘Industrial organisation and structure’, in Floud and Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge 
Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004, pp 34- 
5.
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the person was bom locally. County only entries although recorded separately were 
included with ‘Monmouthshire not local’ and ‘Breconshire not local’ in Table 6.9 and 
this must have the effect of understating the true ‘local’ places of birth.
Table 6.9 Birthplaces of Heads of Households, 1851 Census,
578 Abergavenny, 5 Aberystruth, Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo).
Numbers % Numbers %
Local to the study area 54 13.4 54 13.4
Monmouthshire not local 
& Mon’ unspecified
35 8.7 }
}
Breconshire not local 
& Brec’ unspecified
44 10.9 }
}
112 27.7
Glamorgan -  Merthyr 33 8.2 }
Glamorgan -  other 43 10.6 } 43 10.6
Neighbouring English 
Counties
- Herefordshire 15 3.7 }
- Somerset 23 5.7 } 50 12.4
- Gloucester 12 3.0
West Wales
- Carmarthen 48 11.9
- Cardigan 17 4.2 > 82 20.3
- Pembroke 17 4.2
Mid/North Wales 17 4.2 }
Midlands 18 4.5 } 44 10.9
West Country 9 2.2 }
England -  Other 5 1.2 5 1.2
Ireland 9 2.2 9 2.2
Unspecified birthplace 5 1.2 5 1.2
Total 404 404
It was decided to use a fairly wide definition of ‘local’ places of birth as 
follows: The head of household was regarded as ‘local’ if his or her entry in the 
census was one of the following:
1. Any town or village in the North West Monmouthshire region (e.g.
Tredegar, Sirhowy, Beaufort, Ebbw Vale, Trefil, Nantyglo, 
Brynmawr, Blaina, Clydach, Blaenavon, Gamdyrrys, Varteg, 
Rhymney, Victoria and Abersychan.). The villages of Gilwem,
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Llanfoist and Govilon were also included as they had direct working 
links with the ironworks because of the canal wharfs.
2. A place of birth listed as Bedwellty (parish) or Aberystruth (parish) 
unless the entry also included a village outside the area of study
3. A place of birth listed as one of the three Breconshire parishes of 
Llangynidr, Llangattock and Llanelly
Under the criteria listed above the nearby towns of Abergavenny, Crickhowell, 
Pontypool and Merthyr would not be regarded as local
A fairly mixed picture emerges from Table 6.9. In 1851 only 13.4 percent of 
the heads of households were bom locally, while the largest group of immigrants, 27.7 
percent, were those coming from the most immediately neighbouring areas, other 
parts of Monmouthshire and Breconshire and the iron district of Merthyr. Thus the 
largest group of immigrants came partly from rural and partly from existing industrial 
areas.
Not surprisingly the next largest group (23 percent) came from neighbouring 
counties such as Glamorgan excluding Merthyr, Herefordshire, Somerset and 
Gloucestershire. Somerset though not neighbouring by land was certainly near across 
the Bristol Channel. These three English counties recorded lower than the national 
average growth in population in the period and it is clear that some men from the 
farming areas of these counties migrated to North West Monmouthshire. There was 
also considerable immigration from West Wales (20.3 percent), from Carmarthenshire 
in particular, and a not insignificant number of migrants (14.3 percent) came from 
districts farther away such as from the Midlands; some no doubt were industrial 
workers from the iron works in Shropshire and Staffordshire while others came from 
rural North Wales.
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In general the migration pattern was mixed with workers coming to the area 
from existing industrial regions and from rural areas in Wales and neighbouring 
counties of England. As the ironworks and their associated mineral industries were 
practically the only sources of employment in the study area the immigrants must 
have been attracted by the wages on offer and the prospect or hope of continual 
employment. This must certainly be true of immigrants from rural areas while the 
picture was more complicated for workers already involved in the iron trade as there is 
evidence that there was a degree of movement between the ironworks of the district. It 
follows that some of the immigrants bom in farming districts may well have worked 
in other industrial districts prior to working in the North West Monmouthshire area. 
The heads of households examined were predominantly men though where the heads 
of households were women, usually widows, they were still included.
A further feature of the households of the Nantyglo sample was that many of 
the households included boarders or lodgers and some included visitors. The presence 
of substantial numbers of lodgers in households was a feature of the industrial areas of 
South East Wales33 and probably of Britain, and was of some concern to the 
ironmasters who had to provide housing for them. Some employers who rented out 
houses to particular workers under employment agreements were keen that these 
workers took in lodgers presumably because of the shortages of houses. The 
employers sometimes included clauses in employment agreements under which there 
were limits on the rents these tenants could charge lodgers.34
33 Harold Carter and Sandra Wheatley, Merthyr Tydfil in 1851, Cardiff 1982, pp 32,44. Like the study 
area there were many instances of lodgers in the industrial parts of Merthyr though in Merthyr the 
lodgers tended to be accommodated in households in which the main residents had low status 
occupations. This feature was not found in the Nantyglo sample as lodgers were fairly well distributed 
amongst households of low and higher status occupations.
34 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, 13 April 1798 and others.
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In the Nantyglo sample 404 households were examined and it was found that 
130 of them had one or more boarders or lodgers, 32 percent of the households. 
However twenty-eight of the households had forty-one ‘visitors’, which complicates 
the issue. Some of these visitors might have been genuine visitors present for only a 
short time but it is likely that others were really lodgers but were classed as visitors if 
the head of the household or his wife knew the person previously, the term visitor 
being preferred to lodger in these circumstances. Others might just have been lodgers 
in the usual sense. With this uncertainty regarding the visitor category it was decided 
not to include them in the analysis of persons classed as lodgers or boarders. A further 
category was that of servants and it was found that 22 of the 404 households had non 
family servants though it could not be certain that residents classed as servants were 
actually servants in those particular households. The feature about these servants was 
that they were mostly female and bom locally.
Table 6.10 below shows the birthplaces of the 209 persons clearly identified as 
lodgers or boarders in the sample area of Nantyglo, children classified as lodgers who 
were under ten years of age were excluded from the analysis. It would be expected 
that the pattern of immigration for lodgers would more closely resemble the overall 
pattern of immigration in the years immediately prior to the 1851 census on the 
assumption that lodgers would have arrived in the area later than the heads of 
households. However this pattern of immigration for lodgers was found to be quite 
similar to that for heads of households but with slightly fewer births local to the area, 
from nearby areas and from Glamorgan but with a somewhat higher proportion of 
births from neighbouring English counties, West Wales and farther afield in England 
and Ireland. However immigration of lodgers from the Midlands industrial areas
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seems to have been lower. These results suggest a slight change in the pattern of 
immigration.
Table 6.10 Birthplaces of Lodgers 1851 Census
578 Abergavenny. 5 Aberystruth, Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo).
Numbers % Numbers %
Local to the study area 24 11.4 24 11.4
Monmouthshire not local 
& Mon’ unspecified
22 10.5 }
}
Breconshire not local 
& Brec’ unspecified
20 9.6 }
}
46 22.0
Glamorgan -  Merthyr 4 1.9 }
Glamorgan -  other 16 7.7 } 16 7.7
Neighbouring English 
Counties
- Herefordshire 12 5.7 }
- Somerset 15 7.2 } 34 16.3
- Gloucester 7 3.3 }
West Wales
- Carmarthen 25 12.0 }
- Cardigan 9 4.3 } 46 22.0
- Pembroke 12 5.7 }
Mid/North Wales 4 1.9 }
Midlands 2 1.0 } 13 6.2
West Country 7 3.3 }
England -  Other 10 4.8 10 4.8
Ireland 11 5.3 11 5.3
Scotland 1 0.5 1 0.5
Unspecified birthplace 8 3.8 8 3.8
Total 209 100 209 100
An attempt was made to see if the changes in the overall pattern of 
immigration suggested by the lodgers’ analysis in Table 6.10 had in fact applied over 
the few decades prior to 1851. The returns from the 1851 census for the same 
Nantyglo enumerator’s district were examined again and attempts were made to 
identify when heads of households came to the local area by examining the birthplaces 
of their children. 248 cases were found from the 404 heads of households where 
census information on their children allowed an informed estimate to be made of the 
approximate year of the arrival of the particular head. In order to identify more easily
170
trends from the relatively small sample the results have been presented for groups 
only in Table 6.11.
Table 6.11 Approximate dates of arrival in the area of Heads of Households
1851 Census 578 Abergavenny. 5 Abervstruth. Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo).
Birthplace Numbers % of 
total 
sample
1846-
1851
1840-
1845
1830s 1820s
and
earlier
Monmouthshire not local 
& Mon’ unspecified
}
}
Breconshire not local 
& Brec’ unspecified
} 77 
}
31.0 13 11 39 14
Glamorgan -  Merthyr }
Glamorgan -  other } 30 12.1 0 6 14 10
Neighbouring English 
Counties
- Herefordshire }
- Somerset } 37 14.9 14 13 8 2
- Gloucester }
West Wales
- Carmarthen }
- Cardigan } 55 22.2 12 17 15 11
- Pembroke }
Mid/North Wales }
Midlands } 35 14.1 5 8 17 5
West Country }
England -  Other 5 2.0 1 1 1 2
Ireland 9 3.7 3 1 4 1
Total 248 100 48 57 98 45
It is important to stress the crudeness of this method and it could be criticised 
on many accounts but two trends are clearly demonstrated by the analysis. Workers 
bom in nearby areas were less likely to migrate to the area in the 1840s than earlier 
whilst the opposite was the case for migrants from the neighbouring English counties 
of Herefordshire, Somerset and Gloucestershire. These results tend to support some of 
the findings for lodgers above, however migrants from West Wales appear to have 
arrived in relatively consistent proportions over the thirty years of the analysis. There
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1 C
was an exodus of Irish immigrants to Britain in the 1840s but from the analyses 
above only a fairly limited number of Irish immigrants appear to have moved to the 
study area by mid century. Five percent of the lodgers were classified as Irish.
Looking at the overall numbers in Table 6.11 suggests that the largest number 
of the heads of households came to the area in the 1830s. This is not surprising as this 
decade was one of maximum prosperity for the ironworks areas, the 1840s being 
much more uncertain. One of the weaknesses of this approach might have been that it 
masked those situations where workers arrived in the study area via intermediate 
locations or where they temporarily moved out again. However a brief study of this 
issue indicated such cases were not particularly numerous and are not likely to have 
had a major effect on the analyses.
The above discussion attempts to analyse where the immigrants the North 
West Monmouthshire area came from and when the came from the different regions 
of the country. Clearly the main reason they came was that they were attracted to the
o / r
iron districts because of the prospect of higher wages. Although the immigrants 
would be paid unskilled workers’ rates when they arrived it might have been the 
attraction of the skilled workers’ rates that appealed to them as labourers’ wage rates 
were poor by comparison. Data on labourers’ wages is not abundant. Labourers were 
sometimes paid by the day, especially early in the period, and it cannot be assumed 
that they had work each working day of the week and so a daily rate is misleading as 
a measure of the weekly earnings of labourers. However some weekly rates are 
available. Richard Crawshay paid his labourers eight shillings a week in 179138 and 
Clydach ironworks labourers received twelve to fifteen shillings a week in the period
35 Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, Cambridge, 1967, pp 10-11.
36 John, The Industrial Development o f  South Wales 1750-1850, p 63.
37 GRO. D.2472.1, Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, Day labourers schedules.
38 Evans, Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, p 107.
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1800 to 1805.39 If these figures are typical weekly rates for the area there was little 
progress in labourers’ wages rates by the 1830s as Tredegar ironworks labourers were 
paid around eleven shillings six pence to fourteen shillings six pence in this decade.40 
Labourers at Abersychan received similar rates in the period 1844 to 1850 and so the 
labourers wage rates over the period were not very attractive compared to those of 
stilled ironworkers. In addition to the prospect of skilled workers’ wage rates later it 
might also have been the possibility of more regular work that attracted the 
immigrants to the iron districts.
6.4 The growth in population of the area.
The North West Monmouthshire area was thinly populated when the industrial 
revolution was initiated in the district in the last two decades of the eighteenth 
century. Workers were attracted to the area in these early years and later as the 
ironworks expanded their operations. The result was that the population of the area 
increased throughout the first half of the nineteenth century at a dramatic rate. It is 
asserted that this continuing immigration to the area was the main reason for the 
spectacular increase in population growth and it will be demonstrated that other 
factors such as the female age at marriage were not sufficiently different from the 
national average to have played any substantial part in the excess population growth 
rates of the area.
Table 6.12 below gives the population of the parishes containing the ironworks 
under study for all the census years from 1801 to 1851. Merthyr has been included for 
comparison. The table also gives the population of the county of Monmouthshire, and 
for comparison, Glamorgan. Finally to put these figures into context for population
39 John, The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, p 81.
40 Jones, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, p 86.
173
growth during the industrial revolution in Britain, figures are also given for England 
and Wales as a whole.
The parish of Aberystruth included the area in the immediate vicinity of the 
Nantyglo ironworks and that part of Ebbw Vale to the east of the River Ebbw Fawr, 
an area that included the Ebbw Vale furnaces and many of the rows of houses near 
them. The parish of Bedwellty included the town of Tredegar and its ironworks, the 
town of Ebbw Vale and that part of Ebbw Vale ironworks that lay to the west of the 
Ebbw Fawr River plus parts of the district around Sirhowy and Beaufort ironworks. 
The parishes of Llangynidr, Llangattock and Llanelly were largely rural Breconshire 
areas but Llangynidr included other parts of the district around Sirhowy ironworks, 
Llangattock parish included land on and close to Beaufort ironworks and parts of the 
town of Brynmawr and the parish of Llanelly included other parts of Brynmawr and 
the whole of the area around Clydach ironworks. Blaenavon, while not being a parish 
at this time, is included as one as it comprised parts of three old parishes, Llanfoist, 
Llanwenarth and Llanover Upper, clearly identified with Blaenavon, Pwll Du and 
Gamddyrys.
Table 6.12 Population of the parishes in which the iron works of the North West Monmouthshire area
were located and regional and national populations for comparisons, (popu ations in ‘000s).
Parish 1801 1811 1821 1831 1841 1851
Aberystruth 805 1,626 4,059 5,992 11,272 14,383
Bedwellty 1,434 4,590 6,382 10,637 22,413 27,183
(Blaenavon)* 1,469 2,619 4,066 4,382 6,223 5,855
Llanelly 937 1,821 2,962 4,041 7,366 9,644
Llangattock 1,046 1,263 1,947 2,690 4,334 5,415
Llangynidr 775 1,126 1,345 1,440 2,775 3,246
Merthyr 7,705 11,104 17,404 22,083 34,977 46,378
Monmouthshire 45,568 62,105 75,801 95,126 134,368 157,418
Glamorganshire 70,859 85,067 102,037 126,612 171,188 231,849
England & Wales | 8,872,980 10,164,000 11,978,875 13,897,187 15,913,829 17,928,000
Sources. Figures for the individual parishes have been obtained from Summary Census Statistics 
for South East Wales 1801-51, edited by Philip Riden.41 Those for the counties of Monmouth and 
Glamorgan have been obtained from Digest o f  Welsh Historical Statistics.42 
* The figures for Blaenavon for 1801 to 1831 include estimates.
41 Philip Riden, Summary Census Statistics for South East Wales 1801-51, Cardiff 1979.
42 J. Williams, Digest o f Welsh Statistics, Population 7, Cardiff, 1985, pp 17, 20.
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From the population figures above it is clear that the areas surrounding the 
ironworks under study experienced dramatic population growth in the first half of the 
nineteenth century such that the percentage of the population of the three areas in 
Monmouthshire (Aberystruth, Bedwellty and Blaenavon) to the total population of the 
county went from 8.1 percent in 1801 to 30.1 percent in 1851, the increase being 
almost entirely due to the growth of the iron industry and associated mineral 
industries. Table 6.13 translates these population totals into growth rates.
Table 6.13 Population growth over each decade of the parishes in which the iron works districts of
the North West Monmouthshire area were located. (Growth rate percent per decade 
plus growth rate percent few 1801 to 1851).
Parish 1801-11 1811-21 1821-31 1831-41 1841-51 1801-51
Aberystruth (Mon) 102.0 149.4 47.6 88.1 27.6 1,687
Bedwellty (Mon) 220.1 39.1 66.7 110.7 21.3 1,796
(Blaenavon)* (Mon) 78.3 55.3 7.8 42.0 -5.9 299
Llanelly (Brecon) 94.3 62.7 36.4 82.3 30.9 929
Llangattock (Brecon) 20.7 54.2 38.2 61.1 24.9 418
Llangynidr (Brecon) 45.3 19.4 7.1 92.7 17.0 319
Monmouthshire 36.3 15.6 24.5 41.3 17.2 245
Glamorganshire 20.1 19.9 24.1 35.2 35.4 227
England & Wales 14.6 17.9 16.0 14.5 12.7 102
Growth rates calculated from census data are crude or overall rates and do not reflect 
individual factors affecting population change such as fertility rates, mortality rates, 
and the age/sex structure43 or immigration and emigration however they are a valuable 
indicator of the general growth rate of a population.
Table 6.13 shows that whereas the population of England and Wales went up 
by 102 percent in the fifty-year period from 1801 to 1851 the population of the parish 
of Aberystruth increased by 1,687 percent in the same period and that of the parish of 
Bedwellty by 1,796 percent. Table 6.14 below consolidates the Monmouthshire and 
the Breconshire parts of the area under study to give an even clearer picture.
43 E. A. Wrigley, ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, in Roderick Floud and Paul 
Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700- 
1860, Cambridge, 2004, pp 59-60.
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Table 6.14 Population growth over each decade of both parts of the iron works area and
comparisons with other areas and nationally. (Growth rate per cent per decade plus 
growth rate per cent for 1801 to 1851.)
1801-
11
1811-21 1821-31 1831-41 1841-51 1801-51
Monmouthshire parishes 
Including study area.
138.3 64.2 44.8 89.9 18.8 1,178.9
Breconshire parishes 
Including study area
52.6 48.6 30.7 77.2 26.6 563.7
All parishes including 
Study area.
101.2 59.1 40.6 86.4 20.9 916.5
Neighbouring area 
of Merthyr
44.1 56.7 26.9 58.4 32.6 502
Monmouthshire 36.3 15.6 24.5 41.3 17.2 245
South West of England 66.9
West Midlands 99.7
England & Wales 14.6 17.9 16.0 14.5 12.7 102
Source. The figures for the South West of England and the West Midlands were obtained from An 
Historical Geography o f England and Wales by R. A. Dodgshon and R. A. Butlin.44
The table demonstrates most clearly of all the dramatic increase in population 
in the area under study. England and Wales grew steadily in population in the first half 
of the nineteenth century, the population approximately doubling, but this growth is 
modest indeed compared with that in the area under study as has been demonstrated. 
In fact the national growth rate in population was highest in the period 1791 to 183145 
and thus the peak in growth rate in the area under study was probably later and if so 
this adds to the suggestion that the industrial revolution arrived in the study area rather 
late. It is also significant that in the nearest region of England, the South West, the 
growth in population over the period 1801 to 1851 was well below the national 
average. This would appear to offer some support to the earlier findings that some 
men were leaving the South West of England.
It is now necessary to seek to explain why the population of the parishes that 
included the study area increased 916 percent in the first fifty years of the nineteenth 
century whilst that of England and Wales increased by only 102 percent. Clearly the
44 R. A. Dodgshon and R. A Butlin, An Historical Geography o f  England and Wales, London, 1978, p 
321.
45 Wrigley, ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, p 65.
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main element in the increase in population in the area was immigration over the fifty- 
year period and descendents of immigrants bom locally but it needs to be estimated if 
other factors were also involved in the excess increase over the national average. 
Looking at the growth in population of the country as a whole the debate has tended to 
involve a comparison of the effects of improving mortality46 and increasing fertility, 
immigration into the country and emigration out of the country not appearing to have 
been major factors. Earlier it was thought that improving mortality rates during the 
industrial revolution period might have been the greater factor but recent work has 
tended to put more stress on fertility.47 Fertility rates can increase for various reasons, 
the most important being a lowering of the age at marriage of women. In 1780-9 this 
was 24.0 in England but by 1830-39 the age at marriage of women had fallen to 23.1, 
not apparently a great movement but capable of accounting for a sizeable part of the 
increase in population in England.48 Examination of local parish marriage records for 
the area is the obvious way of checking if the average age of women on marriage had 
followed the national trend or exceeded it but unfortunately actual ages were rarely 
recorded. The common method was simply to record ages as ‘of full age’ or ‘minor’ 
and so local parish records cannot be used. From 1837 all marriages had to be 
formally registered and the ages of the parties concerned were recorded but these 
records are only available individually on request. However it is possible to make 
rough estimates of ages at marriage of women from census data making assumptions 
using the age of the oldest recorded child. From this approach an estimate of the age at 
marriage could be obtained by taking this age as say one year less than the apparent 
age of the woman on the birth of the first recorded child. This method becomes 
increasingly unreliable the older the woman as in many cases the oldest child would
46 Actuaries use the term ‘improving’ mortality which means lighter or reducing mortality.
47 Wrigley, ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, pp 65-9.
48 Wrigley, ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, pp 70-5.
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have left home. Nevertheless restricting a sample to women up to age say 39 might 
give at least an indication of the general age of women at marriage though a particular 
problem is the high pre and post natal mortality rates of children. This point could 
mean that this approach will tend to overstate the age as only live children can be 
identified from census data. Because the enumerators often recorded ages incorrectly 
the 1841 census could not be used.
The same Nantyglo enumeration district identified earlier for the 1851 census 
data was analysed and it consisted of 404 households in which there resided 1,205 
males and 992 females. This excess of males over females was a feature of the study 
area in general and would be expected of a new industrial area subject to huge 
immigration. For an analysis of women’s ages at marriage 176 cases were found to fit 
the criteria described above where the data was clear and reasonable. An average age 
of 22.4 at marriage was found for this area.
For a comparison a smaller sample of 118 households in the vicinity of the 
Clydach ironworks was examined following the same rough approach and the average 
age at marriage obtained was 23.2. A further small sample of 70 households in the 
town of Brynmawr was examined and the average age at marriage for this group was 
found to be 22.4. Brynmawr was a mile or so from the Nantyglo ironworks and just a 
little farther from the Beaufort works. Based on these results the conclusion is that 
there might have been a reduction in the average age at marriage for the study area 
compared with the national average of 23.1. However it could be added that the excess 
of adult males in the local population, many of the excess being single lodgers, would 
act to reduce the birth rate per total population in the area.
It is believed also that stillbirth rates fell nationally during the industrial 
revolution period and it is suggested that the combined effect of this and of the fall in
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the mean age at marriage for women might have accounted for a substantial part of the 
increase in population nationally during the period.49 Data on stillbirths is not 
available for the area under study but it can be assumed that the stillbirth rate in a 
relatively new industrial area would be at least the national average. Hence if the local 
still birth rates were worse than the national average this would act to reduce the 
increase in population.
Finally there is the effect on fertility of economic circumstances. It has long 
been assumed that economic circumstances have had a powerful influence on 
marriage decisions.50 As covered earlier in this work the iron trade tended to swing 
between boom and recession such that any temporary boost to fertility in boom 
circumstances would often be short lived.
From the above discussion it is argued that any increase in fertility in the area 
under study over the national rate was probably not sufficient to make a significant 
difference to the comparative population growth rates. With regard to mortality Table 
6.15 shows that the gross mortality rate for the ten years 1841 to 1850 was higher in 
the districts in which all the ironworks of the group were situated, 
Abergavenny/Bedwellty and Crickhowell, compared with the national average. This 
excess mortality in the study area would act to reduce the population growth rate in 
the area compared with the national average population growth rate.
49 Wrigley, ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, p 71-5.
50 Wrigley, ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, p 76-8.
179
Table 6.15 A comparison of the mortality in the areas under study with other selected areas in Wales
and with the country as a whole. Males and females. Period 1841-1850. (Deaths per 1,000 persons per 
annum)
Districts Deaths per 1,000 living 
Per annum
National 22.35
Abergavenny/Bedwellty 25
Merthyr Tydfil 28
Crickhowell 27
Newport 24
Pontypool 23
Wrexham 23
Cardiff 22
Neath inc Aberavon 22
All other registration 
districts in Wales
<22
Source. Supplement to the Forty-fifth Annual Report o f the Registrar-General o f  Births, Deaths and 
Marriages in England, London, 1885, pp iv, LXXXIVand LXXXV.
In conclusion it has been demonstrated that the population of the North West 
Monmouthshire area grew at a truly dramatic rate in the first half of the nineteenth 
century and that the increases in population were almost entirely due to immigration 
and descendents of the immigrants bom locally. The natural increase in population in 
the area, that is population increase due to rises in fertility rates and improvements in 
mortality rates, was not a major factor when comparing local population growth rates 
with national rates. However as stressed earlier the growth rates calculated were crude 
rates that mask all individual factors including emigration. The detailed study of the 
Monmouthshire Merlin newspaper carried out for this thesis has revealed that 
advertisements encouraging local inhabitants to emigrate to the United States in 
particular, but also to Australia and Canada, appeared regularly in this newspaper. It 
must be assumed that many Monmouthshire people did emigrate in the 1830s and 
1840s and that tends to make the crude population growth rates shown even more 
dramatic.
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6.5 How the population was housed.
The provision of housing for the vast numbers of workers coming into the area 
was always a problem for the ironmasters. There was no workers’ housing at all when 
the works were set up and the responsibility for housing fell on to the masters. It will 
be shown that even by mid century a vast number of the housing stock of the iron 
towns was still owned by them. The section also looks at the types of housing 
provided by the ironmasters over the period of the study and comments on how 
suitable the housing was. Finally the general layout of the housing in the embryonic 
towns is examined and it is suggested that in only one case was there any evidence of 
deliberate structural planning of the layout of the housing.
The ironmasters had the responsibility for housing the workforce and their 
families not just when the ironworks were first established but for many decades 
thereafter. In the early years relatively small numbers of houses were erected usually 
in close proximity to the furnaces but as the nineteenth century progressed and the 
numbers of the workforce grew so did the pace of housing developments. At Ebbw 
Vale the first houses were built in 1787 near the furnaces on the east side of the River 
Ebwy in the parish of Aberystruth but later the Harford partnership erected a number 
of rows of cottages on the Bedwellty side of the river such that by 1824 the Ebbw 
Vale company owned 103 cottages in this parish. The pace of house building 
increased further on the Bedwellty side and also on the Aberystruth side with the rows 
of houses known as Newtown.51 By 1844 the Harford partnership owned 604 
workmen’s cottages in Ebbw Vale plus fourteen agents’ houses and the same 
company owned 348 workmen’s houses at Sirhowy together with ten agents’ houses.
51 B. Caswell, J. Gaydon, M. Warrender (edited and compiled), Ebbw Vale ‘The Works’ 1790-2002, 
Ebbw Vale, 2002, pp 122-6.
52 Newport Library, px M280 672, Particulars of the sale of the Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy Iron Works.
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Much the same pace of housing development arose at other ironworks within 
the group. At Blaenavon early housing such as at Stack Square was built right 
adjacent to the furnaces but by 1833 approximately 470 workmen’s and agents’ 
houses had been erected on the Blaenavon Company’s freehold and leasehold land at 
Blaenavon, Gamddyris and Pwll Du.53 The sale document for the Clydach Ironworks 
in 1833 also indicates that the company had built an array of houses around the 
furnaces, rolling mills, forge and on freehold land nearby.54 In addition to building 
houses the ironmasters also had responsibility for the maintenance of their houses. As 
early as July 1796 the Ebbw Vale ironmasters made an agreement with a mason for 
him to repair the inside of some houses at Lower Hendre and to put up grates and 
make repairs to the roof.55
The need to house immigrant workers to the area meant that workpeople living 
in company housing were expected to offer accommodation to lodgers and the 
ironmasters at Ebbw Vale sought to limit the amount their tenant workmen could 
charge their lodgers. For example, George Jones was appointed by John Harford to 
work at the furnace and was granted a house and firing. However the agreement 
stipulated that Jones was not to charge a lodger more than nine pence a week or one 
shilling and sixpence a week should the lodger be married.56
With regard to the type of housing an early design was that at Office Row in 
Nantyglo built in 1793-95 by the Harfords, the ironmasters at the time. These houses 
were built into a bank and had three levels on the lower side but only two on the upper
53 GRO. D.7.194. 22 November 1833, Particulars of the sale of Blaenavon Iron and Coal Mines 
(including the iron works).
54 GRO. D.591.19.384. 17 July 1833, Particulars of freehold and leasehold estate comprising the 
Clydach Iron Works.
55 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, 17 July 1796, Agreement with David 
Jones, mason.
56 GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819, May 1796, Agreement between George 
Jones and John Harford for the Ebbw Vale Furnace Company.
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side. There were two houses in each unit, the lower house having just two rooms and a 
larder whilst the upper house was of two floors and had four rooms plus a larder.57 
These types of houses can be seen clearly in Illustration 4, ‘Nantyglo ironworks’, on 
the left of the engraving. William Coxe, in his An Historical Tour o f Monmouthshire, 
is probably describing this row of houses when he visited Nantyglo ironworks in the 
late 1790s and met Mr Hertford (Harford).58 Similar houses were built at Ebbw Vale, 
some located very close to the furnaces and this type of house was still being built at 
Ebbw Vale in 1811 and shortly after, an example being the houses at the Gantre. 
Although these early houses usually had gardens there were no sanitary arrangements 
and water had to be carried to the houses from nearby springs.59
The most unusual houses in the area were those described by William Coxe as 
an ‘ingenious contrivance’ in the context of housing at Blaenavon. Dwellings were 
built into an arched railroad bridge by bricking up the arches. Coxe said that this was 
found necessary because of the increasing number of families at Blaenavon.60 These 
houses are shown in Illustration 3 below.
Most of the houses of the area however were small terraced houses of one or 
two storeys. The smallest of the houses had just two rooms though such housing was 
relatively rare in the area except in Nantyglo where about 25 to 30 percent were of this 
type. Other houses had three rooms but the largest group of workers’ houses were 
those with four rooms.61 Examples of the smaller two room houses were those at 
Bayliss Row, Nantyglo, built about 1827. These houses had just one room on each 
floor and were built into the hillside opposite Ty Mawr, the house of the ironmasters,
57 J. B. Lowe, Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875, Cardiff, 1977, pp 16-17.
58 Coxe, An Historical Tour o f  Monmouthshire, p 251.
59 F. J. Ball, ‘Housing and the Industrial Revolution in Ebbw Vale’ in Presenting Monmouthshire, The 
Journal o f the Monmouthshire Local History Council, No. 10, (Autumn 1960), pp 10-11.
60 Coxe, An Historical Tour o f  Monmouthshire, p 228.
61 Jeremy Lowe, ‘Industrial Houses and Settlement Patterns at Nantyglo 1811-1845’, The 
Monmouthshire Antiquary, Volume 111 Parts 3 & 4, (1977), p 196.
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Illustration 3 Bridge houses at Blaenavon.
Source. William Coxe, An Historical Tour o f  Monmouthshire, p 222.
the Baileys.02 Another example of two-room housing was at Bunkers Row, Blaenavon 
built around 1792. These houses were o f the rare back-to-back type with each pair of 
houses having one room plus a loft area above accessed by a ladder. Obviously small 
these houses were provided for lower paid workers.63 Some houses had three rooms, 
examples being at Lions Row, Nantyglo and at Upper New Rank, Blaenavon. The 
Lions Row houses had two rooms downstairs and one room above with less floor 
space than the ground floor.64 The Upper New Rank houses had a kitchen and back
62 J. B. Lowe, Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875 , p 37.
63 J. B. Lowe, Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875, p 15.
64 J. B. Lowe, ‘Industrial Houses and Settlement Patterns at Nantyglo 1811-1845’, p 197.
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bedroom downstairs in addition to a living area. There was a large open sleeping area 
above and so these houses were larger than the Nantyglo houses.65
There are a number of examples of the standard four room house, one of the 
earliest being Stack Square at Blaenavon. These houses still exist being very close to 
the site of the old furnaces and are substantial being two rooms on each floor plus a 
larder. A later example of the four room type was at Chapel Row, Blaenavon. These 
houses were built in 1839 by the Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company who built a large 
chapel in the middle of the row.66
From the above brief account of the housing of the area it can be seen that 
although houses varied in size and in numbers of rooms, in general they were small 
and usually closely packed together in rows. Such rows of workers’ houses were
common in the period in the country and not just in South Wales, the Coalbrookdale
Company for example built several terraces of interlocking houses.67 The houses of 
the area usually had gardens as can be verified from early maps but they were built 
with little regard for drainage or sanitation in general.68 This was partly because the 
rows of houses were built in narrow valleys which made drainage difficult.69 However 
many, if not most, of these early houses were built to last, quite a number still being 
occupied until the 1960s. Colliers Row at Ebbw Vale for example was still occupied 
in that decade.
To obtain an idea of the average level of occupation of the houses of the area 
the enumerator’s returns for the 1841 census was examined and three enumerator’s 
districts in the parish of Aberystruth was selected. The area covered by these three
65 J. B. Lowe, Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875, pp 30-1.
66 J. B. Lowe, Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875, p 42.
67 Barrie Trinder, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, pp 144-5.
68 K. Sullivan, ‘”The biggest room in Merthyr”. Working class housing in Dowlais, 1850-1914’, Welsh 
History Review, 17 (1994), p 155.
69 David Williams, John Frost: A Study in Chartism, Cardiff, 1939, p 112.
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districts is in the centre of the whole area under study being between the Ebbw Vale 
furnaces on the Aberystruth side of the Ebbw Fawr River, approaching the Beaufort 
ironworks and including the area to the west of the Nantyglo ironworks and this 
ironworks itself. The following table is the official table published in the census data 
giving overall figures for the three districts. To this the average house occupancy has 
been added.
Table 6.16 Overall house occupancy of three enumeration districts of the 1841 Census for the 
County of Monmouth. Hundred of Abergavenny, Parish of Aberystruth.
District Occupied
Houses
Males Females Totals Average 
Occupants 
Per house
1 96 350 244 594 6.2
2 197 644 499 1,143 5.8
5 261 831 632 1,463 5.6
Totals 554 1,825 1,375 3,200 5.8
As expected the data in Table 6.16 again demonstrates the excess of males 
over females and the average house occupancy, 5.8, was only a little higher than the
7ft •average for England and Wales which was around 5.5 in 1841. For comparison the 
original Nantyglo target area using the 1851 census enumerators’ returns as earlier 
was also analysed. In this case the complete occupancy breakdown is shown. Two 
exceptional properties have been excluded because they did not represent normal 
housing, the properties being the Bush Hotel that had 14 occupants and its 
neighbouring property which appears to have been a substantial shop probably the 
company shop. This shop had 15 occupants most of whom were called ‘shopman’ in 
the returns while two were termed ‘grocer’ and two ‘servant’. For comparison the 
results of a similar exercise carried out on houses in the southeast section of the 
County of Monmouth are shown.
70 Enid Gauldie, Cruel Habitations: A History o f  Working-Class Housing 1780-1918, New York, 1974, 
Appendix 2, p 320.
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Table 6.17 Household occupancy analysis 1851 Census. 578 Abergavenny. 5 Aberystruth.
Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo) and for comparison a selection of villages in South 
East Monmouthshire
Occupants
in
Household
Occurrences
Nantyglo
sample
Occurrences 
South East 
Monmouthshire
1 1 18
2 26 45
3 59 49
4 67 64
5 66 46
6 70 47
7 50 30
8 32 14
9 16 7
10 5 3
11 7 (11+) 11
12 2
13 1
Total 402 334
Source. The South East Monmouthshire villages were Caldicot, Caerwent, Pontskewett and Rogiet and 
the analysis was obtained from R. L. Gant, ‘Socio-Economic Structure in South-East Monmouthshire’ 
in Presenting Monmouthshire, The Journal o f Monmouthshire Local History Council, No.33 (Spring 
1972), p 15.
The average occupancy of this sample was 5.3, less that for the 1841 sample 
suggesting some improvement in the level of accommodation. However this average 
occupancy was considerably higher than that for the houses in the group of east 
Monmouthshire villages which was around 4.7. The 1851 analysis for the Nantyglo 
sample also shows that there was a considerable degree of almost under occupation 
with nearly 38 percent of the houses having four or less occupants (52 percent for the 
south east Monmouthshire sample). Unfortunately the 1851 census for the Nantyglo 
area like that 1841 rarely included street information and so even where there is some 
knowledge of the type and size of housing in the area it cannot be matched with 
household occupancy from census data with any accuracy.
A final point on house occupancy is that there was a tendency for certain types 
of workers to live close together. To look at this suggestion the target Nantyglo 
sample was further studied and within the enumeration district each group of 50
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houses were analysed by occupation of males over fourteen for the main occupations 
of the district.
Table 6.18. Jobs analysis -  males aged fourteen and over. Key jobs analysed per 50 households 
1851 Census. 578 Abergavenny. 5 Aberystruth, Enumeration district 11 (Nantyglo)
Household
Number
Puddlers Colliers Labourers Bailers Rollers Iron Miners
1-50 0 50 12 0 0 0
51-100 21 3 8 18 6 0
101-150 31 13 7 9 1 0
151-200 29 13 8 5 5 0
201-250 35 10 4 2 2 8
251-300 18 14 7 3 4 14
301-350 18 17 15 0 0 2
351-end 20 16 14 7 4 4
Totals 172 136 75 44 22 28
The analysis confirms the tendency for particular occupations to be clustered. There 
were no ironworkers (puddlers, bailers and rollers) at all in the first 50 households 
though some of the labourers may have been working at the ironworks. This first zone 
of the enumeration district had a concentration of colliers and, to some extent, the 
reverse was true in the next 50 households with only three colliers. The remaining 
groups of 50 households were more evenly distributed except for the absence of 
miners (iron ore miners). There were none of these in the first 200 households but 28 
in the remaining half of the district. The distribution of lodgers also contributed to this 
clustering as there was a tendency for lodgers to be of the same occupation as the head 
of the household in which they were staying.
With regard to the general layout of the housing within the new iron towns of 
the area there is little evidence for any cohesive town planning except possibly in the 
case of Tredegar. In general the ironworks were positioned in the base of the valleys 
close to the rivers. This tended to dictate where houses were built, the earliest near the 
furnaces and the remainder usually around the sides of the valleys still quite close to 
the ironworks sites. With local knowledge of the location of the original ironworks
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this feature can be appreciated today at Tredegar, Nantyglo and Clydach and also at 
Ebbw Vale with regard to the steelworks site, the most northern part of which was 
coincident with the old ironworks site. The layout of workers’ housing with respect to 
the ironworks can be appreciated by examination of Ordnance Survey maps, for 
example those covering the Ebbw Vale area 1880, Beaufort Iron Works area 1880, the 
Sirhowy Iron Works area 1879, the Tredegar area 1878 and the Nantyglo area, 1880 
and 1881.71
There is a suggestion that an attempt at planning the layout of housing 
development was made at Tredegar by Samuel Homfray, the elder. Streets appear to 
have been planned around what is now ‘The Circle’, south of the ironworks. The 
planning seems to have occurred between 1813 and 1818 as it does not appear on an 
Ordnance Survey map dated around 1813 but does on an Ordnance Survey map of
no1826 and it is believed that houses built after 1818 were built elsewhere. The streets 
deemed part of the town planning can be seen on the 1878 Ordnance Survey map of 
Tredegar. These are principally Morgan Street, Iron Street, Market Street, West Lane, 
South Lane, North Lane, East Lane and Iron Row.73
In summary the ironmasters were responsible for the provision of housing 
throughout the period of the study and by the mid nineteenth century each company 
had a sizeable housing stock in response to the greatly increasing numbers of the 
workforce. The houses provided by the ironmasters were basic and small, largely 
consisting of rows of two to four room houses with the latter size dominant. Initially
71 Although permission had been received from the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office to 
include details of these Ordnance Survey maps in this thesis it was not possible to do so as a result of 
the photocopying permission paragraph that was required to be included in the ‘Declarations and 
Statements’.
72 John B. Hilling, ‘Britain’s First Planned Industrial Town? The Development of Tredegar, 1800- 
1820’, Gwent Local History, Journal o f the Gwent Local History Council, No. 94 (Spring 2003), pp 55- 
76.
73 Hilling, ‘Britain’s First Planned Industrial Town? The Development of Tredegar, 1800-1820’, p 69.
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the houses were sited near the works or sometimes near pits. Later the rows were 
positioned wherever it was convenient for them but never very far from the ironworks. 
They were probably solidly built if the extant Stack Square in Blaenavon is typical 
and they usually had small gardens. However there was no water supply or drainage.
In the 1840s and early 1850s the average occupancy of the houses was likely 
to have been in the range five to six persons, quite close to the national average. Thus 
the degree of overcrowding in the area seems not to have been as severe as nearby 
Merthyr. The population there at this time suffered more from overcrowding such that 
Government inspectors in the 1840s thought that only the worst districts of Liverpool 
exceeded the overcrowding in Merthyr.74
Apart from Tredegar there is little evidence of town planning in the siting of 
housing developments while at Tredegar there is good evidence to support the 
suggestion that the structure of the streets to the south of the ironworks were planned 
at least for a period in the 1810s. As can be seen from the Ordnance Survey maps 
mentioned an array of substantial urban areas grew up around the ironworks leading to 
the towns that exist today.
6.6 Conclusion.
The industrialists who came to the North West Monmouthshire area setting up 
and developing an iron industry wanted to keep control to themselves or to relatives 
and as such the proprietorships were usually restricted to a small number of men. 
While the works were relatively small concerns the principal partners, the ironmasters, 
often acted as managers of the concerns themselves and even when the works 
expanded managers and other senior positions were often filled by relatives or others
74 Chris Evans, ‘The Labyrinth o f  Flames' Work and social conflict in early industrial Merthyr Tydfil, 
Cardiff, 1993, p 156.
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by personal contact. However it was shown that advertising for senior positions had 
become common by the 1830s.
A consequence of the successfiil iron industry that was developed in the area 
by the industrialists was the provision of employment for large numbers of workmen 
when there had been no appreciable work in the area previously except at the scattered 
farms around the hills. When they arrived in the area the ironmasters had no pools of 
labour to call upon and the attraction of labour to the area was always an issue for 
them. Although some skilled workers were recruited from other works at times 
especially in the early years or in times of major changes to processes, the majority of 
the skilled workers had been employed previously in the area as unskilled men.
Unskilled labour was attracted to the area by the lure of higher wages. It has 
been demonstrated that the largest numbers of men came from nearby farming areas in 
Monmouthshire and Breconshire or nearby industrial areas such as Merthyr. Others 
came from farther away. Many of those who travelled considerable distances for the 
time came from west Wales and from neighbouring counties in England. There was 
some change in the pattern of immigration to the area with increasing numbers 
coming from the neighbouring counties of England in the later years and fewer from 
Glamorgan excluding Merthyr. Immigration from west Wales was constant, especially 
from Carmarthenshire. With regard to unskilled labour it was shown that very few 
women were employed in the ironworks at the end of the period when the works had 
grown to be large enterprises. Because of inconsistencies in the 1851 census 
enumerators returns it was difficult to assess the degree of child employment but it 
was clear that many children, mostly boys, were employed, few at ages seven or eight, 
many from ages 11 onwards.
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The consequence of the expansion of the ironworks through the first half of the 
nineteenth century was a dramatic increase in the population of the North West 
Monmouthshire area. This population growth was quite remarkable transforming a 
largely deserted landscape broken up only by scattered farms into an urban landscape 
in the valleys and on the hillsides. Evidence shows that in the period 1801 to 1851 the 
populations of the parishes of Aberystruth and Bedwellty grew by more than 1,600 
percent, the population of the whole study area by over 900 percent compared with the 
national average growth rate for England and Wales of only 102 percent.
The dramatic growth in population of the area was due to immigration and 
there is little evidence to suggest that natural increases in population that is by 
increases in fertility rates and decreases in mortality rates were in any way exceptional 
by national standards. As the immigrants settled the population was further extended 
by descendents of these immigrants. There is evidence that there might have been 
considerable emigration from Monmouthshire to the United States and the colonies 
and so the growth in population is even more startling if this factor is taken into 
account. A final point on population is the constant pattern of an excess of males over 
females found in the area. This factor is consistent with a region experiencing vast 
immigration of workers as males tend to migrate first seeking work rather than 
females, an assertion confirmed by the fact that the vast majority of the lodgers 
identified in the census enumerations, likely to be among the most recent immigrants, 
were male.
The ironmasters had the responsibility of housing their workforce and their 
families. They managed to achieve this by erecting rows of two, three and four room 
houses usually relatively close to the ironworks or nearby mines. The houses were 
solidly built but lacked water supply and drainage. The masters encouraged their
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worker tenants to take in lodgers but despite this the average house occupancy was 
little different from the national average. With the ironworks, the associated industrial 
buildings and the increasing numbers of rows of workers houses the iron districts were 
transformed from an essentially rural setting into an urban area. However there was 
little town planning apart from that at Tredegar and even then it was for a limited 
number of years.
On the issue of population growth and the industrial revolution H. J. Habakkuk 
posed this question in 1958 ‘Did the Industrial Revolution create its own labour force? 
Or did the vagaries of disease and the weather produce an additional population that 
either stimulated an Industrial Revolution or had the luck to coincide with one 
independently generated’?75 P. Deane and W. A. Cole believed that ‘most historians 
would agree that the population changes were both a cause and an effect of the 
concomitant economic changes. They differ however, in their analysis of the 
mechanism of interaction, of the timing of cause and effect, and hence the relative 
importance of the causal factors’.76 They added that in the areas most affected by the 
industrial revolution most of the population upsurge preceded the period of rapid 
industrial growth.77 As regards the area under study it would appear at first sight to be 
clear that the industrial revolution caused the population surge in the area but this 
surge was due very largely to inward migration with the natural growth of the 
population playing the lesser role. In feet the effect of fertility and mortality 
collectively was neutral or even slightly negative when compared with the national 
average growth in population. The situation in the North West Monmouthshire area 
also seems to contradict the assumptions made by Robert C. Allen that the industrial 
workforce of an area was the result of population growth rather than movements from
75 M. W. Flinn, British Population Growth 1700-1850, London and Basingstoke, 1970, p 52.
76 Deane & Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, p 286.
77 Deane & Cole, British Economic Growth 1688-1959, p 287.
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agricultural areas.78 Migration to the study area from agricultural areas, nearby, in 
West Wales and in other areas, was dramatic. Probably it has to be accepted that the 
study area was rather different from the norm as discussed by most historians. That is 
what makes the area such an interesting subject for research.
78 Robert C. Allen, ‘Agriculture during the industrial revolution’, in Floud and Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 
2004, p 101.
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Chapter 7 Conclusion.
An attempt has been made in this thesis to describe how the industrial 
revolution occurred in the North West Monmouthshire area in the last two decades of 
the eighteenth century and how it arrived later than in the nearby Merthyr area. 
Dramatic changes followed the onset of the industrial revolution in the study area and 
attempts have been made to account for these changes in the period to 1850. The 
changes came about as a direct result of the establishment and growth of a vibrant iron 
industry, an industry almost non-existent in 1780 but one that by 1830 made nearly 
fifteen percent of British pig iron output.1 It has been shown how a small group of 
incoming industrialists were the catalysts for the changes and it was stressed how vital 
their role was especially in setting up the iron industry. The difficult conditions that 
faced these early industrialists such as poor communications have been described and 
a considerable degree of ingenuity, skill and perseverance was necessary as well as 
access to capital. These industrialists were not untypical of industrialists in the early 
industrial revolution in Britain but most already had an industrial background 
especially in the iron industry before they came to the area.
Control of the ironworks was often kept within the same family or within close 
social contacts for long periods of time. For example the Harfords of the Ebbw Vale 
Company who through various partnerships consisting of family members and social 
or business contacts retained control of the company right through to 1843 from the 
1790s. Joseph and Crawshay Bailey were proprietors of the Nantyglo Company to 
1850 and beyond and there were three generations of Thomas Hills and two 
generations of the Hopkins family at Blaenavon. The Homfray family was prominent 
at Tredegar ironworks from its inception through to the end of the period of the study
1 R  Scrivenor, History o f  The Iron Trade, London, 1854, pp 96, 134; Philip Riden and John G. Owen, 
British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Cardiff, 1995, p lx (Table 1.2).
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and in addition the Kendall family ran the Beaufort works for decades until the works 
was taken over by the Baileys in 1832. This pattern of control was of course common 
in the industrial revolution period and was deemed desirable by partners in view of the 
uncertainties of the period. The point is illustrated by Pat Hudson: [social and familial 
networks were engaged to underpin economic exchange in the uncertain, high-risk, 
information-poor business environment of the industrial revolution].2
Thus the early industrialists of the area and their successors generally 
succeeded in running their businesses within a national economic climate of 
fluctuating demand for iron and a continual trend of falling iron prices. It has also 
been shown how the ironmasters had a pragmatic approach to changes in technology 
introducing improvements when circumstances suggested they would aid their 
businesses, sometimes continuing to use older approaches if these were deemed cost 
effective at the time. However the ironmasters of the area were also leaders with the 
introduction of new processes at other times. In the nineteenth century iron industry 
improvements were usually relatively minor in nature but were frequent and had the 
effect of improving performance over time. The masters’ pragmatic approach to 
technological change did not prohibit the growth in output in any way. Iron output 
increased continually in the area over the period such that the core group of ironworks 
plus the newer ironworks that were set up lower down the Monmouthshire valleys 
formed one of the major iron manufacturing districts of Britain in the second quarter 
of the nineteenth century.
Throughout the period of the study access to capital was always a vital element
in the success of the ironworks and there were a few cases where shortages of capital
or overexposure to loans caused the companies to fail, the Harford partnership of
2 Pat Hudson, ‘Industrial organization and structure’, Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The 
Cambridge Economic History o f  Modem Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 
2004, p 55.
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Ebbw Vale in 1843 being the prominent example. However in general this company 
and the others of the group were able to acquire sufficient finance for their concerns to 
function successfully. The partnerships were always restricted to a handful of 
individuals and in good years much of the profits were reinvested rather than having 
to be distributed to large numbers of shareholders. In fact with regard to capital 
structure it has been suggested that the partnership was the most suitable structure for 
these iron companies in the first half of the nineteenth century.
Labour was the other vital element in the growth and success of the iron 
companies. There were no pools of labour available to the industrialists in the early 
years and they had to bring skilled men with them or attract skilled labour from 
neighbouring industrial areas such as Merthyr. It has been shown that apart from the 
early years the majority of skilled ironworkers were originally recruited unskilled, 
converting to skilled sifter serving time with skilled men. Unskilled workers were 
attracted to the area by the wages offered and they came from areas both close by in 
Monmouthshire and Breconshire and from farther afield in Glamorgan, West Wales 
and the neighbouring counties of England. Credit should be given to the ironmasters 
for their ability to attract farm workers and others to move to the area in times when 
the lack of transport meant that such moves were very cumbersome.
A consequence of the growth of the ironworks of the group and the 
recruitment of large numbers of workers to the area was a dramatic growth in the 
population of the iron districts. This growth was truly exceptional for the industrial 
revolution period in Britain. The masters were responsible for housing the incoming 
workers and they built up large stocks of housing, small units but not unreasonable for 
the time. The level of house occupancy was not very different from the national 
average.
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The overall conclusion therefore is that the industrialists who came to the 
study area, and their successors, deserve considerable credit for setting up an iron 
industry in the circumstances described and for the expansion and general success of 
this industry through difficult economic circumstances throughout the first half of the 
nineteenth century. This group of men were tough businessmen who expected much 
from their employees but they did provide regular employment for many people over 
a long period of time.
As a result of the success of the iron industry and its associated mineral 
workings the study area was converted from a rural one to an urban district consisting 
of an array of new towns across the heads of the Monmouthshire valleys. These new 
towns were Tredegar with Sirhowy, Ebbw Vale with Beaufort, Brynmawr and 
Nantyglo and Blaenavon. Further towns such as Blaina, Victoria, Abersychan, Varteg 
and others developed lower down the valleys in the first half of the nineteenth century 
as the iron industry of the district expanded. The dramatic changes to the study area 
and its urban character is most clearly demonstrated by contrasting Thomas Kitchin’s 
1748 map of Monmouthshire, Illustration 1, with the Ordnance Survey maps of 
around 1880, discussed earlier.
It has been shown that by the mid nineteenth century the ironworks of the 
study area formed a successful group of companies principally manufacturing wrought 
iron rails and other bar iron products, making a substantial contribution to the British 
iron industry. However the next three decades were to see further dramatic changes 
and as a postscript to this study the main features of these changes are now outlined. 
Output of wrought iron in Britain continued to grow such that by 1865 output was not
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far off double that of 1850.3 However the British iron industry was adversely affected 
by the extra tariffs imposed by the Americans on imported iron during the American 
Civil War which had started in 1861. Competition from Continental iron producers 
was also beginning to have an effect4 but the biggest threat to the mass wrought 
industry was to come from the development of processes enabling steel products to be 
manufactured on a commercial scale. Henry Bessemer’s process for manufacturing 
steel was introduced in the 1850s in Britain rather erratically, steel being used in the 
production of rails and other products such as plate used for building ships.5 However 
in the next two decades steel manufacture increased dramatically such that by 1880 it 
was in the ascendancy and the iron industry was collapsing.6 In South Wales the 
production of wrought iron rails fell from 534,000 tons in 1869 to less than 100,000 in 
1877.7
The Bessemer process was originally introduced as a method of producing 
wrought iron without the puddling process as well as a steel manufacturing process. 
However once steel could be made commercially its flexibility of use over that of
o
wrought iron meant that a decline in the wrought iron industry was inevitable. The 
study area had already been affected in that the improved blast furnace technologies 
such as hot blast greatly reduced the fuel needs such that by the 1850s the optimum 
location of iron and steel works was at or near the coast rather than within the 
coalfields.9 Local ironworks had already been importing ores in increasing amounts 
and in addition local ores could not be used in the steel making process in its early
3 Alan Birch, The Economic History o f the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784-1879, London, 1967, p 
121.
4 John P. Addis, The Crawshay Dynasty, Cardiff 1957, pp 130-1.
5 J. R. Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, Basingstoke and London, 1988, p 76.
6 Michael Atkinson and Colin Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760- 
1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987, p 3.
7 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 15.
8 Monmouthshire Merlin, 4 October 1856, Bessemer’s Invention, from The Engineer.
9 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 77.
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years.10 The net effect was that by 1880 iron ore mined in South Wales represented
only 1.9 percent of the United Kingdom total compared with around WA  percent in
1855.11 Added to these problems for the South Wales ironmasters was the heavy
•  12capital investment needed to enter the steel market commercially.
It is not surprising therefore that many of the South Wales ironworks closed, 
not having the resources to convert to steel manufacture. Amongst others Penydarren, 
Hirwaun, Golynos, Varteg and Pentwyn ironworks closed in the 1860s while the 
Abersychan ironworks closed in 1881.13 Within the core group of ironworks the 
Clydach Company shut down their blast furnaces in the 1860s. The concern continued 
for a time as the New Clydach Sheet and Bar Iron Works but closed finally in the 
1870s.14 Clydach was always one of the most vulnerable of the study group being one 
of the smallest works and often short of capital The Sirhowy ironworks that had been 
a subsidiary of the Ebbw Vale works since its break with the Tredegar ironworks in 
1818, closed for the last time in 1881.15 However three of the core group of ironworks 
did convert to steel manufacture.
Under the dynamic leadership of Abraham Darby and Thomas Brown the 
Ebbw Vale Company expanded and acquired the Victoria works and collieries in 
1848, the Abersychan works in 1852, and the Pontypool blast furnaces and collieries 
and the Pentwyn works in 1857.16 For about ten years from 1854 the company 
experimented with steel making but eventually in 1864 the company adopted
10 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 13.
11 B. R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane, Abstract o f  British Historical Statistics, Cambridge, 1962, p 129.
12 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 15.
13 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 13; 
Laurence Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, Merton, London, 1995, p 112.
14 GRO. D.591.19.365. Sale Particulars of the New Clydach Sheet and Bar Iron Works; Riden and 
Owen, British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, p 9.
15 Geoffrey Hill and Gordon Green (compiled by), Industrial Locomotives o f  Gwent, London, 1999, pp 
85-6.
16 John Lloyd, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Iron Works (1760-1840), London, 1906, p 
156; Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 106; B. Caswell, J. Gaydon, M. Warender, 
(edited and compiled), Ebbw Vale ‘The Works* 1790-2002, Ebbw Vale, 2002, pp 433-44.
200
Bessemer’s process and in the same year the company converted to joint stock status. 
By 1870 the Ebbw Vale Company was operating seven 6 ton Bessemer converters but 
it was still producing huge amounts of puddled iron having 161 puddling furnaces in 
1872. In 1873 Abraham Darby retired and the company was reconstituted into the 
Ebbw Vale Iron and Coal Company (Ltd). The production of steel was growing at 
Ebbw Vale such that by 1878 the company was making 1,200 tons of steel rails each 
week.17 The Ebbw Vale Company had been one of the leading British concerns in 
steel making developments, so much so that the recently formed Iron and Steel 
Institute of Great Britain paid a visit to Ebbw Vale in September 1870 to view the new 
processes; Mr Bessemer was present.18
The Blaenavon ironworks opened their new forge in 1859 and the new mill 
was completed in the following year. The company also built three new blast furnaces 
in the late 1860s. About six years after the company converted to limited company 
status it was forced into liquidation in 1878 following the failure of its bankers, the 
West of England Bank. By this time the company had already invested in two steel 
converters and fortunately a new company was formed such that by 1881 there were 
five furnaces in blast.19
Like the Ebbw Vale works the Blaenavon ironworks also made a valuable 
contribution to the development of steel manufacturing. In 1878 Percy Carlyle 
Gilchrist and his cousin, Sidney Gilchrist Thomas invented a process that made it 
possible to produce phosphorous free steel. Prior to this invention iron made from ores 
that had a phosphorus content could not be used in Bessemer converters to make steel.
17 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, pp 107-8.
18 Monmouthshire Merlin, 17 September 1870, The Iron and Steel Institute of Great Britain, Excursion 
to the Ebbw Vale Works.
19 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 123.
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Following this invention a much greater range of iron ores could be used in steel
0 (\manufacture.
The last works of the group to enter the steel market was the Tredegar 
Company. Samuel Homfray II who had dominated the scene at Tredegar for more 
than forty years had relinquished his share in the partnership by 186221 and retired to 
his Glen Usk estate near Newport. By 1867 the Homfray family had sold their 
interests in the company22 and eventually the new owners looked towards steel 
manufacture. A Bessemer plant was erected and the first steel ingots were rolled in 
August 1882 followed by the first steel rails in September of the same year.
The dependency on key industrialists such as the Harfords and the Darbys at 
Ebbw Vale, the Homfrays at Tredegar and the Hills at Blaenavon is no better 
illustrated than in the case of the Nantyglo works. It has been demonstrated that under 
the leadership of the Baileys this works was the most successful of the core group of 
ironworks for many years. Iron production continued at Nantyglo and Beaufort in the 
1850s and 1860s but in the late 1860s it became clear that the Bailey family wished to 
retire from the business.24 Sir Joseph Bailey died in 1858 but the company continued 
as J. and C. Bailey and although day-to-day management of the works had been 
passed onto the next generation of Baileys,25 Crawshay Bailey retained financial 
control. Finally, in March 1871, it was announced that the company was to be sold, 
the reason offered being Crawshay’s advanced age. In July of the same year it was 
announced that a company was being set up to acquire the works and mineral estates
20 Harris, The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, p 76; Hill & Green, Industrial Locomotives o f  Gwent, p 
53.
21 David Morris, The History of Tredegar From the Beginning of the Iron Works up to the present day, 
(Winning entry in the Eisteddfod of the Cymrodorion of Tredegar in 1862), p 20.
22 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 81.
23 Monmouthshire Merlin, 25 August 1882, Tredegar, Commencement of steel making, 8 September 
1882, Tredegar, The Works, First rolling of steel rails.
24 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 130.
25 Monmouthshire Merlin, 22 July 1853.
26 Monmouthshire Merlin, 31 March 1871, Nantyglo.
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of the Nantyglo and Beaufort concerns and those of the Blaina Iron and Coal
Company Limited that included the ironworks at Blaina, Cwm Celyn and Coldbrook
Vale. £650,000 was to be paid for the properties.27 The new company, The Nantyglo 
and Blaina Iron Works Company (Limited) ran the Beaufort and Nantyglo ironworks 
for a few years but closed the Beaufort works in 1783 and the Nantyglo works the 
following year.28
In late October 1871 Crawshay Bailey, then aged 82, received a formal 
presentation of an elegantly bound Bible on his retirement from the proprietorship of 
the Nantyglo and Beaufort ironworks, the address commenced as follows:
We address you on the present occasion with mingled feelings of 
pleasure and regret. For many years we have enjoyed the privilege 
of being employed by you, and the severing of such relationship is 
to us a cause of painful regret. We remember with delight the
confidence and good fellowship that invariably existed between
you and your workmen however critical the times, however dark 
the horizon, unity and peace prevailed. We do not take absolute 
credit to ourselves for this important fact, but attribute much of our 
success to your firm, judicious, and skilful management.
Crawshay Bailey did not live to see the demise of his enterprise as he died a few 
months later.30 Crawshay’s great ironworks is shown in Illustration 4 on the next page.
In this study the partnership was deemed the most suitable capital structure for 
iron manufacturing companies in the first half of the nineteenth century but the
27 Monmouthshire Merlin, 28 July 1871, The Nantyglo Iron Works.
28 Ince, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, p 130.
29 Monmouthshire Merlin, 3 November 1871, Presentation to Mr. C. Bailey, Senior.
30 Monmouthshire Merlin, 12 January 1872, Death of Mr. Crawshay Bailey.
203
Illustration 4 A view  o f  the N antyglo ironworks c. 1830.
Source. South Wales Illustrated in a Series o f  Views, London. (No date or author supplied). 
The engraving is adjacent to page 133 o f  the book and was engraved by S. Lacey from a 
drawing by H. Gastineau with colouring added later.
situation was changing in the second half o f the century. The amount o f capital needed 
for the new steel making processes was such that the joint stock company structure 
was becoming more appropriate and in South East Wales only the two major Merthyr 
iron companies, Cyfarthfa and Dowlais had the financial resources to resist the trend. 
These two companies did not become limited liability companies until 1890 and 1899 
respectively31 and in the case of the Cyfarthfa Company it was the immense cost o f 
introducing steel manufacture in the 1880s that led the partners to convert to limited 
company status. The Dowlais Company however had rivalled the Ebbw Vale 
Company in its early experiments and adoption o f steel manufacturing processes and
31 Atkinson and Baber, The Growth and D ecline o f  the South Wales Iron Industry 1760-1880, p 63.
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had six Bessemer converters by 187032 and in the following year the company was
•  •  •  l " !making steel from Siemens-Martin open-hearth fiimaces in addition.
While the steel industry was the successor to the iron industry in the study 
area, in South East Wales and in other districts of Britain, and the tinplate industry 
was expanding, the sale coal industry was becoming the dominant industry in the 
coalfields. This industry was expanding rapidly in the second half of the nineteenth 
century such that in just four years from 1871 to 1875 the number of coalmines in 
Britain increased from 2,885 to 3,933 and in South Wales in the same period from 299 
to 415.34
32 Birch, The Economic History o f  the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784-1879, pp 170-1.
33 John A. Owen, A Short History o f Dowlais Ironworks, Merthyr Tydfil, 1972, p 44.
34 Monmouthshire Merlin, 8 September 1882, Progress of the Coal Trade.
205
Bibliography.
Original sources - documents.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 129, Lease, 20 March 1813.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 146, Deed of Assignment of Sirhowy Iron 
Works to the Harford Company, 14 November 1822.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 149, 1 December 1820, Deed to secure 
£30,000.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 173, 15 May 1829 and Document 181, 23 
March 1837, Mortgage debt with J. and C. Bailey.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 185, 27 January 1826, further legal charge to 
secure £20,000 from William Crawshay on the security of properties.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 186, 28 September 1825, Loan of £14,000
from Jones, Jones and Davies, Abergavenny and Document 188, 1 May 1823, 
Loan of £6,000, from the same bank.
Ebbw Vale Works Archive, Document 225, 11 November 1845, Ebbw Vale and 
Sirhowy ironworks now in the ownership of the Darby partnership.
GRO. D.7.194. Sale document, Blaenavon ironworks, 22 November 1833.
GRO. D.7.12. Lease, Thomas Hill, Samuel Hopkins and Joseph Bailey, Matthew 
Wayne, 25 March 1811.
GRO. D.7.15. Lease, Earl of Abergavenny and Hill, Hopkins and Platt, 30 November 
1789.
GRO. D.7.213. Marquis of Abergavenny and Nantyglo Company.
GRO. D.43.6328. Sale particulars of Rumney Iron Works and estates, 17 July 1835.
GRO. D.43 M250 (4801). 5 June 1772, Articles of Partnership Crawshay & Moser.
206
GRO. D.397.20. 19 November 1825, Lease, J. and C. Bailey to Leah Needham 
(widow) of Beaufort Iron Works.
GRO. D.397.834. 4 July 1849, Lease of mineral land. J. and C. Bailey to Robert 
Cruttwell and others.
GRO. D.397.916. Abstract of the will of Frederick Levick of Wain Wem Co. 
Monmouth, 25 September 1855.
GRO. D.397.917. Deed of Partnership, 14 May 1846, Blaina and Cwm Celyn 
ironworks.
GRO. D.397.1074. Document showing the co-partners of Beaufort Ironworks, 1 May 
1824.
GRO. D.397.1659/1660. Farmlands, cottages etc. leased by J. and C. Bailey.
GRO. D.397.1664. Lease, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 16 October 1779.
GRO. D.397.1667. Will of Edward Kendall, 16 December 1793.
GRO. D.397.1669. Leases, Duke of Beaufort and Messrs. Kendall, 28 December 
1801.
GRO. D.397.1670. Will of Jonathan Kendall, 10 April 1805.
GRO. D.397.1671. Deed of Co-partnership between Messrs. Kendall and Bevan, 12 
August 1816.
GRO. D.397.1675/9. Documents showing the co-partners of Beaufort Ironworks.
GRO. D.397.1677. Letter to C. Bailey re. Valuation of Beaufort ironworks, 1832.
GRO. D.397.1679. Sale of Beaufort Ironworks to J. and C. Bailey, 17 January 1833.
GRO. D.454.939. Correspondence and notes, accounts etc. associated with 
Abersychan Ironworks especially galeages, 1843-1850.
GRO. D.591.3.217. Articles of Partnership, Blaenavon, 1822.
207
GRO. D.591.19.384. Particulars of freehold and leasehold estate comprising the 
Clydach Iron Works, South Wales, 17 July 1833.
GRO. D.591.23.46. Clydach Ironworks, 19 January 1832.
GRO. D.591.23.109. Will of Samuel Hopkins of Blaenavon, 13 April 1813.
GRO. D.749.508. Sirhowy and Ebbw Vale Auction Particulars, 18 April 1844.
GRO. D.751.295. Will of Thomas Hill. Will proved in London, 2 June 1825.
GRO. D.751.356. The Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company Minute Book.
GRO. D.917.316. Homfray Partnership documents, 15 December 1824.
GRO. D.2472.1. Ebbw Vale Memorandum Book 1796-1819.
GRO. D.2472.2. Ebbw Vale Letter Book 1824-1827.
GRO. D.2472.3. Ebbw Vale Company Journal 1791-6.
GRO. D.2472.4. Ebbw Vale Company Journal 1814-15.
NLW. Maybery MSS, Letter from Robert Thompson (Abbey Tintem Works) to 
Walter Powell solicitor (Brecon), 27 November 1810.
NLW. Maybery MSS 348, April 1841, Clydach Ironworks Patent.
NLW. Maybery MSS 363, Clydach Iron Company, Year ending 31 March 1824.
NLW. Maybery MSS 3421-2, Make reports at Clydach Ironworks May/June 1825.
NLW. Maybery MSS 3431/3432, 18 June 1825.
Newport Library, pqm 330 012, Samuel Rogers, Advertisement for Genuine 
Westphalian Essence prepared by Samuel Rogers, Newport, 1815.
Newport Library, qm 330 672, Letter from S. Rogers to Thomas Brown, Cwm Celyn 
ironworks, 20 October 1838.
Newport Library, pm 425.3 625.1, Memorandum relative to a Magnificent Toll-free 
Stone Bridge across the River Severn between The New Passage in 
Gloucestershire and The Black-Rock in Monmouthshire, Abergavenny, 1845.
208
Newport Library, M l60 665.7, S. B. Rogers, Mineral and Metallurgical Chemist, 
Nantyglo, A Letter to the Coal Owners and Workers o f Coal Mines in 
Monmouthshire, and certain parts o f Glamorganshire and to the Directors and 
Shareholders o f Gas Light Establishments, situate on a route extending from 
Cardiff to London, via Gloster, etc. (and others) On a new mode o f Supplying 
London, and other populous places, -and also, the “Great Western ” and other 
railway companies with GAS.
Newport Library, qm 330 672, Samuel Baldwin Rogers, Outline o f a NEW and 
exceedingly beneficial SYSTEM OF COMMERCE, etc., to be established 
generally throughout the United Kingdom, under legal, and i f  possible, Royal 
authority., Nantyglo, 14 October 1848.
Newport Library, px M280 672, Particulars of the sale of the Ebbw Vale and Sirhowy 
Ironworks, 1844.
Newspapers
Monmouthshire Merlin, published from 1829.
Monmouthshire Beacon, published from 1837.
Other original sources.
Enumerators’ returns for the 1841 and 1851 censuses.
Supplement to the Forty-fifth Annual Report o f  the Registrar-General o f  Births,
Deaths and Marriages in England, London, 1885, pp iv, LXXXIV& LXXXV.
Children’s Employment Commission 1842.
Maps.
Caiy, John, Map of Monmouthshire, in Richard Gough, Brittannia. Volume 3, 1806.
Kitchin, Thomas, A New Map of Glamorganshire, c. 1760s.
Kitchin, Thomas, Map of Monmouthshire, 1748.
209
Priyeane, John, Map of the Ironworks and Collieries in the Counties of Monmouth
and Glamorgan, 1843.
Smith, C., A New Map of the County of Monmouth, 6 January 1804.
Ordnance Survey map of the Tredegar area, 1878.
Ordnance Survey map of Ebbw Vale, 1880.
Ordnance Survey map of Beaufort Iron Works, 1880.
Ordnance Survey map of Sirhowy Iron Works, 1879.
Ordnance Survey maps of Nantyglo area, 1880 and 1881.
Published works.
Addis, John P., The Crawshay Dynasty, Cardiff, 1957.
Addis, John, Into the Millennium: A Brief Guide & Historical Notes o f The 
Community & Outlying Districts o f Crickhowell, 2001.
Atkinson, Michael and Baber, Colin, The Growth and Decline o f the South Wales Iron 
Industry 1760-1880: An Industrial History, Cardiff, 1987.
Barber, Chris, Eastern Valley, The Story o f Torfaen, Llanfoist, 1999.
Barber, Chris, Exploring Blaenavon Industrial Landscape World Heritage Site, 
Llanfoist, Abergavenny, 2002.
Birch, Alan, The Economic History o f the British Iron and Steel Industry 1784-1879, 
London, 1967.
Bradney, Sir Joseph, A History o f Monmouthshire, Volume 1 Part 2b, The Hundred o f  
Abergavenny (Part 2), London, 1992, (published originally in 1907).
Bradney, Sir Joseph, A History o f Monmouthshire, Volume 5, The Hundred o f 
Newport, Madeleine Gray (ed.), Cardiff and Aberystwyth, 1993.
Byles, Aubrey, The History o f the Monmouthshire Railway and Canal Company, 
Cwmbran, 1982.
210
Carter, Harold and Wheatley, Sandra, Merthyr Tydfil in 1851, Cardiff, 1982.
Caswell, B., Gaydon, J., Warrender, M. (edited and compiled.), Ebbw Vale ‘The 
Works ’ 1790-2002, Ebbw Vale, 2002.
Clark, Arthur, The Story o f Monmouthshire, Volume 2, Monmouth, 1979.
Cleere, Henry and Crossley, David, The Iron Industry o f the Weald, Leicester, 1985.
Coxe, William, An Historical Tour in Monmouthshire, London, 1801.
Crouzet, Francois, The First Industrialists, Cambridge, 1985.
Deane, Phyillis and Cole, W. A., British Economic Growth 1688-1959, Cambridge, 
1967.
Dodgshon, R. A. and Butlin, R. A., An Historical Geography o f England and Wales, 
London, 1978.
Elliott, John, The Industrial Development o f  the Ebbw Valleys, 1780-1914, Cardiff 
2004.
Elsas, Madeleine (ed.), Iron in the Making: Dowlais Iron Company Letters 1782- 
1860, Glamorgan County Council, 1960.
Evans, Chris (Calendared by), The Letterbook o f Richard Crawshay 1788-1797, 
Cardiff, 1990.
Evans, Chris, ‘The Labyrinth o f Flames * Work and social conflict in early industrial 
Merthyr, Cardiff, 1993.
Evans, Eric J., The Forging o f the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain 1783-1870, 
Harlow, Essex, 2001.
Evans, Rev. J. and Britton, John, A Topographical and Historical Description o f the 
County o f Monmouth, London, 1807.
Flinn, M. W., British Population Growth 1700-1850, London and Basingstoke, 1970.
211
Gauldie, Enid, Cruel Habitations: A History o f Working-Class Housing 1780-1918, 
New York, 1974.
Gray-Jones, Arthur, A History o f Ebbw Vale, Risca, Monmouthshire, 1970.
Harris, J. R., The British Iron Industry 1700-1850, Basingstoke and London, 1988.
Hill, Geoffrey and Green, Gordon, Industrial Locomotives o f Gwent, London, 1999.
Hudson, Pat, The Industrial Revolution, London, 1992.
Ince, Laurence, The South Wales Iron Industry 1750-1885, Merton, 1993.
Ince, Laurence, Neath Abbey and the Industrial Revolution, Stroud, 2001.
John, A. H., The Industrial Development o f South Wales 1750-1850, Cardiff, 1950.
Jones, David J. V., Before Rebecca: Popular Protests in Wales 1793-1835, London, 
1973.
Jones, Edmund, The History o f Aberystruth, 1779, Facsimile edition, J. E. Owen (ed.), 
1988.
Jones, Oliver, The Early Days o f Sirhowy and Tredegar, Tredegar, 1969.
Laun, John van, The Clydach Gorge, Abergavenny, 1979.
Lloyd, John, The Early History o f the Old South Wales Ironworks (1760-1840), 
London, 1906.
Lowe, J. B., Welsh Industrial Workers Housing 1775-1875, Cardiff 1977.
Mitchell B. R. and Deane, Phyllis, Abstract o f British Historical Statistics,
Cambridge, 1962.
Mushet, David, Papers on Iron and Steel, Practical and Experimental, London, 1840.
Mushet, David, Report on Victoria Iron Works & Mining Grounds, Bath, 1841.
Newman, John, The Buildings o f Wales Gwent/Monmouthshire, New Haven and 
London, 2000.
Osborn, Fred. M., The Story o f the Mushets, London et al, 1952.
212
Owen, John A. The History o f the Dowlais Iron Works, 1790-1970, Risca, Newport,
1977.
Owen, John A., A Short History o f Dowlais Ironworks, Merthyr Tydfil, 1972.
Percy, John, Metallurgy: Iron and Steel, London, 1864.
Phillips, E., Pioneers o f the Welsh Coalfield, Cardiff, 1925.
Powell, Evan, History o f Tredegar (Subject of a competition at Tredegar Chair 
Eisteddfod, 25 February 1884), Newport, 1902.
Pike, E. Royston, Human Documents o f the Industrial Revolution in Britain, London, 
1966.
Riden, Philip and Owen, John G., British Blast Furnace Statistics 1790-1980, Cardiff 
1995.
Riden, Philip, Summary Census Statistics for South East Wales 1801-51, Cardiff
1979.
Scandrett, W., Old Tredegar Volume 7, Newport, 1990.
Scrivenor, H., History o f the Iron Trade, London, 1854.
Smiles, Samuel, Industrial Biography: Iron Workers and Tool Makers, London, 1884. 
Trinder, Barrie, The Darbys o f Coalbrookdale, Chichester, 1974.
Trinder, Barrie, The Industrial Revolution in Shropshire, Chichester, 2000.
Truran, William, The Iron Manufacture o f Great Britain, London, 1855.
von Tunzelman, G. N., Steam Power and British Industrialisation to 1860, Oxford,
1978.
Ward, J. T., The Factory System, Newton Abbot, 1970.
Wilkins, Charles, The History o f the Iron, Steel, Tinplate and Other Trades o f Wales, 
Merthyr Tydfil, 1903.
Williams, David, John Frost: A Study in Chartism, Cardiff, 1939.
213
Williams, J., Digest o f Welsh Statistics, Population 1, Cardiff, 1985.
Famous People o f Blaenau Gwent, Blaenau Gwent Borough Council, 1989.
South Wales Illustrated in a Series o f Views, London. (Published by Jones & Co. No
date or author supplied)
Articles and essays in journals and published works.
Allen, Robert. C., ‘Agriculture during the industrial revolution’, in Roderick Floud
and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modern Britain, 
Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Ball, F. J., ‘Housing and the Industrial Revolution in Ebbw Vale’ in Presenting
Monmouthshire, The Journal o f  the Monmouthshire Local History Council, 
No. 10, (Autumn 1960).
Bruland, Kristine, ‘Industrialisation and technological change’, in Roderick Floud and 
Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modern Britain, 
Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Burt, Roger, ‘The extractive industries’, in Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), 
The Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume 1 
Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Colebrook, Kim, ‘A History of the British Ironworks, Abersychan’, Gwent Local 
History Journal, Volume 54.
Evans, Chris, ‘Global Commerce and Industrial Organisation in an Eighteenth
Century Welsh Enterprise: The Melingriffith Company’, Welsh Historical 
Review No. 20, (2000-01).
Evans, Chris and Jackson, Owen and Ryden, Goran, ‘Baltic iron and the British iron 
industry in the eighteenth century’, Economic History Review, LV, 4 (2002).
214
Eyles, Joan M., ‘William Smith, Richard Trevithick and Samuel Homfray: Their 
Correspondence on Steam Engines, 1804-1806’, Transactions o f the 
Newcomen Society, Volume XLIII, (1970-71).
Gant, R. L., ‘Socio-Economic Structure in South-East Monmouthshire’ in Presenting 
Monmouthshire, The Journal o f Monmouthshire Local History Council, No. 3 3 
(Spring 1972).
Grey-Davies, T. G., ‘Iron-Bottom Rogers’ in Presenting Monmouthshire, The Journal 
o f Monmouthshire Local History Council, No. 12 (Autumn 1961).
Harley, C. Knick, ‘Trade: discovery, mercantilism and technology’, in Roderick Floud 
and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modern Britain, 
Volume I  Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Hilling, John B., ‘Britain’s First Planned Industrial Town? The Development of 
Tredegar, 1800-1820’, Gwent Local History, Journal o f the Gwent Local 
History Council, No. 94 (Spring 2003).
Hudson, Pat, ‘Industrial organisation and structure’, in Roderick Floud and Paul
Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, Volume 
1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Jones, Oliver, ‘The Sirhowy-Ebbw Vale Tunnel’ in Presenting Monmouthshire, The 
Journal o f Monmouthshire Local History Council, No. 31, (Spring 1971).
Knight, Jeremy, ‘The Blaenavon Iron and Coal Company, 1836-1864: A Victorian
Joint-Stock Venture’, Bulletin o f the Board o f Celtic Studies 1980, Volume 28, 
part 4 (May 1980).
Lowe, Jeremy, ‘Industrial Houses and Settlement Patterns at Nantyglo 1811-1845’
The Monmouthshire Antiquary, Volume 111 Parts 3 & 4, 1977.
215
Matthews, M. D., ‘Small and medium enterprise in the eighteenth century: financing 
local enterprise in south-east Wales’, National Library o f Wales Journal, 32:4 
(2002).
Minchinton, W. E., ‘Brecknock and the Industrialization of South Wales’, (ed.) D. J. 
Davies, Brycheinog, Volume 7 (1961).
Mokyr, Joel, ‘Accounting for the Industrial Revolution’ in Roderick Floud and Paul 
Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modern Britain, Volume 
1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Pollard, Sidney, ‘The Genesis of the Managerial Profession: the Experience of the 
Industrial Revolution in Great Britain’, Studies in Romanticism, Volume IV 
Number 2 (Winter 1965).
Roberts, R. O., ‘Financial Developments in Early Modem Wales and the Emergence 
of the First Banks’, Welsh History Review, 16 (1993).
Schubert, H. R., ‘Extraction and Production of Metals: Iron and Steel’, in Charles
Singer, E .J. Holmyard and A. R. Hall (eds.), A History o f Technology Volume 
IV The Industrial Revolution c.1750-1850, Oxford, 1958.
Sullivan, K., ‘”The biggest room in Merthyr”. Working class housing in Dowlais, 
1850-1914’, Welsh History Review, 17(1994).
Voth, Hans-Joachim, ‘Living standards and the urban environment’, Roderick Floud 
and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modem Britain, 
Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
Wrigley, E. A., ‘British Population during the ‘long’ eighteenth century’, in Roderick 
Floud and Paul Johnson (eds.), The Cambridge Economic History o f Modern 
Britain, Volume 1 Industrialisation, 1700-1860, Cambridge, 2004.
216
‘A List of the Proprietors and Committee of the Monmouthshire Canal Navigation’, 
Reginald Nichols (ed.), Monmouthshire Medley, Volume 3, Pontypool, 1978.
Theses and unpublished works.
Ball, F. J., Essays on the History of Ebbw Vale. Volume 1 Industrialisation, Ebbw 
Vale, 1971, (unpublished).
Ball, F. J., Glyn Ebwy to Ebbw Vale, written in the 1950s, (unpublished).
Davies, John Gwyn, ‘Industrial Society in North-West Monmouthshire 1750-1851’ -  
a thesis presented to the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, Ph.D.
1980.
Evans, P. W., ‘The History of Industrial Relations in the South Wales Coal Industry to 
1912’- a thesis presented to the University of Wales, Ph.D. 1955.
James, David, History of Nantyglo and Blaina, Gwent County Library, Approximately 
1950 (unpublished).
Morris, David, The History of Tredegar from the Beginning of the Iron Works up to 
present day, (unpublished), Winning entry in the Eisteddfod of the 
Cymrodorion of Tredegar in 1862.
217
